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Iraq: The Defection of Husayn Kamil

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Iraq: The Defection of Husayn Kamil

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Developments Leading to Defections Viewed

95LH0266A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 21 Aug 95 pp 28-29

[Report by Dr. Su'ad al-Sabah]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last June, the Iraqi al-Dulaym tribes rebelled against the authority in Baghdad and entered a bloody confrontation with it. The repercussions of this confrontation are still reverberating. According to some reports, some active members of these tribes, which are influential in Iraqi Sunni circles, have recently taken refuge in Syria. They have established an opposition organization and concluded an alliance with leaders of the Iranian-supported Shiite opposition. The al-Dulaym tribes' split with the authority and the previous tension between the regime and other Sunni tribes, led by al-Juburi tribe, have deprived the Iraqi regime of one of its most important pillars for consolidating its authority in a country consisting of different nationalities with conflicting interests. The regime has depended on the support of the central tribes and clans. Their members have constituted the backbone of the state's sensitive institutions, particularly the armed forces with their various branches and the security and intelligence services.

This gradual decrease in loyalty to the ruling Ba'thist regime, after suspicion replaced confidence in the existing alliance between the authority and the central tribes, had only one meaning: increasing the authority's isolation. The regime concentrated power and hegemony in the Tikrit tribe, which became its basis and throbbing heart. It concentrated power among the president's closest relatives, such as brothers, sons, cousins, and son-in-laws, but the dilapidating virus that hit the regime's outer shell was bound to penetrate to the bone, after competition emerged and personal interests destroyed family ties. The sons formed a separate bloc. They thought that their uncles and the other relatives were only after power and that the only way to deter them was by the sword. Thus, the relatives began falling from their positions one after the other—Irshad Yasin, the president's son-in-law, and Watban al-Hasan, the president's half brother. Based on the history of the Iraqi Ba'thist regime, which has been known for its cruelty and the absence of any compassion and respect for blood ties, the dismissal from a position and even imprisonment were considered a blessing. Perhaps the world has not forgotten how Saddam Husayn got rid of 'Adnan Khayrallah Talfah, his cousin and brother-in-law, by arranging his death in an airplane crash.

An exciting development has recently taken place in Iraq. Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil, the man primarily responsible for the Iraqi non-conventional weapons' programs, together with his brother Saddam, their wives, the president's daughters Raghad and Rana, and a number of officers and escorts, have defected to Jordan. This development offers another solid proof that the ruling regime in Baghdad is collapsing.

Several reasons have been given for the defection. Some people think that the defectors sensed that their lives would be in danger if they stayed in Baghdad. Others think that they realized that the president intended to launch another foreign adventure because he had lost hope that the United Nations would change its position on economic sanctions. So they defected to save themselves from an inevitable new Iraqi suicidal confrontation with the international community. Perhaps there is some truth in both possibilities, but what is evident and most important is that the defection of Iraqi figures of such importance, influence, and closeness to the center of power—even if we disregard the fact that the president's daughters were among the defectors—provides the strongest indication that the ship of the Ba'thist rule is being lashed by storms, which will inevitably sink it soon.

Plot Behind Defection Described

95AE0064A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 25 Aug 95 pp 22-23

[Article by Na'il Mukhaybir: "Secrets of U.S.-Regional Contacts To Eliminate Iraqi Regime; French Sources: Husayn Kamil's Defection Foiled U.S. Scheme To Topple Saddam; Tehran Entered Into Truce With Baghdad To Help It Confront U.S. Scheme; Damascus, Amman, and Paris 'Sensed' U.S. Scheme but Were Not Familiar With Its Particulars; Washington's Endeavor for Reconciliation Among Kurds Is Within Context of Preparing Climate for Coup"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris—Regardless of how contradictory are the stories and opinions on the defection of General Husayn Kamil Hasan, his brother Saddam, President Saddam Husayn's two daughters, and a number of officers, a former French official who visited Baghdad recently is convinced that what is more important is the silent struggle taking place at the regional level over the Iraqi regime's future.

This official believes that several governments adjacent to Iraq want to seize the Iraqi card as a result of the leaked reports about the presence of a plan to topple Saddam. According to the official, there is a race in which several capitals, namely Amman, Damascus, Ankara, and Tehran, are involved. Husayn Kamil Hasan's defection is not accidental, according to this official. Even though the timing is due to the accelerated developments in Baghdad, the defection has

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come at the proper time and after preparation that lasted several months and that sought to speed up the overthrow of Saddam before some capitals get all the cards necessary to play a role in the regional arena through Iraq.

Paris had the feeling that Washington was preparing for some action, but French officials did not know the particulars. However, they felt that the U.S. Administration was planning to do something in the wake of discussions between the two capitals on lifting the blockade imposed on Iraq. At the beginning of this year, France, in cooperation with Russia, was preparing for a draft resolution to call for lifting the blockade gradually. Washington intervened to ask Paris to abandon the plan temporarily. Washington said that it was not against lifting the blockade but that there were new developments in the Iraqi arena, that they had to be taken into consideration before the blockade issue could be discussed, and that they were connected with the Iraqi regime's future.

Robert Pelletreau arrived in Paris at the time to explain to the French the background of the U.S. position, pointing out that there were internal changes in Baghdad connected with the power structure and mechanism of government, that Saddam Husayn had begun to lose his cards after having lost his credibility among high-ranking officers, and that, moreover, there was discontent among some pro-regime tribes.

French Mediation Suspended

Paris was convinced of Pelletreau's explanations. It asserted that it would temporarily suspend its activities on lifting the blockade and that it wanted to maintain coordination with Washington. Sami 'Abd-al-Rahman, a high-ranking official working for Mas'ud al-Barzani, head of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan [DPK], asserts that on the advice of the United States, France suspended its mediation to settle inter-Kurdish disputes between the DPK and the Union Party, led by Jalal al-Talabani. Paris was supposed to set a date for signing the accord to end the fighting in Iraq's Kurdistan. But the French authorities set no date, keeping in mind that Mas'ud al-Barzani went to Tehran to wait for the signal from France to go to Paris for the signing.

Paris was not the only one that knew of what was being planned in Washington. Information in this connection also reached Damascus and Tehran. Meanwhile, the U.S. Administration notified Ankara that its pressure on the Kurds, especially its cooperation with al-Barzani to encourage him to hold dialogue with Baghdad, had to be stopped. It is worth noting that Ankara had been preparing for an accord to cooperate with Al-Barzani and to supply him with more weapons, provided that he restored contacts with Baghdad. Al-Barzani also received a promise from Ankara for support against the al-Talabani-led Union Party. Had not the United States intervened, the Turkish plan would have succeeded.

The purpose of Washington's pressure on Turkey and France in connection with the Kurdistan front was to gain full control of this card within the framework of a broader scheme. The U.S. Administration was aware of al-Barzani's relations with Baghdad and of his position which called for reopening dialogue with the Iraqi regime. The DPK chairman insisted in all talks with the Union Party on holding elections in Kurdistan Province, keeping in mind that Jalal al-Talabani demanded postponement of the elections for a while until this regime's future becomes clear. Al-Talabani was aware of what was going on in Washington and he tried to convey the message to al-Barzani, but to no avail. Washington even believes that al-Barzani conveyed messages to Saddam warning him of what was being readied against him.

Saddam Confronts

As of that time, Saddam started preparing to confront Washington's moves. According to Kurdish sources, Saddam sent, as part of those preparations, Dr. Mukarram al-Talabani to Iraq's Kurdistan to meet with Jalal al-Talabani and al-Barzani. He met the former, who delivered to him conditions for reopening dialogue with the Iraqi regime that could not be accepted by Baghdad. The latter refused to meet with Dr. al-Talabani for reasons believed to have been no more than a maneuver so the level of his relations with Baghdad would not be exposed and so he would not lose all credibility with Washington, which had initiated contacts with the Kurds to hold a reconciliation conference under its auspices.

Damascus was also aware of what was going on, even though it did not have details on the issue. Damascus' fear is that it will be neutralized in connection with the Iraqi arena as part of what can be called a regional reorganization in light of the peace negotiations with Israel. This is why Syria started to move in the direction of forming what Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam has called an "alternative to the National Congress," which includes the opposition and the Iraqi Kurdistan Front.

The idea of forming an alternative emanating from Damascus did actually begin to take shape rapidly and along a line parallel to the U.S. movement, about which information was being delivered to Damascus via special Kurdish and Jordanian channels. A meeting was held with Baqir al-Hakim, president of the Supreme Islamic Revolution Council, and Damascus discussed with him the question of moving the opposition to

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Damascus permanently. 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam met with the Islamic al-Da'wah [Call] Party leadership. PASDAR, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard publication, has reported that the Supreme Council was going to move from Tehran to Damascus. Reports covering this development have said that there are problems between the Iraqi Shi'ite opposition and Tehran and that the latter has closed an opposition camp near the border. It is believed in this regard that Tehran, which has not terminated its Iraqi ambitions, has decided to confront the U.S. scheme and has actually begun to consider cooperation with Saddam, even though this tendency is faced with difficulties due to each side's conditions. Both Baghdad and Tehran wish to cooperate, but each according to its own conditions and private interests and from a position of power. It is said in this regard that as a gesture of goodwill, Iraq has closed the Mojahed-e Khalq camp that is adjacent to the border in Diyala Governorate in return for Tehran's closure of an Iraqi opposition camp near Iran's al-Huwayzah marshlands, which are adjacent to the Iraq's southern border.

Uniting Iraqi Opposition

To give the Syrian movement weight, President Hafiz al-Asad received Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and studied with him the possibility of holding a broad meeting with the opposition factions, especially with Major General Hasan al-Naqib, member of the Iraqi National Congress [INC] Presidential Council, and with Staff Major General Wafiq al-Samarra'i, the ex-director of Iraqi military intelligence. Even though this meeting has not taken place, the question of developing an alternative took a forward stride when Major General Hasan al-Naqib asserted that forces belonging to Mas'ud al-Barzani stormed his home in Salah-al-Din and when he accused al-Barzani of the attempt to assassinate Lieutenant General Mahdi 'Abdallah, a member of the Independent Council that is headed by al-Naqib. Al-Samarra'i has also accused al-Barzani of attempting to assassinate him. Both men have said that the INC has ended and that the opposition must be brought together within a new framework.

Amman has not been absent from what is happening, and it has been closely watching developments in the Iraqi domestic situation for some time. To a large degree, Amman has been the link between some active military commands and the United States. The fact that Jordan has no relations with the opposition and no plan to work with it does not mean, according to the official who visited Baghdad and Amman, that it is indifferent to the developments in Iraq. King Husayn is personally concerned with the Iraqi file, and he met with Husayn Kamil Hasan at the latter's request in mid-July. He also had contact with Husayn Kamil a year ago when the latter went to Amman for surgery. Two months ago, Amman began to move in the direction of certain Arab countries to open dialogue with them on Iraq's future. Even Jordanian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Karim al-Kabariti came to Paris for the same issue within the context of preparing for a two-sided initiative: one side urging Iraq to alter its regime and a second side urging the western countries to accept the idea of opening dialogue with the regime. Jordan declared that the plan was available if the parties concerned, i.e. Washington and Baghdad, agreed to it.

The fact is, according to the French official, that there is agreement between Washington and Amman that the regime can be changed only from within. Washington believes that Amman holds some keys, keeping in mind that Paris believes that Husayn Kamil Hasan, who has relations with King Husayn, is a U.S. card. Husayn Kamil was "turned around" some time ago through contacts made by experts working with the special UN commission in charge of disassembling the Iraqi armament programs. France believes that Husayn Kamil began to form a network in the military establishment within the context of a plan calling for overthrowing the regime. Amman believed, as did Washington, that conditions were ripe, especially in the wake of last May's developments and the Dulaym tribe uprising.

French sources believe that Saddam became aware of the matter and launched a campaign of liquidation and dismissals, including the dismissal of Oil Minister Jawad al-Hububi who was chairman of Matrix Shell, a British corporation that was accused in 1990 of being behind building Iraq's giant gun. Al-Hububi is a friend of Husayn Kamil Hasan's, and Hasan is the man who authored the idea of the gun and of forming the British corporation. Moreover, Saddam appointed Lieutenant General 'Amir Rashid as oil minister, attaching to his duties the Ministry of Industrial and Mineral Resources which had been headed by Husayn Kamil. 'Ali Hasan al-Majid was also dismissed from the Defense Ministry and Sultan Hashim, a professional military officer, was appointed in his place. This appointment was aimed to please the army before it was too late.

Conflict within the family reached the point where Saddam was compelled to hold a family meeting on 11 July 1995 to settle the disputes on the oil issue. Upon conclusion of the meeting, 'Udayy opened fire on his uncle Wadban at an official car park close to the meeting place. Husayn Kamil, whom 'Udayy accused of "treason" and threatened with death, witnessed this incident.

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The French official has said that even though Husayn Kamil's defection has exposed the fragile nature of the regime, it constitutes a setback to the U.S. scheme. Husayn Kamil has lost his influence and his role in this scheme, and he can be used only for some information, especially information connected with the armament programs and the government mechanism. It is difficult to rely on Hasan abroad , not only because the opposition does not trust him but also because Saddam has launched in the army a liquidation campaign which has included those previously connected with Staff Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil.

Reasons for Defection Explained

95LH0265A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 21 Aug 95 pp 26-28

[Article by Yusuf 'Uthman: "Why Has Husayn Kamil Hasan Defected; Iraqi President's Son-in-Law Feared for His Life From His Two Brothers-in-Law; Prophet's Birthday Anniversary Is Occasion for Family Picnic; United States Wants Information on Iraqi Foreign Armament Network"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no doubt that last week's most prominent Arab development was Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil Hasan's defection from Iraq, along with his brother Saddam Kamil Hasan, their two wives, and more than 20 officers. They all took asylum in Jordan, which has declared an unambiguous position welcoming all and granting the brothers Kamil the right to political asylum.

Two Perspectives

In the opinion of journalists and political observers, this development gains its importance from two perspectives: The first concerns the closeness of the relationship that binds Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to each of Husayn Kamil Hasan and Saddam Kamil Hasan. The former is the husband of Saddam's daughter Raghad and the second is the husband of his daughter Rana. This marriage relationship, plus the blood relationship that precedes it, is what gained the two men a closer position with the Iraqi president than other relatives. This relationship led to the second perspective, namely the sensitive position that Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil Hasan occupied in the Iraqi regime. For many years, he was the official in charge of the Iraqi military industrialization program. Husayn Kamil's brother was the officer in charge of the president's guard. Within these two perspectives, one must look for the reasons that led to the defection decision and to what made the two daughters and wives agree to it and insist on accompanying their husbands.

Extreme Centralism

Some observers believe that the Iraqi regime is founded on an extreme centralism embodied in President Saddam Husayn himself. This centralism is governed by suspecting and mistrusting most of those who hold sensitive responsibilities, regardless of how closely they are related to the president. This is why titles given to individuals have often been no more than formalities that give their holder no special privilege outside the president's will and his own tactics in the game of family balances. This is evidenced by the fact that the president has simply been able to get rid of Barzan al-Tikriti, his half brother. A lot was said in the media about the special relationship that tied Barzan to Saddam, about Barzan's ability to discuss matters with Saddam, and about Barzan's control of delicate security and military affairs, but Barzan ended up residing in Switzerland on a narrow mission prescribed for him by Saddam Husayn himself, who gave Barzan the title of presidential adviser. Another man viewed by observers as a strongman in the Iraqi regime because he was interior minister is Watban Husayn, Saddam Husayn's other half brother, but Saddam easily removed him from this position not long ago as part of what was reported in the media to be a struggle for power among the same family members. Those who observe developments closely believe that recently this struggle has not been within Saddam Husayn's big clan but within his own immediate family. This struggle is because his two sons, 'Udayy and Qusayy, have begun to extend their fingers to all government decisionmaking centers because their influence has been growing with the encouragement of their father, and because they are about to tighten their grip—the kind of grip which their father has in the regime—on whatever is connected with the government to serve their own interest. From this perspective, perhaps this was the first time that Husayn Kamil Hasan, the son-in-law, felt that in addition to the first authority, embodied in Saddam, there was another authority to which he had to pay homage. This new authority is embodied in 'Udayy on the one hand and in Qusayy on the other. Husayn Kamil did not exclude from his calculations that he would be done harm if he did not deal with the new givens as devotedly as he did with his father-in-law. Perhaps this is why the sister felt displeased with her two brothers' behavior toward her husband and her sister's husband. It could be that the calculation of profit and loss started from this starting point. The recollection of private memories, which everybody has had inside the regime, caused fear to overwhelm the element of reassurance and security in these people, and so they decided to defect. It would not have been easy for this man who, until the moment of his defection, seemed to be strong and influential and who enjoyed special immunity em-

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bodied in the fact that he is the president's son-in-law; it would not have been easy for this man to make the decision to defect if he had not felt great danger to his person and if his wife had also not been convinced of the presence of this danger. This means that the struggle within the same family had been surpassed and that it was settled in the interest of 'Udayy and Qusayy, the two sons. It also means that there might have been some sort of a retaliatory arrangement that caused the two sisters to act in solidarity with their husbands or to fear for them. Thus, the two sisters decided to withdraw from the father's life, knowing for sure that this was a final withdrawal and that without the father, life would be full of the ghosts and fears of prosecution and liquidation. So, the choice was not easy and the escape decision was based on evidence. A choice had to be made between immediate death and delayed death, and the option was for the delayed. This is because Husayn Kamil Hasan knows perfectly well that he owes all he has to his father-in-law. He rose from the position of a motorcycle driver in the vice president's motorcade to the personality most closely associated with the president and most influential in the regime. Perhaps within himself, Husayn Hasan would have been prepared to submit to the influence of brothers 'Udayy and Qusayy had he felt secure, but the regime's structure and his knowledge of the regime's anterooms caused fear to prevail in him. So he planned for his defection, and the president's trust in him helped his plan. The occasion was a scheduled official visit Husayn Kamil Hasan was to make to Bulgaria. As for taking his family along, he justified by the venerable prophet's birthday anniversary which lasted four days in Iraq. Perhaps this was not the first time in which the family accompanied him on an official visit.

Clinton's Step

It is possible that the defection of Husayn Kamil Hasan and of his brother will not have any impact on the regime in Iraq because of the government structure in which a person does not derive his influence from the position he holds but from the president who has chosen him. It is within this context that the Iraqi president decided to appoint two people to replace his son-in-law. He issued one decree appointing 'Adnan 'Abd-al-Majid Jasim minister of industry and minerals and another decree appointing Staff Major General 'Amir Rashid al-'Ubayd acting chairman of the Military Industrialization Authority. Perhaps there could be a foreign impact on the regime as a consequence of this defection. The signs of this impact have appeared through the U.S. interest, considering that U.S. President Bill Clinton has declared Washington's readiness to defend Amman if it is subjected to a threat from Baghdad. Thus, he preempted any Iraqi contemplation of the use of force or pressure to bring back the defectors. It is as if with this announcement, the White House underlined its own protection of the defectors. This was followed by the start of contacts with the defectors. The media has reported that U.S. military experts have met with Staff Lt. Gen. Husayn Kamil Hasan. He is certainly not in a position that permits him to conceal any information, especially information connected with mass destruction weapons or information on the foreign networks that Iraq had created to develop its weapons programs, not to mention information on the Iraqi Army's weapon systems and on dimensions of the conflict between the regime and the tribes on which it had relied. Husayn Kamil Hasan will be a source that will provide accurate information on these matters in return for security for himself, his family, and his aides. He knows in advance that he will pay this tax. Moreover, Saddam Husayn himself is aware of the exorbitant cost. Consequently, he has found none other than Judas to whom to liken his son-in-law.

Regardless of how accurate, sensitive, and important is the information that Husayn Kamil Hasan will disclose, it is difficult for the United States to enter on the side of the Iraqi regime's departure. The United States will try to employ this information just to confront the campaign, part Arab and part European, to lift the sanctions against Baghdad and to prove that the U.S. analysis is the soundest. Thus, the Iraqi regime will remain—according to the outcome of the "desert storm" war as seen by the United States—capable of protecting itself from collapse and of being a U.S. card for intimidating more than one domestic and foreign circle. Perhaps the U.S. declaration President Clinton made about Washington's readiness to protect Amman revives the idea of the Iraqi regime's threat to its environment so as to further blackmail this environment politically and materially.

Fall and No Fall

To sum up, it will be easy for Saddam Husayn, who showed his bitterness when he spoke on the Iraqi television about his son-in-law's defection and accused him of treason, to surpass this internal severance. He has never cared for the departure of a person and the arrival of another. Perhaps his wound is psychological now because his two daughters took part in the defection game. As for the regime, it will become stronger and it will deal with its members more severely. Trust will be stripped away from those who remain at the core of the regime, and caution will characterize relations among all, perhaps with the exclusion of the president and his two sons. Under the umbrella of the existing state of

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alert, the regime will not fall. It is still extremely strong. The military battalions which the Iraqi president formed recently, giving them his own name, are a part of the regime's obsession with protecting itself. It is certain that if brothers Husayn Kamil Hasan and Saddam Kamil Hasan could do something, they would have done it, but the regime's grip is stronger than everybody, at least for now and under these circumstances.

May God help Iraq. Its northern part is beyond government control, as is its southern part, and all depends on an international decision led by the United States. Whatever authority the regime continues to have, it is over the central part of the valley between the Tigris and the Euphrates, where problems and clashes have abounded. The worst problem is that there is no alternative among all the opposition factions.

Paper Views Defection, Transfer of Billions

95AE0066A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 25 Aug 95 pp 15-18

[Article by Walid Abu-Zahr: "Defection File of President's Son-in-Law; Deal and Trick in Husayn Kamil's Defection Scenario; Secret of $15 Billion Which Tempted President's Son-in-Law To Seek Asylum in Jordan; 'Udayy Became Angry at Husayn for Refusing To Disclose Secrets of 'Foreign Assets;' Iraqi Oil to Haifa Terminal, Shared Equally With Israel; Objective: Surround Syria by U.S. Forces Deployed in Region"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Husayn Kamil Hasan's defection and his taking asylum in Jordan is the visible tip of the iceberg. Under the water surface, a much broader scheme is concealed, and this scheme covers the entire region. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has followed the secret details of the scheme through its correspondents in Paris, Washington, and other places knowledgeable with the issue so as to present a complete file on the development. The detailed information in some reports may sound conflicting, depending on the source's position in connection with the main event, but all reports flow into one channel, namely the "scheme" channel.

Why did Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil do it and defect to Amman? For weeks to come, this question will continue to be the most important question, perhaps even more important than the scenario whose various chapters the region will witness. Ambiguity engulfs the main reason that motivated the bright star in Baghdad's sky to abandon power, fame, and high status and to defect to the Jordanian capital, inviting an abundance of perils and attracting U.S. investigators to try to extract information from him about the gigantic Iraqi armament programs.

Is the extraordinary intelligence which led this distant cousin of the president from the bottom to the top with the speed of a rocket, making him the beloved husband of the president's eldest daughter, Raghad, also the same intelligence that has led him to abandon the boat at the right moment, just before it sinks? Or are there other considerations that have motivated him to embark on this adventure, along with his brother Colonel Saddam, who is also the husband of Rana Saddam Husayn? Or has Husayn Kamil's intelligence abandoned him this time, thus making him opt for the wrong choice?

There is no doubt that the numerous causes attributed by the international and media circles concerned to Husayn Kamil's step, which has revived in "some people" the hope of the Iraqi regime's imminent collapse, harbor within their folds the harbingers of a new confrontation with Baghdad that reminds of the Kuwait liberation war. Our information, derived from trusted sources, confirms that the real cause is something other than all that has been said and that U.S. agencies cannot claim that they have produced this scenario. The reason can be summed up in a couple words: Look for the billions. Let us begin from the start.

The start took place in al-'Awjah, a village in Tikrit, the birthplace of Husayn Kamil Hasan and of Saddam Husayn. Tikrit is also where al-Bayjat tribe, to which both men belong, lives.

Since his early youth, Husayn Kamil attracted Saddam's attention when the latter was vice president because he, Kamil, is a brilliant person and skillful interlocutor who explains his ideas well and who is a good listener. Kamil quickly became one of the aides of Shaykh Khayrallah Talfah, Saddam Husayn's maternal uncle and the father of his wife, Sajidah, when Talfah was Baghdad governor in the late 1960s. All this came about after Kamil had enlisted in the army as a noncommissioned officer. Saddam then included Kamil in his personal protection team in 1970 when he, Saddam, moved to the Revolution Command Council deputy chairman's office at the Iraqi National Assembly in Karat Marry, which is close to the presidential palace. In 1973, Saddam Husayn dispatched Kamil to enroll in a six-month military security course in the capital of Yugoslavia for training on the protection of political figures. Kamil returned to Baghdad to become a member of the second-line team protecting Vice President Saddam and he was given the rank of second lieutenant. He was then promoted to first lieutenant during the Iraq-Iran war and he became one of Saddam Husayn's main aides.

It seemed in that period that there was nothing to prevent Husayn Kamil from rising to the top, especially since

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President Saddam began to rely on his relatives increasingly. Perhaps Husayn Kamil's golden opportunity came when Saddam selected him to be a member of the team that accompanied his wife Sajidah and her daughters—Raghad, Rana, and Hala—on their trips abroad. Kamil accompanied them as the officer in charge of their protection and also because he was skillful in meeting all "family" needs. While carrying out that duty, Kamil gained the confidence of Saddam's family, in addition to the confidence of Saddam who seemed to be pinning great hopes on him and showering him with high ranks until he rose to the rank of lieutenant general.

Marriage and Confrontation

This smooth trip of advancement and promotion in practical life encountered no major obstacle until Husayn Kamil embarked on the most important step of his life, namely marriage to Raghad, Saddam's eldest daughter. It is said that Sajidah played a major role in persuading Saddam of the bridegroom's virtues whereas the marriage plan aroused the anger of Saddam's half brothers, namely Barzan, Sab'awi, and Wadban, who believed, according to tribal traditions, that one of Raghad's cousins was more entitled to marry her than the son of her father's uncle.

Initially, Saddam paid no heed to the family protests, viewing them as a tempest in a teacup and just a transient internal "displeasure, " but a sudden development a few days later touched off a large-scale dispute when the happy family was giving a big party at al-Rashid hotel in honor of the engaged couple. Wadban al-Tikriti got so angry that he opened fire in the direction of the bridegroom and his bride.

When Saddam learned of the news, he became enraged and he could not take lightly the fact that his brother's audacity would reach the point that would allow him to harass his daughter. Saddam considered this act an inexcusable insult to the president's honor. Sajidah became even angrier and more emotional and tense, and she played a significant role in inciting Saddam against his ungrateful half brothers. The fact is that Sajidah has Saddam Husayn's ear and exerts great influence on him. She is a lady with a strong personality and she knows how to impose her presence and her positions. She is also one of the Party's original "strugglers" and she took part in conveying instructions, orders, and weapons during the preparation for the 1968 revolution when Saddam was in jail.

Saddam's wrath at his half brothers reached the point where he issued decrees dismissing all of them from their positions and ousting them from whatever pertained to power and the government. Barzan, who is married to Sajidah's sister, was dismissed from his position as intelligence chief; Wadban from his position as Salah-al-Din (Tikrit) governor; and Sab'awi from the National Assembly. They were also ousted from their social positions: Barzan was ousted as head of the Arab Horseman's Club and Wadban from his position as al-Rashid Club president.

To express his resentment of his half brothers, Saddam went on the same day to the General Intelligence premises, summoned all officials there, and instructed that an investigation be launched on all allegations about the agency's excesses under Barzan's chairmanship. The fact is that Barzan had turned the intelligence agency into a gigantic agency which had its representative in every ministry, governorate, and district, a representative who was viewed as shadow minister or shadow governor. What is important is that on the following day, Saddam summoned Major General Hisham Sabah Fakhri and appointed him intelligence chief. Contrary to custom, Fakhri's appointment was announced through AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI magazine so everybody would know that Barzan had been dismissed!

After a while, emotions subsided and Sabhah Talfah, Saddam's mother, intervened to reconcile the brothers. Meanwhile, Husayn Kamil's star began to shine with his transformation from "aide" to industrialization director. Saddam instructed that restrictions on his half brothers be eased and he permitted Barzan to take care of business and commercial affairs. Barzan is the man who supervised the foundation of numerous trade establishments and the partnership in financial institutions abroad. Meanwhile, Saddam permitted Wadban to devote his time to managing his agricultural property and permitted Sab'awi to engage in non-political activities. He then permitted Barzan to be "deported" to Geneva as Iraq's UN representative there.

The important thing is that this phase was considered a new leap in Husayn Kamil's life. He had become the president's son-in-law and as military industrialization director, he was assigned to contact foreign firms to launch an ambitious plan to manufacture biological and germ weapons, missiles, and the giant gun. Kamil successfully concluded important deals with Brazilian, Argentine, British, French, German, and U.S. firms.

Those who know Husayn Kamil say that he is extremely intelligent and capable of persuasion and that he surrounded himself with a class of experts, intellectuals, and technocrats. He was able to convince Saddam Husayn to invest 5 percent the oil revenues abroad through varied international investments, following the example of Kuwait whose proceeds from foreign investments equal its oil income. The main argument Kamil used was that these sums would help the party regain

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power if a coup was staged against it. Kamil also convinced Saddam that foreign investments were important as a cover to finance deals with foreign weapons firms under the umbrella of the ban imposed on Iraq during its war with Iran.

Saddam was convinced of the idea and commissioned Husayn Kamil to implement it. He also came to view Kamil as the alternative to 'Adnan Husayn al-Hamdani, the Iraqi economy's Caesar, as 'Adnan was called when he was planning minister and director of major projects and of oil affairs.

Husayn Kamil exploited President Saddam's confidence and the full commission he gave him to set up a monstrous network of foreign contacts, extending from West Europe, to Latin America, and to Africa. He also founded establishments, corporations, and financial establishments in Germany, France, Britain, Brazil, and Argentina. Moreover, he reinforced relations with former Eastern Bloc countries and enlisted the assistance of Iraqi and foreign businessmen abroad. These corporations ended up managing enormous assets amounting to nearly $15 billion, constituting the yield from the 5 percent deducted from the oil revenues and from other transfers for military industrialization requirements. Husayn Kamil is the only one who possesses the secrets and keys to these billions and the secret numbers to the foreign deposits. This is why Saddam Husayn said that Kamil has stolen millions belonging to the people when he took asylum in Jordan!

Perhaps the disputes between 'Udayy and Husayn Kamil started at that moment. 'Udayy has become an immense business octopus, in addition to his irresistible power as the number one security official and his control of Iraq's domestic trade and of its trade with Jordan and Turkey. He has also established with Rafsanjani's son a business alliance that has enabled him to control trade with Iran.

Secret of the $15 Billion

Because 'Udayy is always looking for more, he turned his attention to the Iraqi funds employed abroad in investments about which he knew nothing and all of whose secrets were in the hands of Husayn Kamil, his brother-in-law, especially since the funds involved amounted to a stunning sum of $15 billion.

However, Husayn Kamil was careful not to disclose the secrets of these sums or the keys to reach them, relying on the president's support and on his place in the family, but 'Udayy did not despair. He began to incite his father against Kamil. Finally, he took the opportunity at a meeting to direct harsh criticism to Husayn Kamil for supporting the disclosure of secrets of the Iraqi military industry to the United Nations, accusing him of lackeyhood to the United States. Husayn Kamil waited for Saddam to defend him, but the latter did not. Saddam also remained silent when 'Abd Hamid Hamud talked to Kamil harshly. Husayn Kamil understood the message and realized that his star was on the wane, and this is why he started to think of defecting. He realized that the Iraqi arena has to be completely free for the expected successor, 'Udayy.

Kamil's fears escalated when Raghad, his wife, tried to mediate in the dispute with 'Udayy, her brother. She went to him but he flew angrily in her face, telling her, "Your husband is a thief!" She then went to Saddam, her father, to ask him to intervene, but he turned her down. The subsequent scenario of defecting and taking asylum in Amman is well-known.

Contact With Americans

The other question raised recently is: Has Washington had a role in Husayn Kamil's defection? Information available to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI indicates that Husayn Kamil began his contacts with the Americans in the second half of the 1980s, even though relations between Baghdad and Washington were good at the time, during his visits to Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina. He met several times with U.S. intelligence men. Moreover, Kamil's assistants among Arab businessmen secured for him an excellent network of contacts with the Americans.

This information says that one of the meetings with the Americans took place in Yemen, with the Yemenis thinking that they were bringing Washington's and Baghdad's viewpoints closer to each other. Similar meetings were held in East European countries in the 1990s.

There is no doubt that the Americans were able to convey a certain message to Husayn Kamil via a businessman—a message that delighted him even though it was a message to the effect that he could not be the alternative to Saddam because no leader of this regime can be an acceptable alternative. The message was also to the effect that Husayn Kamil derives his entire status from his closeness to Saddam and that if he puts distance between himself and Saddam, his status and his influence will disappear.

Reports say that this U.S. position was explicit and that Kamil cannot allege that he embarked on his step to contribute to lifting the Iraqi people's hardship. At home, he would be more capable of accomplishing this, if he wanted to.

Moreover, he cannot allege that he defected in order to work to replace the regime because his chances of doing

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it were greater at home. Furthermore, Kamil's defection and his contact with the Americans will weaken, and do not strengthen, his position at home. There is no doubt that Husayn Kamil realizes all this. However, the material inducements are greater!

Deal and Trick

Has this man's defection created all this clamor and this troop amassment, thus bringing back to mind the Gulf war climate?

Reliable sources say that two men have swallowed the U.S. bait. The first is Saddam Husayn who thought that this scenario, which took place with his knowledge, would lead to lifting the UN blockade against him when Washington realizes that it is impossible to move him from his place. The second is Husayn Kamil who was intentionally driven by Saddam Husayn and 'Udayy to defect, believing that he was fleeing with the least damage possible and with a lot of money from a sinking ship in which he has no place.

Sources confirm that Saddam Husayn was looking for a way out to enable him to provide complete information to the United Nations on the Iraqi mass destruction weapon programs, but without seeming to be making concessions to the United Nations. His purpose was to get the UN blockade against his country lifted so he would strengthen the chances of his continued stay in power and of regaining control over the south and the north.

This information was delivered to the United States by a regional party, coupled with the expression of willingness to conclude a peace accord with Israel. This message was also delivered to Israel, which found in it an opportunity to accomplish several objectives. It asked the regional party to mediate for the convocation of an Israeli-Iraqi meeting. A meeting was actually held and semi-agreement was reached by the two sides on the need to conclude peace when the UN blockade against Iraq is lifted. The Israeli side promised to help Iraq in this regard in return for an economic reward, part of which is to resume pumping Iraqi oil through Israel to the Haifa terminal, provided that Israel get one half the revenues.

Israel also promised to cooperate with the United States to find a solution to the UN sanctions issue. U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials met and developed a solution. This solution was to exploit Husayn Kamil, the "man" who controls the Iraqi military industry secrets, and to create circumstances that encourage his defection from his country. Saddam Husayn's role was to create a justification for Iraq to disclose its military secrets so that the "defector" will not do the disclosing exclusively. The sources point out that this part of the picture is the part that is evident to Saddam's eyes, and it reminds of the female U.S. ambassador's trick [prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait]—a trick which Saddam considered a go-ahead signal to invade Iraq. In the concealed part of the picture, there is agreement between Israel and the United States to escalate issues in Iraq and to exploit them to land in the region U.S. forces that are likely to pose a threat to Syria's rear, considering that Syria will be surrounded by Israel and by U.S. forces, including the forces deployed in Israeli ports. These are the forces that were sent on the pretext of preventing Saddam from embarking on any new military adventure.

According to the sources, Iraq itself is the secondary target of the United States and Israel. The first and main target is Syria, and the aim is to pressure it so it will make concessions in the negotiations with Israel, which are currently suspended. Rather, Yitzhak Rabin's determination to freeze the Syrian track has perhaps been motivated by the wait for implementation of the Iraqi scenario.

The sources conclude by saying that the Israeli and U.S. calculations on the one hand and Saddam Husayn's calculations on the other are what have created a fabricated crisis called Husayn Kamil Hasan, and he is the last to know!

Editorial on Defection of Husayn Kamil

95AE0053A Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic
22 Aug 95 p 17

[Editorial by Muhammad al-Rashid: "Great Defection Scenario"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that the scenario of the defection of Husayn Kamil Hasan, the former Iraqi minister of industry and mineral resources and director of the Military Industry Authority, to Jordan could be a likely solution to the Iraqi problem. It also seems that this scenario is harmonious with the steps of the dual containment policy which the United States has adopted toward Iraq and Iran and which seeks to replace the Iraqi regime and to modify the Iranian regime's behavior so as to make it compatible with the U.S. interest in the region.

The United States wants to contain the Iraqi regime without weakening it vis-a-vis the Iranian regime. This is why it seeks to utilize this scenario to at least effect a tactical change in Iraq's political system while maintaining Iraq's unity and strength as a counterbalance to Iran. William Egan, the U.S. ambassador to Jordan, has asserted the U.S. commitment to Iraq's security and unity, provided that Iraq does not overstep a strategic objective of the U.S. policy in the region, namely to preserve

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Israel's strategic development by destroying Iraq's mass destruction weapons.

It seems that Husayn Kamil Hasan's defection was logical and natural. The Iraqi regime is on the verge of collapse and it is incapable of controlling domestic conditions. Moreover, the Iraqi people have been consumed by the international boycott, and this heralds a tempestuous rebellion that leaves no part of Iraq united. At the same time, the United States is subjected to external pressures from its allies, especially the French and the Russians, to lessen the intensity of the boycott. It is also subjected to domestic pressures by oil and arms corporations that want to get post-boycott contracts.

The defection scenario might be a good opportunity for the United States to reach an understanding with Husayn Kamil Hasan to resolve Iraq's mass destruction weapons problem in return for army control of the conditions in Iraq because the existing various opposition forces are incapable of transforming Iraq into an integrated unit. The army is the only force eligible to preserve Iraq's survival in the absence of Saddam Husayn's regime, if the United States pledges to give Saddam safe passage to Jordan, Morocco, or Brazil, and if Husayn Kamil Hasan utilizes the force he has in the Iraqi Army currently as an alternative to Saddam, pledging to establish a democratic regime. In this regime, all political forces will be able to participate under the umbrella of international pledges to the opposition forces ensuring the new regime's survival. The United States will then ensure a regime that conducts itself in a manner compatible with its dual containment policy. What strengthens the possibilities of this scenario is that there are preludes and contacts for this likely scenario. THE JERUSALEM POST, an Israeli paper, noted in its edition of 14 August 1994 that the United States coordinated the scheduled defection plan and informed Jordan of it at least one week ahead of time, getting from Jordan an advance permit for the Iraqis to be received in the country. The newspaper asserted that the CIA had made the arrangements preceding the defection.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT also reported in its edition of 12 August 1995 that informed sources in both Amman and London affirmed that U.S. contacts with Husayn Kamil had taken place from within Jordan through William Egan, the U.S. ambassador in Amman, and from outside Jordan by a White House official through a high-ranking Jordanian official. The paper also reported that Husayn Kamil has initiated contacts with the opposition forces to form a broad front that undertakes the "salvation task." What makes this scenario even more likely is the change in the rhetoric of the Jordanian regime, the Iraqi regime's permanent ally, considering that King Husayn called for a change in the Iraqi regime existing in Baghdad in an interview he gave YEDI'OT AHORONOT, an Israeli paper, on 14 August 1995.

This scenario seems likely to rescue the United States from the failure of its dual containment policy toward Iraq and Iran, according to the HERALD TRIBUNE. The days are pregnant with developments, so let us watch and see what fate God has for His servants.

Kamil's 'Treason' Described in Religious Terms

95AE0056A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 12 Aug 95 pp 1, 6

[Commentary by Salah al-Mukhtar]

[FBIS Translated Text] The story of the treason committed by Husayn Kamil is not new. Treason is as old as Adam and continues to recur. What happens is that greed or envy take control of a mentally imbalanced person. They make him imagine that he is above all values and truths, so that he hastens along the road of delusion, which is the entrance to the kingdom of Satan!

Last night, the president-commander delivered an extremely succinct speech that is one of the most important messages on values in history. He dealt with jealousy, envy, and greed and their role in taking a person from the kingdom of God to the kingdom of Satan, i.e., in transforming him from a good person who believes in God and God's law and who adheres to higher values—e.g., truth, honor, loyalty, justice, fairness, patriotism, and altruism—into a rapacious beast who denies and tramples all of God's laws as well as supreme values, kinship ties, and love!

Cain, overcome by jealousy of his brother Abel, killed Abel. Judas Iscariot, one of Jesus' disciples, used a kiss to point out the Messiah to the disbelievers. Jesus was then crucified.

Selfishness on the part of several notables of the Prophet Muhammad's tribe Quraysh, including relatives of the noble Prophet Muhammad, destroyed their bonds of kinship and values of chivalry: They conspired to kill Muhammad, God bless him and grant him salvation, and selected one person from each tribe!

Now, thousands or hundreds of years after these incidents, human societies use the names of these traitors as symbols of treason, perfidy, and evil. The Christians and others use the name Judas Iscariot to describe someone who feigns loyalty and purity to someone close and then betrays that person. A person becomes a traitor as a result of being overwhelmed by various factors. A prime factor in this regard is conceit: The traitor believes that he is much greater than he really is. He strives upward until he breaks his neck and enters Satan's kingdom!

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The Muslims use the names Abu-Lahab [the Prophet's uncle and a fanatical opponent of Islam at its inception], Abu-Raghghal, and other names to refer to someone who betrays his family, friends, and the nation.

What kind of person can wear the mask of love and loyalty while bearing enough evil within his heart to damage the good people around him? Why would he do so, especially after he has been given every opportunity to have the honor of occupying prestigious positions and making history? History clearly shows that great messages are, without exception, directed to all of humanity, without any distinction between persons based on personal knowledge, kinship ties, or anything else. A great message attracts everyone and changes them from within by making them believe in its content and by having them experience its values, examples, and principles.

The chance to work with one who bears a great message and heralds a new world provides a rare opportunity to demonstrate talents and abilities. The primary purveyor and architect of the message, Commander Saddam Husayn, with his embrace of groups to whom he has been destined by circumstances and relationships to bring his message, is preparing these groups through his directives and his lessons, and by monitoring them, calling them to account, and rewarding them, so that they assume the responsibility entrusted to them. Therefore, ultimate success will be the result of association with the bearer of the message. Therefore, the close "disciples" would not have been successful in their work and would have remained anonymous without the sponsorship and opportunities provided by Commander Saddam Husayn and his preparation of the requirements of success. Thus, I believe and trust that the soldiers of the noble Arab Prophet, Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation—some of whom were his elders—who worked with him and learned from him, were compelled to change their values and principles gradually in order to absorb the values and prescriptions of his message. Some of them became successors to the prophet without being swept away by feelings of unfaithful conceit that made them believe that they were better than the primary bearer of the message. Others continued fighting without a formal order to do so. They fought the apostates to martyrdom for the sake of Muhammad's message, satisfied and happy with their lot.

By contrast, persons who embarked on major missions under compulsion or in pursuit of personal gain were overcome by tendencies toward apostasy and schism.

They denied Islam whenever they had the chance! Therefore, we find that history is fair in its treatment of these elements. It presents us with innumerable good examples covering thousands of years. These positive examples heavily outnumber the negative examples. History has cast them in a positive light, inspiring successive generations to respect and exalt them whenever they are mentioned, because they were committed to loyalty, values, and principles, and they neither compromised nor committed apostasy.

At the same time, history attaches the stigma of treason, perfidy, and lack of values to a few names, which continue to serve as examples to this very day.

The traitor Husayn Kamil is one such example of a person who became imbalanced, deviated from the straight path, and chose to follow Satan's path. He forgets that, had it not been for Commander Saddam Husayn's sponsorship of him, he would have remained an ordinary, unknown person! Greed "killed" Husayn Kamil. His unfaithful conceit toppled him into the abysses of fantasy and delusion, which dragged him into the illegal, illegitimate aspirations that recent days have completely exposed.

Envy is one of the most dangerous if not the most dangerous emotion. It overwhelms some, causing them to quickly lose their vision of the truth, supreme values, and principles. Such people do not desire to remember the oath of loyalty, which they swore repeatedly. When an envious person sees someone who is more effective, more capable, and more deeply believing in great principles, who has advanced through the ranks based on his virtues and accomplishments, the envious one believes that his illegitimate path has been cut off. He then turns to Satan's camp, violating bonds of kinship and loyalty and the nation's supreme interests.

What happened must not cause us to lose our trust in others. Rather, it must strengthen our conviction that the principles of justice and law are the determining factors in issues such as these. Work in the Ba'th state is an honor and duty for one who believes in it. It is by no means a personal privilege. Likewise, Islam is an honor for believers. It does not grant them the right to exploit it for selfish purposes.

This incident is only a reprehensible anomaly. It must not cause us to forget that the overwhelming majority are staunchly loyal to the commander and principles and are resolved to continue on the path of uprightness and national purity. We must also remember that it is better for this traitor to disappear from the political scene at this time than to remain in his position, where he would be a dangerous mine that could explode at any unfavorable movement, inflicting huge material and psychological damage on the people, or where he could

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engage in internal sabotage, adding new problems to the blockade.

Iraq's 20 million constitute united armies marching under the leader's command and fighting for the sake of his exalted principles, which are the principles of the Arab nation, Islam, and the Ba'th. Occasionally, we see the fall of individuals. This is natural in a march in which the march commander and his soldiers are making history and establishing the pillars of "God's kingdom" on earth. It is in this "kingdom" where principles, justice, loyalty, the honoring of one's word, respect for the individual and his freedom, and defense of the homeland without hesitation will flourish.

We, loyal soldiers of the old guard or the new guard, who have rallied around the commander's leadership during the march of the revolution, who have become melded together by the experiences of the glorious Battle of Qadisiyah Saddam, the mother of unforgettable battles, pledge to always remain sons and brothers who obey his orders, who proceed on his path, and who fight his enemies, regardless of their names, lineage, or position.

The great people of Iraq live on as they march under the banner of "God is great" to create new heroic epics, which history will mention with pride and honor and which will amaze all of humanity.

Husayn Kamil's 'Treason' Called Insignificant

95AE0057A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 15 Aug 95 p 6

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Inad: "About Those Who Are Chased by Their Shadows"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Throughout mankind's long history, no traitor has been able to justify his treason or to persuade others of it. Treason is unjustifiable because "traitors have no argument to make before the loyal," as President Saddam Husayn pointed out in his address to the great people.

Treason is deviation from the group's opinion and will and from what is customary and required of the group and its members. It is deviation with predetermination and in a direction sharply opposing the group's procession. This is why treason is also an exception to a general rule, and this is from God's kindness. It is also from His kindness that traitors have appeared at widely interspersed periods in peoples' and nations' history.

The leader has pointed out accurately and emphatically the intrinsic and psychological causes of treason. The most strongly present cause is the instability and imbalance a personality develops when it is pierced by greed and possessed by conceit. Consequently, the scale of evil inspired by the devil predominates the scale of goodness that pleases the Compassionate. Here, treason as a characteristic is an ugly practical embodiment of conceit when it grows and it gains control of a weak spirit.

A traitor's psychological and personal makeup appears in its clearest and most dangerous form at uniquely sensitive times. Motivated by a morbid makeup, the traitor wants to play a role beyond his weight and wishes to project for himself an embellished image that is not his true image. This embellished image is exaggerated by transient position and considerations and it motivates the traitor to imagine that he has distinguished capabilities and that he can play bigger roles.

If we look at and examples from the modern history of nations, we find that what unites traitors is that they have been trusted and that they have been, to a degree, in positions of responsibility, but serious turning points in their nations' life make traitors forget the trust placed in them. In place of this trust, they develop interlocked fear and conceit because they feel that they are no longer able to pretend and deceive in their work. Thus, they take the fatal step , falling into the abyss of betraying their leaders' and peoples' trust, and betraying as well what is hoped of them. Meanwhile, they imagine that they are rising higher, but actually they are sliding to the bottom.

The leader cited the example of Judas, who betrayed Christ when he imagined himself to be the successor to Christ, "rising a wrung in the ladder of the world after having soiled himself with disgrace. This is how Judas committed betrayal."

In light of this profound and focused analysis which the leader offered in his address—an address that is tantamount to an eloquent lesson in the motives for treason—we find, as human experience has also taught us, that treason is not classified in a variety of categories because, to put it simply, it emanates from a single principle, namely ingratitude, disavowal, and the desire to inflict harm on an individual or a group. This is why a minor traitor and a major traitor are equal, even though their levels and the consequences of their actions vary. Both carry one, and only one, characterization: traitor.

Numerous tales of treason continue to give rise to questions, whether at the time they occur or afterward, when analysts try to explain them. These questions arise as a result of either timing or motives, but the ambiguity disperses when reviewers recall the fact that treason remains essentially unchanged and that a traitor knows his motives and determines his timing. He is pushed toward this timing by numerous factors which do become

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inevitably known afterward. However, the traitor tries to "fool" others and to camouflage the reasons which, when learned and determined, add nothing to the treason as an act, an indication, and a consequence.

In the important turning points of nations' history, traitors usually emerge in a manner and with a timing which, some may think, are sudden in nature, but the fact is that they are not. Difficult situations set men apart because such situations are a tried touchstone that separates mettle and intention on the real ground. Perseverance in time of adversity and of escalating dangers requires a highly principled and serious character that can endure. This is something that traitors cannot do because of their character, their rashness, and their weakness. This inability is why they fall in every phase and with every stride. Here, we come to one of the lessons in the leader's address, namely, "In a great procession and under difficult circumstances, the traitors may betray but the procession keeps on rising and gaining great meanings."

If Mecca's inhabitants are better aware of its trails and if a family is better aware of its members, then characterization of the traitor as something more than what he is by some foreign circles is, one the one hand, an indication of the depth of his treason. On the other hand, such characterization is an indication of the ill will of the circles that use treason against the country or the people from whose ranks the traitor has swerved. Such characterizations will not deceive us, the Iraqi people, and will not pass without a derisive smile or a dismissing hand gesture.

Husayn Kamil, the man who betrayed us recently, does not surpass this concept. In fact, he was no more than a joint in the state's big machine—a rusted joint that could no longer endure the burden of turning in the required manner during the steadfastness and crossing phase. The fall of this small joint was logical and it cannot be given more than its real dimensions, keeping in mind the fact that the machine will keep on turning without interruption because small joints will not bring it to a halt and because they are replaceable. This is in the nature of small joints. Moreover, nations' forward marches in the past could not be stopped by a turncoat or a traitor because a group procession is always able to purge itself and to cast away what is bad in it. This is how Iraq and its people have been.

We do not wish to pause before the incident of treason, whatever the treason and including Husayn Kamil's treason, to console ourselves. We must pause before it to learn and make conclusions. This is another lesson which the leader's message to his people teaches us. Treason is a grave experience from which we must make conclusions regarding future action indicators and regarding controls governing our evaluation and approach. This is why the leader has asserted firmly that "we will fight abuse and treason, especially treason, in handling the people's wealth and in betraying the country and the procession. We will fight and will not condone those who imagine that they can turn the Iraqi people's wealth into a milking cow serving relatives, favorites, and sick souls that promote evil." It is certain that the reasons and prerequisites for selection will be more careful and stringent so that traitors' numbers will not increase even by one and so all requirements of the crossing will be secured in order that we can build a just, modern, faithful, and capable system and a state founded on justice, loyalty, and sublime concepts, as the leader has said.

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Husayn Kamil's Career Traced

95LA0384B Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic 22 Aug 95 p 33

[Unattributed article: "Husayn Kamil: A Life Abounding in Crime Under Umbrella of Saddam's Regime"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil is not too dissimilar from Saddam Husayn. He is also not far from Saddam's clan. Kamil was born in al-'Awjah village within the jurisdiction of the Tikrit Governorate. It is the same village in which Saddam Husayn was born. They are both from the same clan, namely al-Bayjat, and Kamil's father is Saddam's cousin. Kamil's trip toward power started when he was appointed one of the escorts of 'Abdallah Talfah, Saddam's maternal uncle and his father-in-law, who was appointed Baghdad governor in the late 1960s. Husayn Kamil had just started his military life at the time with the rank of non-commissioned officer. In 1973, Kamil was sent to Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia, for a six-month security course in which he received training on how to protect prominent political figures. Upon his return, he moved to an advance line (second line) within the team protecting Saddam Husayn. He did well in this job, which made him eligible for the rank of second lieutenant in 1978, and then the rank of first lieutenant. He became one of Saddam's main escorts and he then received higher and higher military ranks in record time, rising to the rank of colonel and then major general. Subsequently, he became one of Saddam's closest aides. His status was strengthened further and his influence grew when he married Raghad, Saddam's eldest daughter, in the mid-1980s, on Saddam's insistence and despite the opposition of Saddam's family, especially of Barzan Ibrahim al-Hasan, Saddam's half brother and head of the Iraqi Intelligence Agency at the time. After marrying Saddam's daughter, Kamil became the third most influential man politically in Iraq. On Saddam's personal directive, Kamil took charge of implementing the biological, germ, and missile weapons project which started in 1985. He concluded important deals for this project with Brazilian, Argentine, British, French, German, American, and Egyptian firms. Kamil is considered one of the most prominent planners of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. He, along with 'Ali Hasan al-Majid and Sab'awi Ibrahim al-Hasan, is one of three who have become known to have been involved in planning and supervising the invasion under Saddam's direction. Kamil has been known for severe and criminal suppression of riots in northern and southern Iraq. He played a prominent role in putting down the popular uprising that exploded in wake of Kuwait's liberation. He led columns of Republican Guard tanks, storming Karbala' and al-Najaf and wiping out the uprising there. In the wake of the cease-fire in the second Gulf war, Saddam appointed Kamil minister of defense, but he quickly dismissed him four months later when Iraqi forces failed to control the Kurdish town of Kolar at the end of 1991. He was re-appointed industry minister. The latest position he held on 1 July 1995 was that of immediate director of the Military Industrialization Authority. Saddam granted him 50 million dinars in his capacity as industry minister and as some sort of honorarium on occasion of the military invasion of Kuwait. Kamil divided the sum among his entourage, keeping 20 millions for himself. Kamil established firm relations with Jordan and felt very reassured about dealing with Jordanian officials. He purchased a number of properties and homes in Amman, the Jordanian capital, with the help of the Iraqi trade attache in Jordan, who is considered one of Kamil's closest associates. Kamil also encouraged a number of Iraqi merchants to use Amman as their base of operations. Through him, the Iraqi trade volume via Jordan amounted to two-thirds the total Iraqi foreign trade. In February 1994, he suffered partial paralysis and a coma after which he was taken to Jordan. There, he underwent surgery at al-Husayn Medical City to remove a head tumor and stayed there for a month until he recovered. King Husayn of Jordan granted him a Jordanian passport to enable him to complete his treatment in Europe.

'Udayy-Husayn Kamil Conflict Described

95AE0065A Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 25 Aug 95 pp 19-21

[Article by Mufid 'Abd-al-Rahim: "Did President's Son-in-Law Defect Because of Dispute With 'Udayy Over Influence and Money; Raghad and Rana Fled When Their Father Married Third Mistress; Husayn Kamil's Defection Has Put Saddam in Defensive Position"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington—U.S. intelligence and military circles in particular view the defection of Staff Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil; Staff Lieutenant Colonel Saddam Kamil, Husayn's brother; and Raghad and Rana, their wives and Saddam Husayn's daughters, as a development which "heralds a chain of rapid developments in Iraq that could lead to a radical change in the Iraqi political leadership." However, U.S. political and military officials and experts warn that this may not happen overnight for numerous reasons, even though what has happened "constitutes a crushing below-the-belt blow to Saddam Husayn's regime," according to a former U.S. female official.

The questions that continue to be mulled by Americans are not embodied in how much Husayn Kamil and his brother know about the Iraqi weapons systems or about the regime's security structure because such knowledge

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is a foregone conclusion. Rather, the questions are: How much are the two men prepared to disclose about Iraq's secrets, to whom are they prepared to disclose them, and what is the price for such disclosure?

A female U.S. official who decided to talk to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI believes, in her interpretation of Husayn Kamil's and his brother's decision to flee Iraq recently, that personal reasons were extremely important "reasons" in the decision to flee Iraq, especially since Udayy and his brother Qusayy have evidently begun to play broader roles in the Iraqi government and have begun to necessarily encroach upon the spheres of influence which were monopolized until recently by the brothers Kamil and by many other leaders of the Iraqi regime. This official added that the financial resources on which Saddam relies to reward his close associates are diminishing daily, thanks to the sanctions. Consequently, the competition for the remaining resources has gradually begun to turn bloody at times. This is what Husayn Kamil and his brother ultimately concluded. Rather, it is possible that they feared for their lives from 'Udayy and Qusayy as a result of the escalating friction and competition between the Kamil brothers and Saddam's two sons. This official added, "The truth of the matter is, according to the reports at our disposal, that 'Udayy has many of Saddam's qualities. Rather, he has a lot more of the viciousness that distinguishes his father. Consequently, he started to encroach upon the 'empires' of other regime leaders. This has definitely disturbed these leaders and motivated them to flee." The former U.S. official speculates that Husayn Kamil's defection could be "nothing but the beginning, especially since his experience has been successful to date. This experience could provide the model to others, as long as Jordan has opened its doors to Iraqi opposition elements and to those breaking away from the regime."

The U.S. official added, "It seems that Husayn Kamil and others finally concluded that they were on their way out of the regime and its circles anyway. Had these people reached such a conclusion in the past, they would have still thought that it would have been possible for them to return after a while and that they could at least continue to enjoy the regime's largesse, but the situation is different now and the largesse exists no longer. Saddam's regime itself is ailing and may not last long. Therefore, these people have begun to make different decisions. To put it briefly, it seems that Husayn Kamil ultimately concluded that in light of all this, he no longer has a future in Iraq—a conclusion which many others may have reached. So he decided to defect."

Michael Eizenstadt, an Iraqi affairs expert at Washington's Near East Studies Institute, also finds it likely that personal reasons are behind Husayn Kamil's decision to flee Iraq. He has said that the defection was not because of "disagreement over the Iraqi policy, but due to personal reasons and to conflict over influence, power, and resources."

Talking of the breakdowns and the fissures in the Iraqi president's family, Eizenstadt reminds that 'Udayy, Saddam's son, killed Camille Hanna, his father's personal guard, when it was rumored that Hanna was the godfather of the relationship between Saddam and Samirah Shahbandar, an Iraqi Airways hostess and the former wife of a high-ranking Iraqi Airways official. Saddam married her afterward. This created in the family a fissure which claimed 'Adnan Khayrallah, Saddam's maternal uncle and a former defense minister, for a victim. Eizenstadt further added that when Husayn Kamil was dismissed from the Defense Ministry in 1991, it was because Saddam realized that an alliance had developed between Kamil and 'Udayy, who was promoting Kamil's cause in BABIL. This motivated Saddam to deprive Kamil of his position as defense minister. The U.S. expert has added that his latest information is that "Saddam has a third mistress and he may have even married her. This has disturbed Raghad and Rana, Saddam's daughters, and has driven them to prefer defection with their husbands to staying in Iraq with their father."

Eizenstadt agrees with the U.S. official's statement that it is evident that the power of 'Udayy and Qusayy, Saddam's two sons, is growing and expanding constantly and that this expansion reached areas traditionally subject to Husayn Kamil's powers and influence. This has added further reasons explaining the defection of the Iraqi dissident and of his aides.

Strategic Significance of Husayn Kamil's Dissension

The female U.S. official has said that Husayn Kamil's and his companions' defection is a "very big blow to Baghdad's regime, regardless of the way one views it." She added that the latest act of dissension has put Saddam Husayn in a very defensive position. It has also "exposed that which we all know, namely that there are big and serious cracks within Saddam Husayn's family and his ruling regime."

She has also talked about the psychological impact of what has happened on the ordinary citizen in Baghdad. She said, "It is extremely significant. The impact of the dissension of the regime's number two man, his brother, and their two wives, who are Saddam Husayn's daughters, will not be transient. This dissension will puncture the vision that some of Saddam's close associates have of him as a strong man whose regime is firm and

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unshakable. People have begun to wonder how much longer Saddam's regime will last instead of wondering when the sanctions will be lifted.. Therefore, these people's dissension could be, as some sources assert, the beginning of the Iraqi regime's end, especially in the wake of the latest reports which say that 'Udayy, Saddam's eldest son, has shot Wadban, his uncle, and his uncle's wife and daughter. What is more, there are reports that he killed all of them. There are also reports that the regime has asked Barzan al-Tikriti to return but that he has refused."

As to the significance of the dissension to the Iraqi Government's endeavors to lift the sanctions the United Nations has imposed against it since the Iraqi forces' invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the U.S. official has said, "We want to see Iraq submit to all UN demands, but the question is: If Iraq responds to all UN demands tomorrow, will the sanctions against it be lifted? The answer, simply, is no. The reason is that the United States does not trust Saddam Husayn, his family, or anybody in his current regime, even though many people, such as the French, the Russians, and the Chinese, and even some people here, have been grumbling about the prolonged maintenance of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. Some of them even express this opinion with the argument that the Iraqi regime is staying and that the blockade cannot be kept forever.

The U.S. official added, "In the past few months, we have seen the regime's base being eroded in the wake of the regime's clashes with the al-Juburi, al-Dulaym, and al-Ibrahim clans that constitute the regime's mainstay. Erosion has now started from within the regime. This latest development confirms that the sanctions are successfully working to explode the regime from within."

Asked about the extent of harm that Staff Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil can inflict on the Iraqi Government's efforts to conceal some elements of its armament programs from the United Nations and, consequently, the damage it can cause to its efforts to have the sanctions lifted, this U.S. official said, "If Husayn Kamil does not know all these details, then I don't think anybody else knows them. This is the man who has been in charge of building most, if not all, of the Iraqi weapons programs, including missiles, and even nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He is the man who knows all foreign countries, firms, and individuals who have worked with him to develop the entire Iraqi war machine in the 1980's. Moreover, he is the man who has carefully supervised the concealment of some elements of these programs in the wake of the Gulf war in an attempt to hide them from the eyes of the United Nations so they can be used later when the sanctions are ended."

She added, "When Husayn Kamil decides to disclose to the Americans or to the United Nations all the information he has about the Iraqi armament programs, it is important that they keep in mind that Saddam Husayn does not know exactly what Husayn Kamil will disclose or not disclose. As a result, Saddam will be uncertain and his uncertainty will cause him to reveal a lot of what he has concealed to date.

"The fact is that we have begun to see a change in Baghdad's position in this regard. On the one hand, the Iraqi regime has stopped saying that the end of this month must be the end of cooperation with the UN weapon inspectors. On the other hand, the UN Security Council has not issued a positive announcement about Baghdad's adherence to its dictates. We have also seen Tariq 'Aziz invite Rolfe Ekeus to Baghdad to reveal to him information which the Iraqis now say 'Husayn Kamil had been concealing from UN inspectors as part of a conspiracy to prolong the sanctions against the Iraqi people.'"

Information on Demand

What are the military aspects that Husayn Kamil can reveal? U.S. sources say that Husayn Kamil is the right man who was at the right places to reveal all that pertains to the Iraqi armament programs and to the attempts to conceal them from the United Nations. They add that even though Major General 'Amir Rashid, who was Kamil's deputy for years and who has taken over Kamil's position now, is the man who talked to the UN commission assigned to eliminate Iraq's mass destruction weapons, Husayn Kamil is the man who represented Saddam Husayn in dealing with the United Nations in connection with fulfilling the requirements of removal of the Iraqi weapons. The sources add that the most important aspects that Iraq has not fully revealed are its biological weapon programs.

To date, Iraqis say that they have produced quantities of poisonous biological elements, but they have not revealed whether they have loaded them into certain bombs to be dumped from the air, to be used as missile projectiles, or to be used in some other way. Husayn Kamil can disclose this information.

The sources add that whereas the UN commission believes that it has a reasonable list of the number of long-range Iraqi missiles destroyed during and after the war, it is possible that the Iraqi regime has been able to conceal some missiles, possibly amounting to dozens, according to a U.S. military expert.

The other area is chemical weapons. The U.S. expert has said that the problem in this area is that the Iraqis allege that they have concealed [as published]

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the records on the production of chemical elements. This being the case, UN inspectors cannot find out the quantities of chemical elements that the Iraqis have actually produced. This may lead one to believe that Iraq has concealed some chemical elements also. In all these areas, the information that Husayn Kamil discloses could be extremely significant to the mission of the UN teams searching for Iraqi weapons. This will also have a direct impact on how long the sanctions against Iraq continue.

Regarding the nuclear program, the U.S. military expert has said that the UN commission has acquired full information on the enriched nuclear material that was in Iraq's possession. The commission has also been able to expose most laboratories and plants where Iraq conducted its nuclear research.

In addition to the information which Husayn Kamil has on Iraqi armament programs, the U.S. expert says that the ex-Iraqi official and his brother know a lot about other sensitive aspects of the Iraqi regime. It must be remembered that Husayn Kamil is the man who transformed the Republican Guard in the 1980s from a single guard brigade into an army comprised of several well armed and well trained brigades. At a certain period of time, Husayn Kamil also founded and headed the Special Republican Guard. Moreover, he founded and headed the Special Security Agency which guards Saddam Husayn personally. After Kamil, this agency was headed by Husayn Kamil's brother, who fled with him. Moreover, Husayn Kamil knows the names of individuals in the Special Security and the Republican Guard whom he trusts and who, it is believed, can be recruited to stage coup attempts against Saddam Husayn. These are people who have a grudge against Saddam's regime and who are prepared to stage a coup against him for their own reasons.

Will West Deal With Husayn Kamil?

But the question raised now is: To what degree is Husayn Kamil prepared to expose the Iraqi armament programs? The U.S. expert has said that the belief is that Husayn Kamil will be much more difficult on this point than many people think, especially if we remember that he aspires to project himself as an alternative to Saddam Husayn's regime. Consequently, he cannot appear to be a man who has sold Iraqi state secrets to the Americans and other current enemies of Iraq when he protects himself as a national alternative to the current Iraqi regime. She added, "I believe that he will bargain over selling the information in his possession to the parties that are prepared to purchase it and use it against Saddam Husayn's regime. I don't mean that he will only ask for money in return for the information. He will also ask for other things in return, such as support and a pledge that his life, his brother's life, and the lives of their families, as well as their property in Iraq, will be preserved."

Why wouldn't Husayn Kamil cooperate with the Americans? The U.S. official said that the "U.S. price could be exorbitant for him." Explaining this, she said that the Americans "may not be prepared to help him realize his dream to be Iraq's next leader." She added, "The Americans have accused this man of being the man responsible for developing the Iraqi mass destruction weapons, the man who used chemical weapons against Kurds in the north, and the man who brutally put down the Shi'ite uprising in the south. There is a lot of blood on his hands. This makes it very difficult for the United States to establish relations with a man who has such characteristics."

The U.S. military expert agrees with the U.S. lady official on Husayn Kamil's unwillingness to disclose Iraqi secrets. He said that the Iraqi official has stated that "Iraq's interest will be the main criterion for what he will or will not disclose because of his personal political reasons." But this U.S. expert has added that one must remember that "Husayn Kamil can disclose the information he has, provided that this disclosure does [not] find its way to the media. This way, he will be able to consequently claim that he has not disclosed Iraq's military secrets and he can carry on with his political aspirations while supplying the information necessary for the parties that want it, getting the support he needs from these parties in return."

The U.S. expert has also said that the extent of the information which Husayn Kamil can provide on Iraq's military secrets and other information to speed up the overthrow of Saddam's regime "will depend on whether Husayn Kamil will embrace the U.S. option or the Arab option, i.e. the Jordanian or Gulf option, for dealing with this information." He added, "Husayn Kamil can provide enough information to the Americans and the United Nations to embarrass Saddam and to speed up his overthrow. Thus, he will at least achieve one of his goals."

How can Washington exploit this information against Saddam Husayn? The U.S. expert has said, "There have been several coup attempts against Saddam Husayn. Reports have indicated that the United States has been behind these attempts, the latest of which was staged nearly a year ago when Republican Guard units tried to overthrow Saddam Husayn and failed. One can imagine that Washington will exploit the information it gets and use it to organize similar coup attempts."

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The expert added that Washington has been using a "dual approach in dealing with the Iraqi regime since the Gulf war: the first is to deal with the Unified Iraqi Congress [UIC], the main Iraqi faction that is experiencing numerous splits, and the second is to rely on contacts within Iraq and far from the UIC. These are the contacts through which the United States tries to organize operations inside Iraq."

Scenarios of Husayn Kamil's Cooperation With the United States!

If Husayn Kamil agreed to cooperate with the United States and the United Nations by disclosing whatever Iraqi armament programs remain in place, then what are the scenarios resulting from this cooperation? The U.S. official said that there are at least three scenarios. The first scenario is that the United States will confront Saddam Husayn promptly and his only choice will be to confess to and disclose what he has concealed. Consequently, this will have a positive impact on the possibility of lifting the sanctions against Iraq. Those who demand lifting them will then be able to say that Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations and that there is no reason to continue the sanctions against it. The second scenario is that the United Nations, on the instructions and choice of the United States, will begin supplying this information "drop by drop" in order to prolong the blockade for the longest time possible in order to ensure continued worsening of the conditions in Baghdad and, consequently, to help topple the regime.

The third scenario is: What happens if Husayn Kamil provides certain misleading information for his own purposes and if the UN team confronts the Iraqi Government with this information and this government denies it? This, too, is a likely scenario and the Americans can, according to the U.S. expert, use it to prolong the sanctions against Baghdad's regime because it will take a long time to verify if this information is truthful or not.

As to the possibility that Husayn Kamil will end up a political refugee in the United States, the U.S. official says that this is unlikely, especially in view of the U.S. Administration's opinion of Saddam Husayn's family and his regime leaders. Because of his aspirations, it is unlikely Husayn Kamil is considering such an option at this stage. If Husayn Kamil comes to the United States as a political refugee, gets permanent residence here, and cooperates with its administrations, it will be difficult for him to play the political role which he says he wants to play.

Saddam's Personality, Politics Viewed

95LH0267A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 21 Aug 95 pp 30-35

[Article: "Secrets of Saddam's Personality; Saddam: A Good Politician Says One Thing and Does Another; Saddam's Usurpation Theory Believes Only in Suppressing and Shackling People; in Saddam's Mind, Unity Concept Is Based on Aggression and Border Violation; Security Means Ruler's Persona; Only Voice in Iraq Is Voice of Sharp Political Commands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This article was written sometime before half of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's family defected from Iraq last Wednesday, 9 August 1995. The article deals with Iraq's difficult conditions and with the demarcation of borders with Kuwait, focusing on aspects that have formed in the Iraqi president's performance what the writer calls the "usurpation theory." The writer cites some living examples connected with Saddam's view of affairs and with his personality.

If history's boundaries play an immense role in structuring the formulae of states, political regimes, and concepts of human relations, then geographical boundaries are no less important in formulating political transformations that ordinarily affect this or that part of the world. This means that geography will play a role that greatly influences people that rely in molding their societies on concepts and modes of behavior which history produces in their arteries. This means that a state is not a phenomenon that history produces or detonates from within its deep conceptual roots, starting from past intellectual and cultural programs. Rather, geography, like history, plays an important role in building a state, its institutions, its systems, and the behavioral modes of its leaders.

Therefore, we believe that there are two concepts of the state: The first is based on reliance on history, i.e. on the heritage, values, and principles of a certain nation; the second is based on denying and disregarding history as a legacy and an intellectual value in this or that nation. This concept is also based on the geographical environment and on the state figures, leaders, and concepts that it can produce, depending on the ruler's will and on the human climate he creates. This geographic-historical theory was extremely obvious in the memory of Primakov, a former Soviet presidential envoy, when he met with Saddam Husayn and warned him of the consequences of his continued occupation of the State of Kuwait.

Primakov, who first worked in the Soviet Communist Party's information media and then in the administration of the intelligence apparatus, was angry at the Iraqi

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ruler's conduct and at the futility of the warnings he had carried with him from the Gorbachev leadership. However, Primakov understood well the lesson of the geographical state when he heard Saddam Husayn's response after he had assured Saddam that the international alliance was targeting him personally. Saddam said: "It doesn't matter." [1]

In Iraq, the state is a "geographic" concept that has no connection with root values or with the Arab and Islamic heritage. It is natural that such a state would generate modes of behavior, governance, and administration plans, and leader selection methods that are closely tied to the ruler's inclination and temperament. This contrasts with the concept of the historical state or the state founded on a public political referendum. In this state, governance belongs to the public through their legal and constitutional democratic institutions.

In Iraq, history is excluded as a governance value in social and political life. The only plan that exists there is the plan of the ruler who practices his own method of geographic usurpation. He also exercises his freedom to take revenge on his adversaries and foes. As for a political public and for the requirements of economic development, prosperity, and regional and international relations based on mutual respect, they do not exist in the dictionary of the ruler's geography, which is stamped with the ruler's political resolutions, his big cars and palaces, and his General Federation of Women!

In Iraq, where the only voice heard is the voice of sharp political commands, no man can object to ethnic usurpation schemes. The ruler is the field marshal, the genius commander, the descendant of 'Ali Bin al-Husayn, the skillful engineer, and the father of progress and civilization. Whoever objects to this state theory is a suspicious coward and a man considered to have committed the crime of high treason! Thus, high national treason is tied to the ceiling set by the ruler who possesses the legitimate power to obstruct liberties and free expression, not to mention his ability to massacre the "dignity of people" so as to crown his false victory over the lie [as published] of human virtue and over the people's right to their usurped social options.

In Iraq, the ruler is not debated on all particulars that are connected with the public interest and that have their national and international dimensions because the rhetoric of geographic usurpation prevents the ruler from accepting the theory of separating his repressive domestic political power and might from his power and aspirations to control and dominate others! He is very sensitive to separating his persona inside the country, which is oppressed by his tyranny, from the persona he plays outside the country. This is why Saddam Husayn has, with his skill in repression, been exercising his domestic usurpation in the same way he has been exercising usurpation in his relations with others.

In this regard, Husayn al-Shahrastani, an Iraqi nuclear scientist who fled the usurpation jails, has said, "A foreign delegation visited Iraq for a trade mission connected with Iraq's purchase of spare parts for biological and chemical weapons. When the two sides signed the purchase agreement, Saddam Husayn turned to me—I who was forced to attend the meeting—and said that the spare parts had to be used for purposes other than those on which we had agreed with the delegation. When I asked him about the reason for the difference, he stressed to me angrily, 'A good politician is one who says one thing and does another!'"

In Iraq, where the value of history, of agreements, and of the principles of human legislation is nullified, the ruler exercises his freedom to usurp the concept of security. Thus, he creates in his own way "history's" most repressive agencies or builds atonement coffins for those who are tempted to violate his security theory. This is why words mean nothing when human rights organizations speak of violations in this jail or an attack on liberties in that intelligence agency at a time when an entire people are violated. Here, one cannot discuss legitimately and humanly the issue of usurpation by the ruler and this ruler's concept of security because the ruler believes deep in his heart that it is his right to make death decisions and that legislation, constitution, security, and the people are all summed up in his persona.

In 1985, international calls urging the adoption of democracy to determine societies' political rights and to promote the possibility of using polling boxes to select leaders who represent their peoples; such calls proliferated on the peripheries of the "democratic revolution that took place in East Europe." Meanwhile, the theory of usurpation emerged from the halls of the Republican Palace in Baghdad through Saddam Husayn who said, "In Iraq, no elections or polling can be conducted to select the ruler because we are confident of our people's ability to select their leadership, and this is what we see and feel daily."

The usurpation theory believes only in the repressive vision and course, which has become the only means to shackle the people and to drag them to the abyss of the terrible houses in Raghibah Khatun. Thus, government usurpation ties all particulars of life, liberties, free expression, and the other party's right to its inclination and proprieties, which nobody can debate. This usurping persona also applies to the party's literature and to the culture of the cadres working in its apparatus, which

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the party has sought to make an indivisible part of its terrorist entity. This is why we were not surprised when we read in some of the ruling party's literature a number of intellectual passages that talk about an Arab unity that will not be achieved unless Iraq—the ruler—undertakes the unity plan by expanding its national area at the expense of Arab national security and unless it seizes 20 percent of the world's oil reserves. This was an obvious reference to a unity plan which would have a most devastating impact on Iraq, its neighbor Kuwait, the region generally, and the world on 2 August 1990.

Occupation Is Geographic Concept of Unity

Prior to the 1979 coup in which he eliminated the barrier consisting of his political adversaries, Saddam Husayn was facing a fierce battle with some moderates within his party and government apparatus. Those moderates saw political governance with a different eye. Meanwhile, he believed that this wall impeded the execution of his wish to violate stipulations, laws, and legislation to seize power and to monopolize state and society. The unity advocated by Munif al-Razzaz, the Jordanian Ba'thist who lived in Iraq, was different from the unity that Saddam Husayn wanted. The Arab national security which Ilyas Farah underlined in the party's literature and culture was different from the security whose dimensions the comrade struggler [Saddam] wanted to tailor. This is why victory ultimately belonged to the theory of usurpation, of destroying all party and political lines, and of shifting the "geographic culture" course toward violating the borders of others. Therefore, we can talk about the concept of Arab unity in Saddam's mind only through aggression, the violation of international borders, and the expansion of Iraq's national "security." In this case, security means "security" of the ruler's persona. We cannot talk about international relations founded on mutual respect unless we talk about the deception, fraud, and gambles made against a background of the worst principles and methods employed in relations with the world. This is why in his conversation with the U.S. ambassador to Iraq prior to the occupation of Kuwait, Saddam Husayn did not hesitate to employ deception and to gamble when he said to her, "We have offered the Kuwaitis a non-aggression treaty but they have rejected it, using the pretext of the laws and rules of international relations and of the presence of international traditions and ethics that reject the violation of borders." [2]

To the mind of the Iraqi intelligence apparatus, liquidation of the Arab unity concept opened the door for the usurpation mentality to arrange its own unity scheme on the eve of Saddam's monopolization of political governance. This is why Saddam did not enter into any national security plan beyond his borders. Otherwise, his aspirations and his unity would have had to be founded on usurping and punishing others and driving them into homelessness for an immensely important reason, namely the transformation of usurpation into a virtue with which the world deals very poorly. Thus, the recognition of this "virtue" turns into a sanctity or a human or social fact which peoples appreciate and respect and of which they feel proud. The transformation of Kuwait—a human, social, and political virtue established firmly in the Kuwaiti people's affections—into a governorate is a sublime goal to whose sanctity Saddam clings, if the world lets such a transformation pass. Violation of the Kuwaiti people's sovereignty and security is a political and human virtue to Saddam's mind because he has "returned the branch to the root" and has been able to seize 20 percent of the world's oil reserves, thus accomplishing two main objectives: tying the Kuwait people's sovereignty and security to his personal "sovereignty" and security; and passing the usurpation scheme as a virtuous scheme which, to his mind, must be spread throughout the region and the world.

Marginal Proximity

Since the 1916 Sykes-Picot accord, the concept of the State of Iraq was designed to be the concept of a state that relies more on the ruler's options than on the options of the ruled. It seems that this line, whether in Iraq's general political structure or in its goals and objectives, was adopted to fragment unity of the Iraqi society—a society naturally built on strict intellectual options influenced by the systems, mini-states, and political laws that had ruled Iraq in succession since the emergence of what is called Mesopotamia. In this country, the ruler is the doctrine for the public's worship rites and dealings. The public is the imitator that does not move without the permission of its political authority. This is not because this public is cowardly or because its intellect and experience are deficient. Rather, it is because of extreme repression, narrow human rights, stifled virtue, and the similarity of this virtue to some forms of usurpation. This is why the dreams and aspirations of which Staff Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim thought in the early 1960s are the same dreams and aspirations of which Saddam has dreamt. The colonel made his decisions in this regard on the basis of his belief in the Qasim security concept, not Iraqi security concept, and out of his passion to expand the area of his political and national person as a leader countering the leadership of Egypt's 1952 revolution.

Thus, the aggression patterns are similar. The forms of this aggression do, in fact, become closer the nearer

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we move to the psyche of the ruler who belongs to his geographic environment and the more closely we examine this ruler's concept of life, society, free expression, and international relations. Such an examination makes it obvious that in the "usurpation" schemes and forms and the geographic conspiracies that we see, the ruler quickly disavows all his obligations and does not consider himself responsible for what has happened. Didn't Saddam Husayn say that Kuwait refused to conclude a non-aggression treaty? If the economic sanctions are lifted, what would prevent him from attacking Kuwait anew on the pretext that he rejects recognition of Kuwait because Iraq gave this recognition under duress, as he said to the so-called Iraqi National Assembly in 1980 and as evidenced by his abrogation of the 1975 treaty and of the war he launched against Iraq.

Kuwait as We Should See It

If the usurpation mentality has exercised its authority over the Iraqi people for many years and has forced them to implement its aggressive schemes through coercion, incarceration, execution, and death squads, then the Iraqi people imitate Saddam's schemes no longer. The proof is the sweeping popular uprising that erupted in Iraq's governorates in 1991. That uprising expressed its position on usurpation clearly. However, we feel that there is a political, social, and human message that must be performed by the true Iraqi opposition institutions, namely to overcome the psychological and political crisis between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti peoples and to work to heal the rift that was caused by the invasion.

Despite the immensity of the border crisis and of the tragic consequences that it has caused, the borders have never been and will never be the Iraqi people's quest. Moreover, leading the Iraqi people to the economic sanctions trap and starving Iraqi children has never been and will never be a Kuwaiti quest. Through Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad, Kuwait has repeatedly emphasized that it does not oppose the delivery of drugs and foodstuffs to the Iraqi people. Regrettably, we notice that there are Arab and Iraqi opposition circles that keep harping on this crisis with the purpose of perpetuating its roots and effects. This in itself is a problem, and its consequences must be treated wisely and deliberately because of its broad dimensions and of its comprehensive negative ramifications.

Even though escalation of the sedition rhetoric by these circles serves only the goals of discord, isolation, and the accumulation of disagreements between the two peoples, we wish to underline some issues and points which we believe will, if acknowledged, provide an incentive to revive the efforts to restore normal relations between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi peoples, especially since the Baghdad regime is living in regional and international isolation and experiencing internal frustrations. The points are the following:

1. UN Resolution 832, which calls for the demarcation of Iraqi-Kuwait borders, was adopted unanimously and approved by a UN committee emanating from the Security Council. This committee took into consideration the circumstances of the real political situation which coincided with the invasion of Kuwait. Therefore, the Iraqi opposition's irrevocable approval of the resolution is in harmony with its confrontation against the regime, whether from exile or when it assumes political power after Saddam Husayn.

If some Iraqi opposition factions object to the resolution and find that it does not suit the Iraqi people, then they are required to develop solutions that serve the two peoples' interests and their effort to coexist peacefully. These are still pending issues, even though the regime has resolved them in its own way.

2. In their present condition, the Iraqi people do not need to be involved in an issue which is stipulated by the UN resolutions and which a UN committee is following up on the ground. Rather, they need a strong opposition capable of releasing them from the state of repression, meaning that they need a democratic climate, thus keeping the Iraqi people at the mercy of this futile instigation which will cause them nothing but problems and difficulties, and they already have enough problems and difficulties.

3. The Iraqi opposition should understand the nature of the current international condition which is gripped by the currents of the economic, political, and security challenge. This opposition must learn from the experiences of border conflicts that have destroyed human systems and immense economic and material wealth and resources. It must realize that the use of violence and usurpation with the "brother" can only entrench anarchy and devastation and impede progress, peace, and economic prosperity.

4. The presence of an "Iraqi" opposition in power will not be the end of the Saddamist pattern of the usurpation of soil and man in Kuwait. Therefore, there has to be an "Iraqi opposition" act that reassures the Kuwaiti people about their sovereignty over their land. Moreover, the establishment of an economic, political, and security system founded on democracy and polling boxes will spare Iraqis the need to worry about a few wells annexed by the United Nations to the State of Kuwait in accordance with documents presented by Kuwait and accepted by the United Nations. Therefore, ridding Iraq of the usurping ruler pattern is the guarantee that the psychological consequences of the presence of these

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wells in Kuwait now will be surpassed, especially if the opposition devotes attention to the plan to establish fraternal relations with the Kuwaiti brothers. Even if we acknowledge for the sake of the argument that a few Iraqi oil wells have been lost, this loss will increase security if the Iraqi and Kuwaiti peoples surpass the crisis and create horizons of serious and fruitful cooperation.

5. At a time when the Iraqi and Kuwaiti peoples are still straining under the weight of the horrible catastrophe caused by Saddam Husayn, some cries are heard here and there to clear the Arab atmosphere and to restore Saddam Husayn to the ranks instead of urging the removal of this nightmare. Even though the Arab states realize well the meaning of the presence of Saddam's regime at the top of the authority in Iraq, we say that what is required is to open up to the Iraqi parties and forces that are loyal to the cause of their people. It is essential to support and aid their just struggle instead of trying to involve Saddam in the Arab action arena. We are confident of the wise diplomacy which Kuwaiti Foreign Minis Sabah al-Ahmad oversees and of this diplomacy's role in blocking the path in the face of the return of Saddam's regime. We believe, moreover, in the ability of this diplomacy to cement foundations of the relations between Kuwait and the factions that are loyal to the Iraqi people.

6. Kuwait is a sovereign state, and it is entitled to enjoy stability and security. It must not turn into an Iraqi issue that tops the concerns of influential politicians in the opposition. Rather, we want this priority to be liberation of the Iraqi people from the political, economic, and human massacre being perpetrated by the Saddamist usurpation. We want it to be impermissible to view the sisterly Kuwait with the eye of usurpation.

7. To incite the emotions of the Iraqis who are experiencing economic difficulties over the issue of border demarcation is disgraceful on the part of some Iraqi opposition factions. It is also tantamount to an unjustifiable return to the maelstrom of the crisis. In their current condition, the Iraqi people cannot deal with this crisis. The Iraqi people suffer from the absence of limitations on the ruler and from the loss of freedom. What value is there in land and in oil wells without a freedom that guarantees dignity and honor against violation and that protects the soul from the evils of usurpation?

8. The Iraqi opposition must take into account that realism and concern for the Iraqi people's interest are the way to solve the people's political and economic problems. This people's problems cannot be resolved with the usurpation mentality or by following calls that waste efforts and drain capabilities.

9. Economic relations with brothers and neighbors is a demand dictated by the requirements of social development, progress, and prosperity. Therefore, the Arab family must realize that the concept of economic integration cannot be accomplished with a dictatorial regime like Saddam Husayn's regime. When Saddam Husayn wagered on the Arab Cooperation Council plan which he promoted in the late 1980s, he was wagering on mobilizing the Arab ranks to confront the payments due emanating from the war with Iran. This is why one cannot trust this regime which uses the economic sanctions issue to gain numerous political cards which it had lost by invading Kuwait. One cannot deal with such a usurpation-oriented mentality which operates along the lines of duping the official Arab political conscience. Rather, care must be cared for through influence exerted on the international political lobbies to implement UN resolutions that require the regime to distribute foodstuffs and drugs to the people.

10. The sincere Iraqi opposition must include in its comprehensive coup program the issue of the creation of a civilian society in Iraq, i.e. a society at peace with itself and with its neighbors. Therefore, the opposition efforts to eliminate the nightmare sitting on Iraq's chest must be supported. The creation of such a society is a political and economic guarantee of fusion in a climate of social stability between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti peoples. There are between the two peoples numerous justifications and common elements to pave the way for a climate of security and stability.

11. We believe that there are in Kuwait today democratic institutions that discuss all issues with the principles and mechanisms of democratic action. This makes us feel confident of future relations between the two peoples. Moreover, the presence of these civilized institutions makes us feel that our dialogues are strong and firm. Therefore, we urge the Iraqi opposition and all those concerned with the two peoples' affairs to revive a democratic-constitutional dialogue based on realistic political proprieties because we believe that such mutual dialogues will have an impact on the resolution of pending problems and will spread the model of democratic marriage between countries in the Gulf and Arab world.

12. Border problems, no matter how enormous, have never constituted an obstacle in the way of political and social unity between countries that have the same language, history, relations, customs, and traditions. Inversely, the German experience since demolition of the Berlin wall has proven the extent of the strong psychological, spiritual, and emotional bond between the peoples of the two Germanys. Those in charge of the Iraqi opposition's decisionmaking can proceed

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from the demarcation crisis to build bridges of relations between the two peoples. If West Germany has benefited from the Berlin wall tragedies and achieved enormous political and economic leaps, thus becoming leader of the European Community in numerous projects with the United States, then the Iraqi and Kuwaiti peoples can overcome the problem of Saddam's usurpation and can surpass this problem to embody the goals and aspirations that flow into the channel of the interest of future generations. In this regard, we hope that we will play together an important role for the Arab region's peoples, if we move with a sincere intention to serve our common causes and to cast away details that only serve the interest of keeping Arab conflicts aflame in this dear part of our Arab homeland.

13. It is a national and pan-Arab responsibility shouldered by all the people concerned with decisionmaking in both countries to keep Kuwait and Iraq away from political volcanoes and negative tensions, especially since the two countries possess a weighty political and economic power which can be used to strengthen the position of each country at the various levels.

A Position That Must Be Emulated

Relations with Syria constitute a mainstay in any security, political, and economic arrangements in the region. This is especially true since the region is undergoing critical transformations and circumstances that dictate coordination with Syria's historic leadership in order to avoid whatever we can avoid on the peripheries of the peace plan. What we mean is that dealing with Syria will spare the future Arab course the perils of sliding into subservience and captivity to Israeli decisions. Israel will work ceaselessly to include the Arab world in its normalization plan. Therefore, we believe that Syria is the Arab party which can stand capably in the face of Israeli attempts to dominate the Arab world. This is why the concept of the Syrian track in the philosophy of the political literature is nothing but a true embodiment of the idea of the strategic defense plan undertaken by Syria to confront the political and economic schemes hatched by the other side against the Arab nation's interest, goals, sovereignty, and dignity. Therefore, solidarity with Syria, its leadership, and its people—especially with Syria's effort to fortify the nation against foreign threats and to develop an Arab political opinion that translates the aspirations of this track in a way which ensures that this nation continues to live proudly, despite the challenges—is of major national and pan-Arab importance.

Footnotes

1. *Gulf War, the Secret File,* Pierre Salinger and Eric Lauren.
2. ibid.

Saddam's Family Disputes, Defections Viewed

95LH0258A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
16 Aug 95 p 17

[Article by Shafiq Nazim al-Ghabra, associate professor of political science at University of Kuwait: "Attempt at Understanding Dissension in Iraq"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Whatever the reasons for the dissension of Husayn Kamil al-Majid, the former minister of minerals and the official in charge of Iraq's military industry, and Saddam Kamil al-Majid, Husayn's brother and a Republican Guard commander who was in charge of Saddam Husayn's guard, the dissension reflects a deep crisis and the beginning of something big that might hit Iraq. It is likely that the dissension is the consequence of a family dispute with 'Udayy Saddam Husayn and Qusayy Saddam Husayn who have taken control of all security, administrative, economic, and industrial positions in Iraq. At the same time, the dissension is the consequence of despairing of the future of Iraq and of the possibility that Iraq will implement the Security Council resolutions. Kamil Husayn's departure from Iraq confirms that Kamil has understood well that lifting the sanctions against Iraq will not end the country's problems but may even complicate them further. It is evident that even if the sanctions are lifted, Iraq will be subjected to long-term control, to other blockades by the United States, and to cold relations with the majority of the west.

In other words, lifting the sanctions imposed on Iraq while Saddam Husayn and his regime continue to exist will mean that Iraq will be pursued internationally and by the Arab Gulf to repay its debts and the reparations demanded of it. We find it likely that Husayn Kamil has timed his departure from Iraq well, leaving while Iraq is about to complete all dimensions of the international file concerning the mass destruction weapons. What we mean is that he has departed at a time when the sanctions issue is about to be submitted seriously at the international level. Thus, he has departed at the proper time to kick up a storm, to complicate all positions, and to begin seeking new conditions for an Iraq that differs from the Iraq we have known for decades. The cracks that have begun to surface in the Iraqi regime circles are real cracks which show today that the regime has reached a real crisis at a decisive moment.

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In historic moments, the droplets of change begin with an incident or a series of incidents which signify the downfall of a myth or the collapse of a leader, a vision, or a policy. What we see today seems to be the start of a downfall of this kind and the start of a change that might be crystallized in the coming phase.

There are, of course, numerous opinions on the role that Husayn Kamil may play and on the connection of all this with his political past, considering that he has been one of the leaders of a regime that has committed excessive violations against its neighbors and against its own people. Major General Husayn Kamil is responsible for numerous acts committed by the regime previously, including its aggression against the State of Kuwait, but on the other hand, if we fall captive to the past and if we fail to deal with all developments inside Iraq from a sensitive political perspective, we will contribute unwittingly to strengthening Saddam Husayn's grip. Subsequently, such a position contributes to scaring other officers, party figures, people from Tikrit, and tribes in central Iraq who fear that their abandonment of Saddam will lead to their disintegration, collapse, and exposure to massacres. Any positive treatment that the world accords Husayn Kamil and any guarantees that he may get from influential Gulf, Arab, and international parties will provide the most important signal to such officers and party figures and may even provide the spark that determines the degree of the success of change in Iraq.

In his press conference, Maj. Gen. Husayn Kamil expressed himself well. He was brief and he spoke very responsibly about issues. The most important thing he voiced was that his departure has been intended to reflect a mentality that seeks what is new within the old and that looks at the same time to rescue Iraq nationally, to preserve its unity, and to save whichever of its structures and institutions can be saved. Even though we wanted to hear more from Maj. Gen. Husayn Kamil about matters connected with his position on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and on other important issues, such as democracy, citizen's rights, and human rights in Iraq, we understand well at the same time that Husayn Kamil may be the start of something bigger and that due payments for the past cannot be brought up all at once now. Rather, we find that Kamil will be compelled sooner or later to talk to the Iraqi opposition and to develop a vision for an Iraqi national reconciliation between some of the regime's wings that are willing to abandon Saddam Husayn and numerous opposition parties that wish to conclude a reconciliation deal.

The best solution for all Gulf, Arab, and international parties might be a coup in Iraq. There is no doubt that such a coup is the solution to the Iraqi people who have been experiencing fear, starvation, and terror. It is well known that the U.S. Administration has been wagering on a coup in Iraq, staged by people within Saddam's own circle and by his aides and close associates—a coup that is Sunni in content and perhaps Tikriti in tendency. The purpose is to ensure that the sensitive sectarian balance will be preserved, that no void will develop and be exploited by Iran, and that Iraq will not be partitioned and transformed into something similar to Afghanistan, Somalia, or Bosnia. The search for a successor to Saddam who is one of Saddam's mainstays and who leads such a coup is the ideal solution sought by U.S., British, and numerous Arab agencies, including Gulf agencies. These agencies don't want a big change which results in partitioning Iraq under the umbrella of weak and divided opposition leaders living abroad, at least to date.

The search for a new Iraq is not something that can be simplified and mapped out in an article. In its initial form and phase, the change might be tantamount to changing regime elements and bringing in other more open-minded elements from within the regime itself. The change might be a movement by a wing that has learned more from the past and from history and that pounces on a wing that has persistently failed to learn and has remained backward. The change might even be a joint assault by a wing that is good for the future and another wing that has entrenched itself in the past. It might even be a continuation of the same regime, with some of its parties replaced, but if change starts in Iraq, it will not end at the bounds of a white coup and a new form replacing an old form. The change will persist and its pace will be difficult to control. The payments due involving both society and the government and connected with human rights in Iraq may signify an ongoing process which, if started, will not end or stabilize easily.

This development [Husayn Kamil's defection] could also provide an opportunity for numerous other forces that seek change in Iraq. It is the first opportunity since Kuwait was liberated. If exploited well by the opposition forces and by international forces, then perhaps the big mistake which everybody made in the latter phase of the Kuwait liberation war can be corrected. This is the mistake of allowing the regime to regain the initiative against all rebelling Iraqi factions at the time. This strategic mistake caused the international game involving Iraq to remain complicated to this day. The same strategic mistake may be repeated if international forces and the regional opposition concerned don't proceed to decide their position in the interest of serious domestic action that leads to ending the Iraqi people's hardship through a real change of power in Iraq. What has hap-

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pened strengthens all parties seeking change in Iraq: Iraqi opposition (which is experiencing profound disunity and a financial crisis), the Gulf states, the west, and numerous other countries. We may be close today to a moment of historic change, but will Lieutenant General [as published] Husayn Kamil succeed to employ all elements and developments in the interest of ridding the Iraqi people of Saddam Husayn's dictatorial authority and his extremely backward political rhetoric? This depends on the occurrence of real changes in the Iraqi, regional, and international elements that have contributed to date to the continued survival of Saddam Husayn and his regime.

Saddam's Family Relations, Secrets Revealed

95AE0070A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 20 Aug 95 pp 27-29

[FBIS Translated Text] London—Which son is closer to Saddam Husayn? Is it 'Udayy, who diverts the people with his behavior and public opinions, or is it Qusayy, who takes refuge in secret activity and avoids appearing in public? Which of Saddam Husayn's two sons causes him fewer problems and less embarrassment? Which of the Iraqi president's daughters is closest to him, and how does he treat his daughters? Where does his official wife, Sajidah live today?

One of the persons privy to the secrets of these relationships states that a study of the manner in which Saddam treats his sons and daughters reveals his true attitude. It suffices to know only that Saddam has struck Qusayy only once since 1983, while he has struck, slapped, or whipped 'Udayy more than 20 times during the same period.

Saddam has found that the dissimilarity between the two brothers serves as a basis for apportioning roles among them in a way that satisfies their respective aspirations. He has permitted 'Udayy, who craves the limelight, to build his own executive, public organization, which controls domestic commerce, trade with neighboring countries, the media, and professional organizations for students, journalists, artists, and authors. The role of 'Udayy's organization has grown with the emergence of an irregular military organization under 'Uday's command known as "Saddam's Commandos." The president has given his son a practical cover for his actions: a security system in all of its movements selected from the special security apparatus; the military rank of lieutenant general to oblige senior officers to obey his orders; and the right to imprison or execute anyone who harms his person, a right also enjoyed by his father under a notorious decree in effect in Iraq now for a number of years.

'Udayy has entered into a direct confrontation with his three paternal uncles—Barzan, Watban, and Sab'awi—with 'Ali Hasan al-Majid, and, finally, with Husayn Kamil. 'Udayy has become the channel who regulates the passing of information on each of the them to his father. It is said that 'Udayy killed his paternal uncle, Watban. The government has acknowledged that Watban died after being struck by a bullet a week ago, but it maintains that it was a stray bullet fired at a public celebration.

Sajidah's Position

Sajidah Khayrallah Talfah, 'Udayy's mother, has stood by her son constantly since he complied with her request in 1988 to kill Kamil Hasan, one of the messengers between the president and his second wife. The second wife, rumored to be named S. Sh., is said to have borne Saddam a son named 'Ali.

It is no surprise that Sajidah occupies official positions like other members of the family. Because she is known for her shallowness, she has been placed in a limited purview far from the limelight. Sajidah Talfah possesses an inordinate amount of jewelry and diamonds. She is considered one of the richest women in the world and owns private islands in Brazil and Greece and factories that produce agricultural implements.

Her relationship with Saddam Husayn deteriorated significantly after her brother, 'Adnan Khayrallah Talfah, was murdered and Saddam married another woman. She currently lives in a separate house and is searched whenever she visits Saddam.

The degree of closeness in 'Udayy's relationship with his mother is matched by a similar degree of sourness in his relations with his three sisters because of his tendency to impose his authority on them, especially Raghad and Rana, the wives of Husayn and Saddam Kamil. This has alienated the two women, who feel that their brother has no right to wield over them the power that the father customarily exercises in the home. They feel that only their husbands have the right to interfere in their affairs.

'Udayy's relations with Raghad and Rana have clearly been ruptured since 1991. Until 1994, he also continued to interfere in the affairs of his third sister, Hala, until she married Jamal Mustafa al-Tikriti in that year. The latter is a relative of Husayn Kamil. Both belong to the same branch of the family, and Jamal Mustafa al-Tikriti's older brother, Maj. Gen. Mustafa al-Tikriti, is married to Husayn Kamil's sister.

All of the opulence in which 'Udayy has lived and the absolute freedom that he has enjoyed in his life and

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behavior are the opposite of the climate of suppression and coercion that has marked the three sisters' lives. The youngest, Halla, is the only one who enjoys some benevolence on the part of her father, perhaps because of her young age, while Raghad and Rana, since becoming 12, have been subjected to strict discipline in their relations with their father. They have therefore found in their husbands deliverance from a strict patriarchy. Saddam Husayn has always refused their wishes to travel and reside for long periods abroad.

When 'Udayy matured and wished to assume his father's role in ordering around his two sisters, it was already too late. The two sisters were able to ward him off him with the power that they had gained through their marriages to Husayn Kamil and Saddam Kamil.

Saddam and Raghad

However, Saddam once stood by his daughter Raghad by supporting her desire to marry Husayn Kamil, a member of a related family. Raghad became emotionally attached to Husayn Kamil when he was a motorcycle dispatch rider with the rank of corporal.

When he came to ask for her hand in marriage, he met with strong opposition on the part of Saddam Husayn's brother Barzan and Raghad's maternal grandfather. An armed clash occurred. The echo of bullets was heard in the presidential compound located on the Airport Road. Those opposed to the marriage, who included 'Udayy, believed that it was illogical for Raghad to marry a "courier." However, her father, Saddam Husayn, stood by her side and embraced Cpl. Husayn Kamil.

Qusayy and his Father

Qusayy moved in another direction within the family, which differed from that of 'Udayy. Since his childhood, Qusayy has refrained from interfering in his sisters' affairs. He therefore did not clash with them after they married, and he has maintained peaceful relations with them. Also, Husayn and Saddam Kamil were among the closest people to Qusay until the Gulf war, whereas 'Udayy had no such relationship with the two Kamil brothers. Qusayy's relations with the two Kamil brothers have deteriorated only in the last two years. This, after his influence in the presidential security apparatus expanded, and he gained control of the Republican Guard forces, the Special Guard, and the Emergency Battalions after being assigned to head a centralized, coordinating body to which all of these military and security apparatuses were linked. Because of this development, the two Kamil brothers no longer had any influence over these apparatuses.

Qusayy, who has a bachelor's degree in law from the University of Baghdad, has avoided—unlike his brother—clashing with ministers and senior officials. He holds contacts with them on the official level, which is devoid of any personal character. He has referred files relevant to them to his senior employees to handle in an official matter. He has also avoided appearing in the media and has refused to link his name to public sports, social, and professional organizations. He did not clash with his paternal uncle, Watban, when the latter was interior minister and chairman of the Committee of Six, which coordinates between the security, military intelligence, intelligence, special security, and military security agencies and the Interior Ministry, and whose members included Qusayy.

His early marriage to the daughter of Lt. Gen. Mahir 'Abd-al-Rashid, who is not within the immediate kinship circle of his father's family, allowed him to escape the hypersensitivity of the family in that circle.

'Udayy has always been close to his mother, whereas Qusayy has always been close to his father. Despite the older brother's seemingly open ambition to replace his father should any vacuum occur, Qusayy nonetheless has actually prepared himself to a greater degree to perform this role, after having enveloped his position in obscurity and concealed his ambitions. In doing so, he has avoided—unlike 'Udayy—causing resentment among other competitors.

Qusayy has not established many relationships in society. He has been extremely reserved toward his brother's friends and has refused to have anything to do with most of them, perceiving them as persons who would lure him into something less than what he would aspire to in society and the state.

Has Saddam realized all of these differences between his two sons and allowed the first to go out into the limelight to burn up in it while keeping the other as a reserve for decisive moments, which no longer seem distant after the breakaway of the two Kamil brothers and the president's two daughters disrupted all of his alternate plans?

Family Conflicts, Impact on Regime Viewed

95AE0069A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 20 Aug 5 pp 22-26

[Unattributed article: "Who Rules Sixth Republic in Iraq; Conflicts Within Saddam's Family Could End Family's Role; Five Projected Scenarios; Least Bloody

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Alternative Is for Mahir Rashid To Assume Power for Transitional Period"]

[FBIS Translated Text] London—Is a sixth republic about to emerge in Iraq? Who will be the candidate to lead it? How long will its rule last and what is its political model? Will it cross an ocean of blood, or will it be born after the labor of a political deal in which power is passed peacefully from a disappearing republic to a succeeding republic? What are the features of those coming in this republic's boat, and who among remnants of the current regime will join it?

These questions are raised in a most complex phase of change in Iraq's history. A cesarean section is being performed publicly so a new alternative can be born from the womb of the current regime. Disagreement with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has climaxed with the defection of Husayn Kamil and Saddam Kamil, the president's two sons-in-law, and their wives, the president's two daughters, and with their announcement of a plan to topple Saddam Husayn's regime and to replace it by another regime, led by Husayn Kamil himself.

What is new this time is that Jordan, which continued to have reservations against any political activity hostile to the Iraqi president's regime throughout the five years that have followed Kuwait's invasion, has now become the base for the biggest public endeavor to replace the regime in Iraq, thus adding a new regional element to the competition. Are efforts under way for a sixth republic to follow the five republics which started on 14 July 1958 and which have been ruled by 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim, 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif, 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Arif, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and Saddam Husayn? Is there an endeavor to restore to Iraq a monarchy whose rule collapsed 37 years ago? Or will the sixth republic be closer to the monarchic regime in its constitutional pattern and its likely political tendencies?

AL-MAJALLAH has explored the opinions of a number of Iraqi politicians and has emerged with the following report:

Numerous sources contacted in Amman have asserted that Husayn Kamil's decision to depart Iraq and to choose Jordan as the place from which to declare his plan to topple the regime in Baghdad was not a sudden decision. They add that the decision required contacts and preparations that lasted at least one year during which Kamil retreated from public life somewhat and showed a degree of moderation in dealing with the UN teams for inspecting Iraqi weapons. He also passed messages to more than one party in the region about his disputes with the Iraqi president and his son, 'Udayy. Those messages carried a greater significance, namely that this man (Husayn Kamil) has enough ambition and readiness for adventure to make him eligible to project himself as an alternative to Saddam as ruler of Iraq. His defection was timed at a decisive moment of the international dealing with the Iraqi file, the Iraqi opposition, and security conditions in Kurdistan. It also came at a decisive moment of the disagreement in the positions of the five main Security Council members. One can draw up the following picture of the conditions preceding Kamil's defection:

- Increased pressure at the Security Council to resolve the Iraq file after France and Russia had gotten from Iraq promises of big deals to enter the phase of implementation when the global sanctions on the country are lifted. It was difficult for Washington to see this happen without the presence of guarantees that the United States would enjoy a major role in Iraq's economy and oil.
- The U.S. Administration's arrival at a crossroads a year before the presidential election date. Thus, the option has been to either keep the Iraq file suspended until after the election, which would lead to further complications for President Clinton and for the republicans competing for the presidency because it would be difficult to justify any backing down on dealing with the Iraqi president; or escalate the situation with the Iraqi president to the point of military confrontation, which is an unlikely option. This is why the United States needed to demonstrate its capability to exploit the family struggle for power in Iraq without having to resort to either of these options. Husayn Kamil's arrival on the scene has been the most valuable opportunity Washington has gotten since the invasion of Kuwait. The fall of Saddam's regime as a consequence of this opportunity would be an accomplishment credited to President Clinton if he exploits this major split well. If he does exploit it well, he will be safe against use of the Iraq card in the election campaign, whose first salvos were fired in the United States a few weeks ago.
- Decline of the Iraqi National Congress [INC] in wake of the splits which have developed within this congress on a background of personal disputes that have overwhelmed the need to unite the opposition against Saddam Husayn's regime in Baghdad. Meanwhile, internecine fighting between rival Kurdish factions in Kurdistan has deprived them of credibility as to their ability to develop the opposition's political effort, launching it from northern Iraq toward Baghdad in order to bring in an acceptable alternative to the existing regime.

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- The emergence of additional elements urging that the blockade against Iraq be lifted and that the sale of Iraqi oil be permitted. These elements include, on the one hand, the need to control and regulate oil prices and, on the other hand, to obviate the great human suffering inside Iraq. However, the blockade will not be lifted with Saddam Husayn's continued presence at the top of the regime. Therefore, it is illogical to wait endlessly when the region's countries need to stabilize their relations and to get rid of the most querulous and worrisome regime, without allowing accidental consequences to result in the interest of Iran, the other regional rival which will benefit from a continued imbalance in inter-Arab relations.

Democracy Issue

It is not surprising that in the first conference he held in Amman, Husayn Kamil did not promise his audience democracy, political pluralism, and an institutional and constitutional regime. However, he did promise "bread to feed the hungry, happiness, and a modernized state." He also promised a regime capable of ensuring the country's unity and domestic security. These are the priorities which can meet the needs of all those concerned with the Iraq file. They are also the priorities that can project Kamil as the "savior" who can return Iraq to the world community and who can promise his country's hungry more bread and security than democracy and liberties.

The question that persists is: Will Husayn Kamil be an acceptable alternative to Saddam as Iraq's ruler, considering that he has been the main instrument for the implementation of numerous policies and for the cruelty and violence practiced in the country throughout two decades?

Should the "countryside" continue to control political life now that experiences of the near past have proven that this "countryside" has brought political performance down to its lowest level and has stamped public life with the backwardness which Husayn Kamil denounced in his first press conference?

Responding, an Iraqi aide to Husayn Kamil who joined him after his arrival in Amman has said, "Politics knows no sacred cow. There is no politician who is free of the political world's sins and offenses. There is nobody who is better than the other. More than half a century ago, didn't the Kurds opposing Baghdad's regime kill their own kinsmen with a brutality similar to that with which Saddam Husayn's regime deals with its citizens? Is the record of most of the opposition leaders free of the charges of misappropriation of public funds? It is exactly like the record of most of the influential figures in Saddam Husayn's regime, which is not free of such accusations. Therefore, those in the opposition are not eligible to issue absolution deeds. Today it is better to seek today somebody who can remove Saddam Husayn than to seek somebody who just wishes Husayn would be removed. This is why nobody will volunteer to talk about Husayn Kamil's good conduct qualifications or about the good conduct qualifications of his critics abroad."

So, will Husayn Kamil rule Iraq's sixth republic and what are his means and resources to attain this declared goal?

Iraqi sources agree on the following scenarios for a movement for change from within the regime and the military establishment, regardless of whether power ends up in the hands of the man claiming it now, i.e. Husayn Kamil al-Majid, or somebody else's hands, when the Iraqi president's regime collapses under the weight of isolation, dissension, and lack of credibility.

Scenarios From Within the Family

First scenario: Saddam Husayn's two sons, or one of them, take the initiative to control the regime and contain the collapse of the family power. Qusayy Saddam Husayn is more fit to perform this role because he has avoided public display and has continued to prepare himself, emulating [the late] Lieutenant General 'Adnan Khayrallah, his maternal uncle, and utilizing his tranquil relations with a large number of military men and civilians without marring his image, contrary to 'Udayy, his brother, who has been lured by publicity, which has shown the faults of his performance in public life.

According to this option, the chance of preserving the current state structure and institutions is likely. Thus, a lot of bloodshed will be avoided. However, it is doubtful that the government will last for a long time under the umbrella of this option, unless the governing pattern shifts toward civilian political life and unless a comprehensive social deal is concluded to appease most tribal, social, military, and civilian segments whose interests and centers of influence have been struck in the past two decades.

This option might be implemented if President Saddam Husayn disappears suddenly because of natural death, assassination, or agreement to give up power to his two sons or to one of them. This option will foil Husayn Kamil's plan in which he projects himself as an alternative to Saddam Husayn because Qusayy, for example, can present a reform program that contains the elements raised by his brother-in-law about reform, surpassing isolation, and modernization.

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Second scenario: Exploitation of this troubled phase of the country's history by officers from outside the family circle to rearrange their affairs and to stage a military coup to rescue the country from the moment of an imminent fall into family conflicts. These officers will have a great chance to get popular support because they will accomplish two things simultaneously: first, replace the head of state; second, rescue the country from the family conflict. This plan has great chances of success because of general dissatisfaction among high-ranking and mid-level officers and because of the opportunity that the moment of struggle for power offers a third party to pounce on the regime and to declare a state of emergency. However, a military regime from outside the family factions will be confronted with the challenge of successfully ending the international blockade against Iraq and of moving to civilian political life within a short period of time. If the regime fails to accomplish this goal, then the door will be open for a chain of military coups similar to those that took place in Syria in the 1950s.

Third scenario: An ultimatum from Husayn Kamil, those who support him, and those who back him to President Saddam Husayn to give up power peacefully within a certain period of time. This scenario will only intensify the dilemma in which the Iraqi president finds himself and will promote an explosion in the domestic security conditions that weakens the regime's grip. However, the success of this option will depend on how serious is the actual action that follows the lapse of the ultimatum period if Saddam refuses to respond to it, which is most likely in Saddam's case. As for Husayn Kamil, the situation will require that he refrain from persecuting Saddam Husayn and those who have remained with him in power, if they choose to depart power, and Iraq as well, voluntarily.

Fourth scenario: The Iraqi president moves to revive his alliances and to bring back his two half brothers, Barzan, who lives in Switzerland, and Wadban who has been shot in the leg. These two are most hostile to Husayn Kamil and to his assumption of power, despite the sensitivity that characterizes their relations with 'Udayy, the Iraqi president's son. But necessity could lead to reviving the alliance with the two half brothers. Such revival will prolong the life of the current regime if it adopts a partial reform plan which Barzan has been carrying around and advocating for more than four years. In this case, the matter will not end until one of the two remaining factions disappears. It will be most likely that the sons of Ibrahim al-Hasan will resort to monopolizing power at the expense of President Saddam Husayn himself in order to settle old and accumulated accounts with Saddam and with al-Majid clan. This is why a deal of the kind will be temporary and short-lived.

Fifth scenario: Agreement by disputing family factions to install a compromise figure who has not been a party to this conflict; who can preserve the regime's structure and unity of the armed forces; and who guarantees he will not seek vengeance against any of the factions to the conflict, regardless of whether they stay in Iraq or depart. Perhaps the most likely figure to perform this role is Lt. Gen. Mahir 'Abd-al-Rashid, who has isolated himself voluntarily but who has continued to aspire to play this role. What will help him rise to prominence again is his military record during the war with Iran, his relations with Qusayy Saddam Husayn (who is married to his daughter), and his remoteness from direct political action. This has saved him from shouldering the responsibility for the subjective, economic, and military catastrophe that has afflicted Iraq since the invasion of Kuwait. His good relations with the Gulf countries will also help. 'Abd-al-Rashid's presence will be likely if he agrees to rule provisionally for a short period after which he gives up power in favor of a pluralistic constitutional regime that ensures reconciliation among all of the country's main social and political forces. This is something that does not seem compatible with the character of military commanders like him who have big ambitions.

Constitutional Republic

There remains another question connected with the possibilities of the monarchy's return to Iraq. This kind of question is a wishful question that responds to a general climate of nostalgia for the past among a new generation of Iraqis. These Iraqis did not experience this past, but they store in their minds images of a past political life which Iraq has lacked throughout three decades. One of these images is the presence of constitutional institutions and prime ministers who are toppled by street demonstrations or by political parliamentary deals, without any accompanying bloodshed and without elimination of the rivals' influence, weight, and role from public life.

Perhaps this is the point that most evokes the nostalgia for a past which permitted the enjoyment of a degree of peaceful relations in society and which prevented sectarian and ethnic monopolization. That past was also free of the tendency of defying the individual and of the presence of an absolute ruler who ends only with bloodshed and with exposing the supreme interests to danger. That past also avoided embroilment in the sins of political life. Its death has become a cause that evokes collective feelings of guilt toward a man who committed no offense against anybody and it makes Iraqis inclined to disavow all that is connected with the

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massacre perpetrated at al-Rihab Palace on the morning of 14 July 1958, when the royal family was annihilated and Iraq's first republic was born.

According to an Iraqi politician abroad, it has been truly difficult for some constitutional monarchy proponents who work outside Iraq to contain the Iraqi nostalgia for the royal past which was partly tied to the Jordanian model and the person of King Husayn. But nobody goes so far as to call for a new monarchy in Iraq. Rather, many prefer the birth of a constitutional republic whose head watches the constitution and coordinates between the various authorities instead of being an absolute ruler who combines legislative and executive powers in his hands.

The new Jordanian position will make it possible to expand the sphere of sympathy for King Husayn in Iraq, but it will not automatically result in the establishment of a monarchic regime in Iraq that becomes an extension of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Numerous Iraqis may be encouraged to adopt and emulate Jordan's political pluralism experiment and to aspire for a tolerant and rational regime. This Iraqi politician added, "The Jordanian monarch has taken a uniquely courageous position which will not be forgotten by the Iraqi people who thirst for freedom. The issue goes beyond the person of Husayn Kamil himself. It is tied to King Husayn's belief that change in Iraq must take place urgently this time."

A feverish race with time has begun between Saddam and his son-in-law. Each realizes that unless he sets his affairs in order in the next three months, he will not be able to impose his credibility. Saddam will work to regain the Iraqi people's confidence and to restore whatever remains of the collapsed house. He will also try to liquidate his son-in-law at any price. As for Husayn Kamil, he needs to fulfill his promises promptly, or he will be added to a list of politicians who have made numerous promises to topple the Iraqi regime but who ended up involved in individual conflicts or in sectarian, factional, or provincial partisanship. According to an Iraqi poet in Amman, "Husayn Kamil has to start working immediately. When those arriving here procrastinate, people remember them no longer. I recall that the names of some opposition figures were being reiterated by Iraqis in every home during the Gulf war. However, when those figures procrastinated, nobody remembered their names any longer. We are awaiting a savior. His name and color do not concern us. Rather, the savior will have no name and no identity."

"Regardless of who arrives on the train of the sixth republic, this republic will not be able to survive unless it acknowledges," according to an Iraqi politician in Jordan, "political pluralism and unless it abandons false politics; opens the path to modernization; abolishes sectarian and ethnic discrimination laws; establishes a complete and true self-rule for the Kurds; and recognizes that Iraq is not just tribes but a civilization seeking a political, social, and cultural role with which it can prevent the recurrence of catastrophes."

Are the current developments a transitional process that will only end at the threshold of the 21st century when the seventh republic will have been born far from the womb of revenge, the military, and the tribe and will have emanated from the spirit of a constitution that guarantees rights and liberties?

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Defections Called 'Nail in Regime's Coffin'

95LA0381A Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic 22 Aug 95 pp 22-25

[Report by 'Atif al-Jawlani]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perhaps the Iraqi president was expecting to receive a blow from every side, considering the many internal and external enemies he has. However, he never expected the stab to come, this time, from Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil, his son-in-law, the closest person to him, and the subject of his trust and care. Therefore, it was not surprising that, in his speech, Saddam has expressed his astonishment and unawareness of the real reasons for what happened.

Contrary to previous crises when the Iraqi regime tried to belittle their importance and their effect on the situation, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz has admitted the seriousness of the recent crisis when he said: "One cannot say that it was not a heavy blow to the government." A U.S. official dealing with Iraqi affairs described what happened as "the biggest crack in Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's regime since its establishment."

Although Saddam Husayn refused to link the Iraqi officials' defection with the deterioration of the political and economic situation in Iraq, observers think that the recent crisis was a clear manifestation of Iraq's intolerable economic situation and nearly total political isolation. Observers also think that the Iraqi officials' defection was an indication of the suspicion and mistrust that exist in Saddam Husayn's family and between his close followers, who have always supported and defended the regime. Observers think that danger is now threatening Saddam Husayn from within the regime.

While the defection of Husayn Kamil and the other Iraqi officials was the most significant manifestation of the collapse of the close circle that surrounded the Iraqi president, it was definitely not the only manifestation of this crisis, which began several months ago. Eight months ago, former Iraqi Chief of Intelligence Wafiq al-Samarra'i defected from Iraq to Damascus and joined the Iraqi opposition. As an indication of Saddam Husayn's loss of confidence in the people, he took charge of the prime ministry about a year ago. He removed 'Ali Hasan al-Majid, the regime's suppression tool, from his post. The Iraqi president then began concentrating most of the important powers in his hands and in the hands of his sons, who have apparently become the only people he can trust and depend on in light of the successive penetrations of his regime. This shows that, however long oppression and domination may last, the regime will eventually suffer from weakness and disorder, and the magic will turn against the magician.

Jordanian press writer Salah Qallab said: "Husayn Kamil's problem is not personal. It is part of Iraq's incurable crisis and the crisis of the Iraqi people who live under difficult conditions." He added that the defecting officials were the most loyal to the regime. They would not have defected if the situation had not deteriorated to an unbearable point.

It is not difficult for any observer to notice the clear change in the course of Jordanian-Iraqi relations, which have recently begun to witness tension and coolness, although the two sides have avoided making provocative statements. Iraqi officials have refrained from publicly criticizing Jordan, even after Jordan welcomed Husayn Kamil, who declared from Amman his intention to topple the present Iraqi regime. Iraqi media also avoided making any comments about the Jordanian position, focusing their attacks on the defecting Iraqi officials.

Iraqi officials have denied the existence of any tension with Jordan. Tariq 'Aziz described the U.S. President's statement about U.S. readiness to defend Jordan if it faces any threat from Iraq as "American hallucination" and "mere nonsense." He denied the existence of military concentrations, as reported. Furthermore, the Iraqi president hastened to send a cable of congratulations to King Husayn on the anniversary of his accession to the thrown, only three days after the Iraqi officials' defection to Jordan. Political observers think that Iraqi officials were keen to calm the situation with Jordan because they realized the extent of the damage they could suffer if the tension with Jordan increased. Jordan is their only outlet to the world, because of the existing blockade, and the closure of this outlet would greatly harm Iraq.

Jordanian ministers have also been reserved in their statements, trying to calm the situation. They emphasized Jordan's desire not to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs. However, the Jordanian king has been more candid and explicit in criticizing the deteriorating situation in Iraq.

Khalid al-Karaki, Jordanian information minister and deputy prime minister, has affirmed Jordan's desire to safeguard its historic relations with Iraq and the Iraqi people's unity. Jordanian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Karim al-Kabariti has stated that Husayn Kamil's threats to topple the Iraqi regime did not reflect the Jordanian Government's position. King Husayn, however, was extremely candid in his interview with the Israeli newspaper YEDI'OT AHARONOT. He praised Husayn Kamil and said he "admires and respects him for what he did." He added that "life in Iraq was a nightmare

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for him," that he was extremely concerned about the mistakes that had been committed by the leadership in his country on the internal and regional levels, and that he was "fed up with the way the country was managed after all illusions had crumbled."

In a direct reference to the Iraqi leadership, the Jordanian king criticized the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He said: "The invasion of Kuwait was an adventure that resulted in many victims. They were forced, in the end, to get out of Kuwait. Therefore, there was no longer any room to correct matters, because his country embarked on unnecessary difficult adventures."

The Jordanian king said that he met with Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil three weeks before he defected from Iraq, while he was on his way to Russia. He asked him to carry a message to the Iraqi president about the need to reconsider what is happening, change the situation, and respect international laws. King Husayn added that he was shocked by what Husayn Kamil told him. Regarding the possibility that Saddam Husayn would adopt reprisal measures against Jordan, King Husayn said: "We must be prepared to face the challenge. I hope that we will not reach that point. We must take risks for the things in which we believe."

Jordan witnessed intensive political activity following Husayn Kamil's defection. The commander in chief of the U.S. central command, the British defense secretary, and Saudi Chief of Intelligence Turki al-Faysal visited Jordan in the first week after the defection. The Jordanian prime minister denied that the visits of the U.S. and British officials were connected with the recent developments. During a meeting with Jordanian deputies, the prime minister said that the U.S. official's visit was scheduled six months ago. He came to coordinate plans for joint military exercises, which were planned several years ago. As for the British defense secretary's visit, the Jordanian prime minister said: "His visit was part of a tour in the region, which included Egypt, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. It had nothing to do with Husayn Kamil's defection."

The Jordanian prime minister did not mention the Saudi official's visit. He was the first high-level Saudi official to visit Jordan since relations between the two countries became strained following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Jordanian-Saudi relations have recently witnessed noticeable improvement. The Jordanian foreign minister visited Saudi Arabia twice during this month. Jordanian sources said that Saudi Arabia will appoint an ambassador in Amman this month. Some observers interpreted the new Jordanian position toward Iraq as an attempt to improve Jordan's strained relations with the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

On the Jordanian popular level, a state of anticipation and bewilderment prevails among the people regarding the recent developments. Jordanian press writer Tariq Masariwah said in the AL-RA'Y that the Jordanian public was not prepared to absorb these successive political developments. While the Jordanian daily newspapers carried the complete details of Husayn Kamil's news conference, they have adopted a balanced position on the recent developments. They have repeatedly affirmed Jordan's desire not to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs. However, some press writers, who had strongly supported Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait, have expressed their concern about the recent developments. Press writer Fahd al-Fanik said that Jordan rejected any attempt to undermine the official Jordanian-Iraqi relations because this would constitute a mutual suicide. He added that no one would be interested in Husayn Kamil except the international forces interested in the information he possesses, even if this jeopardizes Jordan's security and damages its economy.

Perhaps the most important question being asked today, in the light of the tremor facing the Iraqi regime, is how will this tremor affect the political and economic situation in Iraq, particularly the future of Saddam Husayn's regime? Observers of Iraqi affairs offer different analyses regarding the effects of the recent event on the strength and survival of the Iraqi regime. However, most of them do not expect it to lead to the downfall of the regime soon, although it is considered a new nail in the regime's coffin.

Hani Khasawinah, a pro-Iraqi former Jordanian information minister, said: "What happened was a painful psychological, media, and security blow to Iraq." The Syrian newspaper AL-THAWRAH said that what happened was a prelude to the total collapse of the Iraqi regime. Kenneth Katzman [as transliterated], an analyst in the congressional research services, thinks that what happened was a family quarrel, and there are no wider implications to what happened.

A U.S. official noted that what happened to the Iraqi regime does not mean its collapse has become imminent.

The Iraqi opposition has, so far, not been anxious to cooperate with Husayn Kamil. It accused him of involvement in the killing of Iraqis in the past. The opposition doubted Husayn Kamil's ability to move the army and mobilize the Iraqi people. Ahmad al-Jalabi, secretary general of the opposition Iraqi National Congress, said that Husayn Kamil was "a principal part of the regime just a few days ago, and we think that his influence on the army and the Republican Guard is limited."

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Family Mission for Qusayy

Saddam Husayn has entrusted Qusayy, his younger son, with the sensitive mission of reuniting the family and eliminating disputes between its members. He has given Qusayy specific instructions to spend three days a week in Tikrit to meet with the family elders so as to record their observations and to listen to the causes of their discontent. Saddam has also instructed Qusayy to exert efforts to make everybody understand that the phase is dangerous and sensitive and that it requires united efforts and cooperation because the fate of all of them is tied to Saddam's presence at the top of the government. He has told Qusayy: Tell them that Husayn Kamil has gone to Jordan, that he has not been accepted by anyone of those who call themselves the opposition, and that he has become isolated. We are all in the same boat. If it sinks, all will drown!

Qusayy has been chosen for this mission because he is mild-mannered, calm, unemotional, and accepted by the family. This step has aroused Wadban and Sab'awi, Saddam's half-brothers, as well as Barzan, who is currently in Geneva. These brothers have expressed their gladness with riddance from Husayn Kamil, the "borer," who planted disunity among the brothers and who was able to weave his web around the president and to incite him against his brothers with false allegations. They have characterized Husayn Kamil as the octopus "who pretended to be powerless until he gained power" and as an agent planted by the United States to be used at such a day to strike the family unity from within.

The brothers and family elders asked Qusayy to convey their boundless loyalty to the president and their wish to turn a new leaf in order to eliminate the damaging consequences created by Husayn Kamil's presence and by his defection.

In a related development, Saddam Husayn has instructed Qusayy, in his capacity as head of the special security agencies, not to arrest anybody at the leadership level before consulting with him personally, and only provided that the reasons for an arrest are true and clear. Husayn has also instructed that a security committee be formed under Qusayy's chairmanship, with Taha Yasin Ramadan and Sa'dun Shakir, head of the personal intelligence and the officer in charge of Saddam Husayn's protection before Saddam became president, as members.

Solving Citizen's Problems

In addition to the aforementioned steps that Saddam has taken to command his family's internal conditions and to control the army and security, he has ordered that steps be taken to regain the citizens' confidence in their regime, even if only outwardly, and to alleviate their living burdens.

Saddam Husayn has instructed 'Abd Hamid Hamud, his personal secretary, to form a committee that is tied to the presidency and whose task is to receive citizens' complaints, to exert efforts to follow up on the citizen's problem with any ministry or department, and to work to solve such a problem within the bounds of the law.

Saddam has also instructed that a private direct line be reinstalled so citizens will have the opportunity to talk to him directly twice a week to present their problems and to request his help in solving them. Such a line had been in operation sometime ago but Saddam instructed that it be canceled.

Saddam has also instructed 'Abd Hamid Hamud to fully supervise the country's supply situation, to note the shortages in essential supplies, especially food and medical supplies, and to work to secure such supplies domestically and externally and to offer them at consumer cooperatives in adequate quantities and at reasonable prices. Hamud has been instructed to contact merchants at home and abroad to accomplish this objective.

At the same level, Saddam Husayn summoned Mithal Yunis, the Women's Federation chairwoman, to a meeting headed by Majidah Talfah, his wife, and attended by his two remaining daughters, some relatives, and some female party figures. He asked the conferees to meet with the female relatives of leaders and officials to find out their problems and to solve them with open hearts.

Western sources have said that the purpose of all these measures is to ensure popular, security, and military stability, at least in the next two months because they will be the two decisive months in surpassing the "bottleneck" and considering that Husayn Kamil is the last card that the United States can use. Matters will change in the regime's favor when this card is burned.

External Movement

Saddam has also drafted an international movement plan in which Tariq 'Aziz has regained his status as a dynamo of the Iraqi diplomacy, sharing this responsibility with Foreign Minister al-Sahhaf, with Foreign Ministry Under Secretary al-Qaysi, and with Barzan al-Tikriti who complements the work from his place in Geneva. This group has been instructed to try to find a gap in the wall of international hostility and of Arab wariness of Iraq by opening up to other countries, clarifying the new Iraqi picture, and responding to these countries' wishes.

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To help this group move successfully, Baghdad has disclosed to Ekeus many of its secret files on the production of biological, germ, and nuclear weapons. Baghdad has also expressed it willingness to implement all UN resolutions, including the resolution on the controversial Kuwaiti prisoners issue.

At the same time, precise instructions have been given to Nizar Hamdun, Iraq's UN delegate, to mobilize Iraq's former friends among U.S. businessmen, politicians, and journalists and to reopen dialogue with them in order to familiarize them with the picture of the new Iraq that is responsible to the international community.

Tariq 'Aziz and the group members have been instructed to try to infiltrate the Arab front and espouse the slogan of restoring Arab solidarity. Within this context, al-Qaysi has visited Yemen and asked President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to exert efforts to alleviate the intense Arab estrangement. An Iraqi envoy will arrive in Morocco shortly to ask King Hassan II to exert similar efforts.

Observers remind that in 1979, Saddam Husayn discovered, as he said at the time, a major plot against him, a plot in which 'Adnan Hamdani, his office director and his closest associate, the party secretary, and a number of most important Iraqi notables, were involved. A total of 52 prominent government and party figures were executed when that plot was discovered. As a consequence, the national covenant with Syria was abrogated and heralds of the eight-year Iraq-Iran war emerged.

Saddam is confronted with a similar but more dangerous situation now because he had the West's support during his war with Iran. However, he is in greater danger and is isolated internationally now. King Husayn's explicit position has only made Saddam's situation more dangerous.

What Is the Result?

The evident result is the arrangements we have talked about. But what is the hidden card in Saddam's head? Only Saddam knows it.

Officials Comment on Defections, Impact

Islamic Party Leader al-Tikriti

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[Interview With Dr. Usamah al-Tikriti, Iraqi Islamic Party secretary general and official spokesman, by Ahmad Mansur; place and date not given: "Dr. Usamah al-Tikriti, Iraqi Islamic Party Chairman, to AL-MUJTAMA': Iraqi Regime Has Begun To Collapse, but It Is Difficult To Speculate on Alternative; Iraqi Opposition Agrees on Goals But Personal Caprices and Ambitions Are Ruining Everything" — first seven paragraphs are AL-MUJTAMA' introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recent defection of the Iraqi ruler's two sons-in-law and two daughters to Jordan has evoked large-scale international reactions, considering that the defectors constituted a mainstay of the Ba'thist regime ruling Iraq. Until recently, Husayn Kamil Hasan was considered the regime's number two man. As for Saddam Kamil Hasan, he was in charge of Saddam Husayn's security and guard.

As soon as the defection was announced, all Iraqi opposition factions with their various inclinations and tendencies tried to talk about their position and role in this development. These factions' positions have ranged from a declaration of willingness to fully cooperate with Saddam's two sons-in-law to topple the regime to an assertion that despite his defection, Husayn Kamil Hasan is responsible for all of the regime's crimes, that he has been a main participant in these crimes, and that his hands are soiled with the Iraqi people's blood, the same as Saddam's.

In our observation of the opinions of the Iraqi opposition's various parties and groupings, we have had to explore and find out the opinion of one of the deep-rooted factions whose roots in Iraq date back to the early 1940s. This faction possesses a historical asset and a great human, cultural, and missionary extension that enjoys broad respect among all Iraqi opposition factions. This faction is the Muslim Brotherhood [MB], which is embodied in the Iraqi Islamic Party [IIP] that was founded by Shaykh Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf and Shaykh Ahmad al-Zahawi in 1948 as an extension of the Egyptian MB, which was founded by the martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna in 1928.

The IIP or MB is one of the oldest open parties in the Iraqi arena at present. It announced its foundation in 1959 under the umbrella of 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim's regime. However, the party was prohibited from engaging in its activity several months after it was announced, and party leaders were arrested because of their position toward the regime at the time. Party activity continued underground because party leaders were subjected to arrest and execution campaigns that have gone on from that time to the present time.

However, the party re-announced its presence openly in Britain in 1991, and Dr. Usamah al-Tikriti was selected party secretary general and official spokesman.

Dr. Usamah Tawfiq al-Tikriti was born in Tikrit, Iraq, in 1939. He graduated from Baghdad's Medical School and then obtained a fellowship in diagnostic x-rays from

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Al-Jalabi added that Husayn Kamil is a product of the Iraqi regime, and "we do not know, at this stage, the extent of his mobilization capability or his position among the Iraqi people."

After recovering from their shock, Iraqi officials have reportedly begun taking precautionary measures to reduce any influence Husayn Kamil has had inside the government. Saddam has reportedly issued an order to carry out a campaign against the supporters of the defecting officials.

Even if most observers rule out the possibility that the Iraqi regime would fall soon, because Saddam Husayn is still in control of the situation, negative effects on the Iraqi regime and the situation in Iraq have begun to appear.

The Iraqi officials' defection has provided a chance to expose Iraq's weapons program, which has been a major controversial issue between Iraq and the United Nations. Soon after Husayn Kamil's defection, U.S. officials hastened to contact him to learn about Iraq's secrets in this field. A White House spokesman has stated that the defection of an Iraqi official offers a chance to obtain the required information about Iraq's military capabilities. Husayn Kamil threatened, at his news conference in Amman, that he would be forced to reveal extremely important matters if the Iraqi officials personally attack him. Observers interpreted this to mean the secrets of the Iraqi weapons' program.

Rolf Ekeus, chairman of the UN Special Commission, has stated that Husayn Kamil's defection is an extremely important development because of its important effect on military decisions in Baghdad.

The Iraqi regime has come under heavy pressure to reveal the secret information Husayn Kamil possesses about the Iraqi weapons' program. Releasing this information would affect the chances of lifting the economic sanctions against Iraq. However, Iraq has blundered in dealing with this issue. On Friday, 12 August, Tariq 'Aziz denied that the UN file on the Iraqi weapons' program would be affected by Husayn Kamil's defection, because Husayn Kamil was in charge of the administrative aspect of military production and was not involved in the political decisions pertaining to the negotiations with the Security Council or the UN Special Commission. Two days later, Tariq 'Aziz claimed that his country would give vital information to the United Nations about its weapons' program, which, he claimed, Husayn Kamil did not divulge to the United Nations.

The worsening economic situation in Iraq witnessed further deterioration following Husayn Kamil's defection. In the few days following his defection, the value of the Iraqi dinar dropped to 2,000 dinars to one U.S. dollar, compared with 1,750 dinars before the crisis. The average salary of an Iraqi employee is 5,000 dinars. A tray of eggs is about 3,500 dinars.

Observers do not rule out the possibility that the Iraqi regime will try to assassinate Husayn Kamil, but the Jordanian king has emphasized, in his interview with YEDI'OT AHARONOT, that Jordan will do its utmost to protect the Iraqi officials who have asked for asylum in Jordan. He did not rule out the possibility that the Iraqi regime would try to assassinate them. He noted that, in the past, the authorities assassinated an Iraqi scientists who defected to Jordan.

Whatever the real reason for the serious developments in Iraq may be—whether it was differences among the members of the ruling family over influence, power, and money, or the deterioration in the political and economic situation—what is certain is that oppression, tyranny, and domination will not last forever. What is also certain is that differences and suspicion have penetrated the regime's ranks, despite the tyrannical methods and the iron curtain, which the regime thought could protect it for long.

Saddam Said Benefiting From Defections

95AE0055 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 1 Sep 95 pp 30-32

[Article by Walid Abu-Zahr: "Baghdad: Secrets Behind New Changes and Measures; Saddam Husayn 'Exploits' Husayn Kamil's Defection To Stay in Power; 'Udayy Entrusted With Tasks of 'Absconding Son in Law' and Army Appeased; Exercises for Saddam's Commandos To Deploy in Baghdad Within Four Hours; Qusayy Reunites Family and 'Brothers' Are Pleased With Getting Rid of 'Borer;' Saddam Restores 'Heat' to His Direct Line So He Will Receive Citizens' Calls"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Saddam Husayn is facing currently the most serious situation he has encountered since he assumed power in Baghdad, especially in the wake of the Jordanian position that has been embodied in King Husayn's clear and explicit address, which has contained an implicit attack on Saddam. The Iraqi regime realizes now that the United States is trying to push it to the "final" difficult corner. It is evident that the United States is currently implementing a carefully prepared scenario to remove Saddam now that Husayn Kamil Hasan, Saddam's son in law, and Saddam, Husayn Hasan's brother, have defected to Amman. On the other hand, Saddam Husayn has drafted a "protective" counter plan that is capable, to his mind, of turning the "difficult corner" into a final corner which, if surpassed by the regime in the next two months, will

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signify the end of the regime's ordeal. The plan provides for rearranging the family's affairs, appeasing the people, and reaffirming the army officers' loyalty. It also calls for trying to break the collar of Arab and international isolation.

Western agencies believe that Husayn Kamil has been subjected to a dual exploitation process: The United States has exploited him to dispatch forces to the region, and Saddam Husayn has exploited him to regain cohesion and to justify his subsequent concessions, embodied in disclosing secrets of the germ, biological, and nuclear military industry to Rolfe Ekeus, head of the UN weapons inspection commission, as a first step toward removal of the ban on Iraqi oil exports.

Information available to western agencies indicates that under the umbrella of this scenario, Saddam Husayn has moved to rearrange his domestic house affairs, relying primarily on his two sons, 'Udayy and Qusayy, and on his direct supervision.

Saddam's Scenario

Informed sources say that Saddam Husayn has transferred all powers that were held by Husayn Kamil to his son 'Udayy, including powers connected with the military industry and other responsibilities. The transfer entails 'Udayy's control of all secret funds deposited abroad under various names for the benefit of the military industry. This is for the part of the funds that the Iraqi tracking agencies have been able to trace. Meanwhile, only Husayn Kamil can get to the larger part of these funds, estimated at billions.

To help 'Udayy shoulder this responsibility, Saddam has asked Sa'dun Hammadi, a former prime minister and oil, economy, and foreign minister, to be 'Udayy's adviser. Sa'dun Hammadi is, thanks to the positions he held previously, totally familiar with the economic and oil conditions and he knows the track of Iraqi funds abroad, accumulated through the deduction of 5 percent of the oil revenues, but he does not know where these funds are or how they can be reached. Moreover, in his capacity as a former foreign minister, Hammadi continues to maintain beneficial Arab and international friendships.

Saddam Husayn has instructed that he, 'Udayy, and Sa'dun Hammadi meet every 15 days so he will keep up with the developments. He has also instructed 'Udayy to respect and adhere to Sa'dun Hammadi's opinions and to take advantage of his long experience and from his position inside Iraq, considering that Sa'dun belongs to the Shi'ite sect and that his presence as 'Udayy's right arm is tantamount to appeasing this sect.

Saddam's Commandos

At the same time, 'Udayy continues to command Saddam's Commandos, an armed paramilitary organization which has in Baghdad alone nearly 97,000 well armed and well trained fighters, and they are especially trained on city and street warfare. Every member of this organization is entitled to carry his weapon wherever he is and to keep it in his home, his car, or his workplace. When the command issues the "Saddam warning," which is tantamount to a special signal with a certain ciphered code, nearly 50,000 fighters will be deployed in Baghdad alone within four hours. Within 48 hours, the 97,000 fighters will be deployed in all of Baghdad to confront any threatening movement. In the other governorates, there are nearly 120,000 Saddam commando fighters who have instructions to coordinate with the army and the security forces in each governorate upon receiving the coded signal from Baghdad.

Observers say that about 10 days ago, a trial was made to test the speed with which Saddam's commandos are mobilized and deployed. In fact, they were able to deploy in all parts of Baghdad with their weapons and munitions within four hours.

According to western agencies, 'Udayy has, moreover, been given on Saddam Husayn's orders an office at the Defense Ministry to be tantamount to a military defense council headed by 'Udayy. This council includes the defense minister, the chief of staff, and the air force and air defenses commander as members. 'Udayy will perform at this office the role that the party representative has performed in the army. Saddam has also instructed that a weekly meeting be held under his chairmanship and attended by 'Udayy and the office members to discuss military and defense affairs, considering that the phase is sensitive, delicate, and tantamount to the bottleneck that must be surpassed in a short period of no more than two months.

Saddam has also asked 'Udayy, his son, to make personal visits to high-ranking and minor army officers to strengthen his ties to them; to gain their trust; to establish open dialogue with them; to record and study their observations carefully; and to respond to their personal requests, even if they amount to private services, in the hope that he will gain the army's acceptance as the head of the army.

Sources say that 'Udayy's true personality is not a terrible, cruel, and bloody personality but that this is a mask which he wears as part of the policy to suppress and intimidate the regime's foes. The sources add that this is why Saddam has asked him to respect his advisers and aides and to deal with them kindly and also to cut down on his night activities.

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Britain. He fled Iraq in 1972 because of his affiliation with the IIP—MB—and has not returned to the country since.

Dr. al-Tikriti worked in the UAE [United Arab Emirates] for several years. In 1991 he returned to Britain, where he announced foundation of the IIP and where he started his activity as party secretary general and official spokesman. To find out this party's opinion and position on the latest developments in Iraq, we have conducted the following interview with Dr. al-Tikriti.

[Mansur] What is your comment on Husayn and Saddam Kamil Hasan's defection from Iraq? What are the true dimensions and motives for this defection?

[Al-Tikriti] The defection of Saddam's cousins [vernacular?] along with their two wives, was an unexpected surprise. If there is any comment, then it is that this development indicates that the gang ruling Iraq is aware of the imminent danger and the end. At the same time, the development reflects the regime's internal erosion and the erosion within the tightest circles capable of protecting the ruler. As for the true motives for the defection, it is difficult to answer this question, especially since Husayn Kamil did not disclose them in his press conference.

[Mansur] What was Husayn Kamil's true position within the Iraqi regime's power pyramid? How responsible is he for the crimes committed by the regime throughout recent years?

[Al-Tikriti] Until recently, Husayn Kamil was the number two man in Iraq's power structure. Before 'Udayy Saddam's emergence, everybody thought that Husayn was preparing to inherit power in Iraq.

[Mansur] In the press conference he held in Amman last week, Husayn Kamil seemed as if he were the man to rescue Iraq and the Iraqis from Saddam's regime. What is your comment on the image which Kamil projected and on the rhetoric he used?

[Al-Tikrit] The image that Husayn Kamil projected at the press conference reflects the role he seeks to play, whether according to the scheme he and those who contributed to his defection within the ruling family have devised or on the instruction of the forces which continue to hope to influence formulation of the region's future. These forces have searched and they continue to search for an alternative that accomplishes the goals behind the game they have been playing in the region.

[Mansur] What is the structure forming the Iraqi regime—this structure that has prevented the regime's downfall despite all the crimes and grave mistakes it has committed throughout recent years?

[Al-Tikriti] There is no doubt that the regime ruling Iraq has exerted immense efforts to develop the protection necessary for the ruler and the regime. The regime is surrounded by successive circles of protection, beginning with kinsmen and the tribe and followed by confidantes, the party, and the security agencies which surround the ruler and which have been available to no other ruler whatsoever.

Moreover, the regime has relied on proliferating fear, terror, and lack of trust among people. It has created observation and surveillance agencies and informers, thus making it impossible to create a gap within the ruling regime's wall. The regime has also showered gifts and money on close associates, thus making them extremely keen on its survival. It has, moreover, created among all those surrounding the ruler the feeling that they will fall if the ruler falls, especially those involved with the regime, and they are many.

The greatest security support given the ruler continues to be the support given him by foreign circles which have an interest in the ruler's and the regime's continued survival. Those who wish to see Iraq turned into ruins find no better way to accomplish this goal than to keep Saddam at the head of the government in Iraq.

This entire security wall has been afflicted with erosion and weakness as a result of faulty practices, rash actions, and the ruler's violence against close associates, including leaders, party figures, and kinsmen, because of his arrogance and his fear that somebody will vie with him for power.

[Mansur] Most oppressive and dictatorial regimes have collapsed in the past 20 years in particular, falling and crumbling from within. Can one consider the latest developments a part of the Iraqi Ba'thist regime's erosion and downfall?

[Al-Tikriti] There is no doubt that the latest developments will have a serious impact on the process of the regime's erosion "from within" and that they reflect one of the phases of the regime's downfall.

[Mansur] The Iraqi opposition looks like a clashing tapestry composed of dozens of parties and tendencies. Can this mixture agree on close goals and principles?

[Al-Tikriti] If you were to contact any opposition faction abroad and propose to it replacement of the dictatorial regime by a democratic regime that is keen on Iraq's unity, the democratic and peaceful rotation of power, freedom of expression for the Iraqis, and relations with neighbors, then you would not find disagreement between any two of these many factions.

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This reflects a good common ground over which the opposition factions don't disagree. However, the problem of the Iraqis, and perhaps of the entire Arab nation, is that we always disagree on who is to lead whom, on gaining advantages, and on the immediate exploitation of positions. Afterward, we disagree at the personal and party levels, not on principles. Certain parties and figures that carry the name of opposition think of nothing other than their share of the loot, thus obstructing any concord among the opposition factions.

[Mansur] So what is the IIP's position among the Iraqi opposition parties? What are the party's roots, origins, and extension inside Iraq?

[Al-Tikriti] The IIP is a party whose presence was dictated by Iraq's circumstances. It is the mirror that politically reflects a broad sector of the Iraqi Islamic movement. The IIP's ideas emanate from the feeling that Iraq is an Islamic country and that the Iraqi people can be united only on an islamic basis. Iraqis became disunited only when Islam was driven away from the programs of parties and groups. Today, the Iraqi opposition needs Islam as a foundation from which it marches forth to unite its ranks and as a ceiling at which it stops—a ceiling that prevents revilement and disagreement. The opposition's malady of individualism and self-interest can be treated only by adopting the Islamic thinking and course. Arabs, Kurds, Shi'ites, and Sunnis can be united only by Islam. Non-Muslims are definitely and certainly more fortunate under Islam. Moreover, the current fact is that the international Islamic revival has had its share in the Iraqi arena. If the people could speak up today, the only thing they would demand would be a return to Islam.

We are sorry to say that many leaders of the Iraqi parties and groupings abroad departed Iraq many years ago and have not been fortunate enough to be influenced by this revival. Many of them have maintained their secular tendency and the practices that they inherited from generations of deviation from the Islamic course.

Therefore, our stances in the opposition arena spring and emanate from the principles of our faith. This gives us good relations with everybody. It also gives us the definite desire to contribute to lifting injustice and pushing away the tyrant, establishing justice, spreading goodness and virtue, uniting the ranks, seeking the arbitration of a just law, and giving every individual his due. This is a vast and blessed arena that unites us with all the benevolent Iraqi people, regardless of their different tendencies and positions. We have our paper, DAR AL-SALAM, in which we project our opinions and define our positions. We have relations with most Iraqi parties and groups. We exchange opinions with them and deliberate on various issues. We are tied to them by friendly relations.

[Mansur] What is the true connection between the Iraqi opposition groupings abroad and the real conditions of Iraq and the Iraqi people? Has the Iraqi Ba'thist regime left any chance for such a connection in recent years?

[Al-Tikriti] There are circles that have the connection and the awareness, as well as an informational and political role which they perform in serving Iraq's cause. Iraq's future can be made only by the people inside Iraq. Some factions abroad imagine that their ties to international or regional forces can decide the Iraqi regime issue. These forces have played a definite role in dividing the opposition, soiling its reputation, and linking it to their schemes which do not necessarily agree with the Iraqi people's interests.

[Mansur] So what is the expected alternative in case Saddam Husayn's regime falls?

[Al-Tikriti] It is extremely difficult to speculate on the alternative. However, the international forces, led by the United States, are planning Iraq's future and seeking an alternative that achieves their interests while squandering the Iraqi people's interests. Regrettably, they possess a great degree of influence in this regard. The latest development is perhaps compatible with the U.S. policy because it brings an alternative from within the ruling regime's tapestry, with just a change in faces and titles. Clinton's current zeal to protect this tendency does not need many words.

What remains is the circle surrounding the ruler, which is most capable of bringing about change, especially in the wake of the marginalized role of the army and the people, whose main concern has become their sustenance.

[Mansur] Finally, what, in your view, are the likely scenarios for Iraq's future under the umbrella of the current conditions?

[Al-Tikriti] In light of the comprehensive deterioration in the Iraqi entity, it is difficult to imagine that the Iraqi regime will survive. The ruler has had a chance to appease the people, to release liberties, to restore rights, and to prevent transgression and oppression. The people could forget and could interact with a new reality. But the ruler does not possess the ability to do such a thing, and one cannot imagine that he would follow such a course. In fact, he has established a family rule, has gone to extremes in his brutal suppression, and has defied the people's feelings. The ruler has exhausted the people, spread fear among them, killed their hope, and transformed the Iraqis into starved and homeless hordes. Therefore, we believe that the regime possesses

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the country. What is important now is for the countries in the area not to deal negatively with what happened."

Al-Samarra'i said that he currently heads the Iraqi National Movement, an organization that mainly depends on the Iraqi people at home. The movement has extensions in the army and the party. It also has contacts with some other opposition party organizations in Iraq.

Al-Samarra'i served as chief of Iraqi intelligence until he was appointed director general of the presidential office in 1994. He retained his military rank of staff major general. He said: "I left the country in December 1994 following a major security penetration in our organization, which could have jeopardized the lives of many people if I would have stayed there."

Opposition Figure Hasan al-'Alawi Comments

On Defections

95LH0272A Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 12 Aug 95 p 6

[FBIS Translated Text] Damascus—An opposition expert on the Iraqi regime expects the defection of Husayn Kamil Hasan and his group from Baghdad to Jordan to become a precedent by other relatives of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn.

Hasan al-'Alawi told AL-KHALIJ that the defection of the president's two cousins and daughters will rectify the argument about the "president father" of the Iraqi people who are suffering from social inequality. The defection of these people revealed the absence of a close family network and the Iraqi president's failure to maintain paternal ties with the members of his family.

Al-'Alawi expressed his conviction that the defection of Kamil and his group does not indicate the existence of a power struggle, "because none of Saddam Husayn's family members can compete with him." He maintained that the defection was a "struggle for shares within the president's family." It seems that this struggle had reached a point where "an expert on the regime's internal operations and a member of the security apparatus decided to anticipate matters and leave voluntarily."

Al-'Alawi said that either Kamil and his group were afraid of the possibilities of a popular coup after which they would be brought to account as partners in the regime or they were afraid of the president, knowing he is unmerciful against his close relatives.

The opposition leader thinks that "the international factor" was present in this defection. The operation was probably arranged several months ago. "The primary defector is the primary person wanted by the Security Council and Ekeus because he carried the keys to the Iraqi weapons' stores." The second defector "holds the plans for the Iraqi president's personal security."

Regarding the future of Iraqi-Jordanian relations in light of these developments, al-'Alawi said: "We must note that the Jordanian foreign minister and not the interior minister made the announcement about the defection and the request for asylum. This is, traditionally all over the world, the interior minister's task. I think that Jordan wanted to send a message to the Gulf states and other parties interested in the Iraqi issue that it has finally decided to leave the Iraqi axis."

Al-'Alawi thinks that President Saddam Husayn will try to display flexibility toward Jordan and control his emotions because Jordan is the only outlet for Iraq.

As an expert on Iraqi policy, al-'Alawi says "I do not rule out the possibility that Saddam would now try to establish an alliance with Iran, reviving his offers to the Iranians during the invasion of Kuwait. If he can achieve this, Amman will hear disturbing voices."

Al-'Alawi expects that Saddam would end his alliance with the Tikrit bloc and turn toward the oppressed groups, particularly the Shiite majority, to get their help. He will revive the policy he maintained toward them when he was vice president.

It should be recalled that the Iraqi president removed his half-brother Watban from the Interior Ministry a few months ago and appointed a veteran party official, Muhammad Zammam 'Abd-al-Raziq, in his place. He also removed his cousin 'Ali Hasan al-Majid from the Defense Ministry and appointed Lieutenant General Sultan Hashim from Mosul, instead. He also appointed a prominent Shiite officer, Lt. Gen. 'Abd-al-Wahid Sinan Rabit, as chief of staff.

On Family, Tikritis

95LH0286A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 28 Aug 95 pp 19-31

["Text" of interview with Hasan al-'Alawi, opposition leader, by Zayn Hammud and Nasir Shararah; place and date not given — first six paragraphs are AL-SHIRA' introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Iraqi situation has returned to the international and Arab limelight following the defection of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's sons-in-law, Husayn and Saddam Kamil, and his two daughters, Raghad and Rana, to Jordan.

Once again, the fleets sailed to the region and military forces were deployed. There was a stream of reports and analyses about the Iraqi president's situation, his family, the centers of power, and the future prospects

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in Iraq and the region with or without Saddam Husayn, and about King Husayn's current and future role.

Meanwhile, speculation has continued about Saddam Husayn and his family, the reasons for the defection of his two daughters and sons-in-law, the relations within his family and with those called Tikritis—in relation to Saddam Husayn's hometown, Tikrit.

AL-SHIRA' asked all these questions to Hasan al-'Alawi, a prominent Iraqi opposition leader and a leading strategic researcher of Iraqi internal and external affairs.

Al-'Alawi, who was close to the Iraqi president in the past (more than 10 years ago), responded in detail. He delved into Saddam Husayn's background, his character, his childhood, his rise to power, and his behavior with others and with the members of his family. He also analyzed the basis of the regime in Baghdad and expertly explained what happened until now. He tried to paint a picture of what the Iraqi president could do in Iraq and abroad and what the future could hold for Iraq.

The text of the interview follows:

[AL-SHIRA'] Talking about Saddam Husayn, let us first begin with Tikrit. What is Tikrit? Is it similar to Jabal Lubnan where the ruling elite in Lebanon, before the al-Ta'if accord, came from?

[Al-'Alawi] There is no comparison. Tikrit is an unproductive village, although it is located in the upper Euphrates and Tigris. Perhaps the reason for its unproductiveness is the nature of its people, the quality of the agricultural land, or the absence of large markets that made the people cultivate the land only for themselves. It has no factories, no social or cultural heritage, and no particular folklore of its own. Tikrit is one of several villages in the upper Tigris. According to a census conducted during the royalist era in 1957—which is considered the most accurate—the population of Tikrit was 3,000 people out of a total population of 6 million. You can figure out the percentage. Tikrit is not a scientific center. No centers of science existed in the area, except in Alus [as transliterated], a village on an island in the upper Euphrates. Tikrit is in the upper Tigris, and is 170 km from Baghdad. Alus is a small village, but has produced important scientists.

[AL-SHIRA'] What distinguishes Tikrit then?

[Al-'Alawi] Tikrit was made famous by a person named Mawlud Mukhlis [family name means loyal]. He was indeed loyal. He lived in al-Sharqa', between Mosul and Tikrit. This man was an Ottoman officer. He and others participated in the Arab revolution and in the government under King Faysal I. This man loved his village, and such love did not exist among the Iraqis then.

[AL-SHIRA'] In what year?

[Al-'Alawi] In 1921. This man found work for every poor member of his family. He used to take them by hand and get them jobs in the police, army, or any state institution or department. He had a golden opportunity to serve his community when King Faysal I felt that the clans had no political role that equaled their social and productive importance, particularly agricultural importance. When a class was established in the military college for tribal students who had not completed their school education, Mawlud Mukhlis went to every Tikriti teacher and third grade Tikriti student and enrolled them in the military college. King Faysal opened the military college toward the end of his life, in 1932. Among those who enrolled in the college then was Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr.

[AL-SHIRA'] This means that the Tikriti people constituted the military infrastructure of the Iraqi Army?

[Al-'Alawi] No. They have officers in the Army. They benefited from the national campaign against 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim and from the 14 July 1963 revolution. It can be said that the Tikriti people's entry into the Iraqi institutions, particularly the army, was sponsored by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, who awarded high ranks to their officers.

[AL-SHIRA'] Does Tikriti clannishness exist in the Iraqi regime?

[Al-'Alawi] No. However, Tikrit, which is geographically a small town, is an entity of its own. It can dispense with the country, Baghdad, or even Cairo. The villages in the upper Tigris and Euphrates are distinguished by their independence in the regime. It is remarkable that the same thing does not exist in villages close to Baghdad, although they are Arab Sunni. All the agriculturally productive villages do not have this loyalty. The Arab national project depends on the interest of this or that person in the Tikrit area. One characteristic of these villages is their total separation from the city. Therefore, the Tikrit people do not feel as patriotic as the people in the big cities. Besides feeling isolated, they are hostile toward neighboring villages that share with them in the regime, because they are not allies. They are united by self-interest and the regime.

[AL-SHIRA'] Are they united by an inclination toward war?

[Al-'Alawi] Not at all. They have an inclination toward individual attacks and robbery. They have not consti-

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not a single reason for its survival any longer. However, we cannot envision the mechanism for change. It is the duty of Iraqis to cooperate in this sensitive phase so as to overcome the negatives, forget disagreements, fill the holes that have been dug everywhere, and avoid getting entrapped by the schemes of enemies who rejoice to see the Muslim people crushed by conflicts and divided by hostilities.

Former Foreign Minister al-Nusur

95LH0268A Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 12 Aug 95 p 6

[Report by Shakir al-Jawhari]

[FBIS Translated Text] Amman—Dr. 'Abdallah al-Nusur, chairman of the Jordanian parliamentary foreign affairs committee and former foreign minister, thinks Jordan is not being threatened by Iraq. He also thinks that Jordan will not become an arena for activity to change the situation in Iraq. The former foreign minister denied the existence of a Jordanian-American alliance, in the broader sense of the word.

Al-Nusur emphasized several times during his interview that he was speaking in his personal capacity and that what he says does not reflect the Jordanian official view. He thought that the defection of Staff Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil, Iraqi Industry Minister and son-in-law of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, is an event of humanitarian rather than political implications. He expressed the belief that King Husayn informed 'Udayy Saddam Husayn and 'Ali Hasan al-Majid, envoys of the Iraqi president, that the incident involves some people seeking asylum in Jordan. Al-Nusur denied he was aware of the contents of the Iraqi president's message or what took place between his two envoys and King Husayn, but he expressed the belief that Husayn Kamil apparently had some concerns and fears that prompted him to seek asylum in the house of King Husayn.

We asked al-Nusur about the defecting Iraqi minister's statement that he would begin contacts with the Iraqi opposition at home and abroad to change the situation in Iraq and whether Jordan can tolerate the consequences of such political activity on its territory. He noted that Jordan has never allowed political refugees to carry out political activity against neighboring countries. He said that this had never happened since the establishment of the kingdom. Al-Nusur added that two main principles govern Jordanian policy. These are:

1. Jordan has not practiced terrorism at all. It has not carried out any assassinations inside or outside the country. It also has not carried out any acts of violence, such as explosions and so forth.

2. Jordan has not permitted foreign nationals to carry out political activity on its territory.

Al-Nusur noted that the only exception was the Islamic activity against Syria in the seventies. They carried out this activity on Jordanian territory without the knowledge of the Jordanian Government and its institutions, including the crown. Jordan, he said, has officially apologized to Syria about this activity.

The chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee added that he does not think Jordan will change its political line, as it has proven its usefulness, correctness, and credibility and prevented Jordan from becoming the source of threat or harm to its neighbors.

Regarding Iraq, al-Nusur said that the situation in Iraq was the concern of the Iraqi people, and they do what they want. He emphasized that Jordan will not have any hand inside Iraq and will not allow any political activity on its territory against any neighboring state.

Assessing the reasons for the defection of the Iraqi minister and his group to Jordan, al-Nusur said he had no information about the reasons, but he added: It is clear that differences have taken place inside the five-member group that controls the government in Iraq, which is the al-Majid family. He noted that al-Majid is the grandfather of Saddam Husayn al-Majid and the grandfather of 'Ali Hasan al-Majid, first cousin of the Iraqi president. He said that the other three of the five-member strong group are Lt. Gen. Husayn Kamil and the president's sons 'Udayy and Qusayy.

He added: It seems that differences broke out among the members of this small nucleus. He described the differences as a family dispute unrelated to democracy, human rights, the suffering of the Iraqi people, and the wars waged by the Iraqi regime on all fronts.

Answering a question about the effects of the Iraqi minister's defection on Jordanian-Gulf relations, al-Nusur said that this event would not cause us to draw away from anyone or draw closer to anyone. Our relations with the Gulf states will not be worse or better after it. I do not think it will have any effect. Regarding the conflict with the Gulf states, we did not want it then nor do we want it to continue now.

Commenting on U.S. President Bill Clinton's statement that Jordan is an ally of the United States and his promise to stand by it militarily if it faces an Iraqi attack, al-Nusur said he did not imagine that things have reached the point where Jordan has become afraid of Iraqi military concentrations or an Iraqi attack against it. He said that the Jordanian position was clear. Recalling King Husayn's position during the Gulf war, he said: We do not want to see the time when armies are

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summoned to the area to defend it. This issue is settled. There is no intention to let Jordan become a spearhead in the area or to change our political line. We are determined to defend our stability. We are not part of any alliance. We do not want Jordan to become an arena for the activity of others or for events to develop to make such things necessary. Jordan is not being threatened at all. I do not think that U.S. protection is needed or is on the agenda now.

Al-Nusur denied the existence of an alliance between Jordan and the United States in the broad sense of the word. He said that President Clinton did not mean that there was a military defense alliance. The President said that Jordan was our ally in the peace process, in the stability of the region and the world, and in achieving democracy and human rights. It is a behavioral alliance. He did not mean that there was a secret or an open alliance. This is what I understood from the U.S. president's statement. I am satisfied with it, and it does not bother me.

Answering a question about the joint Jordanian-U.S. military maneuvers announced in Washington, al-Nusur said that joint military maneuvers with big powers have always acquired bad reputation, but he noted that the Jordanian-U.S. maneuvers were a training exercise for the Jordanian Armed Forces. They are not intended to establish a defense pact. He said that Jordan did not join the alliance the United States established during the Gulf war, although joint Jordanian-U.S. maneuvers were conducted before the Gulf war and the occupation of Kuwait. They did not make Jordan join the ranks of one camp or another. Jordan has maintained its absolute neutrality from the military standpoint, he said.

Former Intelligence Chief al-Samarra'i

95LH0269A Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 12 Aug 95 p 6

[FBIS Translated Text] Before Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz gave a description of Staff Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil Hasan, Saddam Husayn's son-in-law, as "a traitor of his country and president and a man who has lost his importance," Iraqi media maintained silence regarding the rift that has taken place in President Saddam Husayn's family and the echelon of his regime. The Iraqi press, radio, and television only reported the dismissal of Husayn Kamil Hasan, who had fled to Amman. They did not report that the Iraqi president's son, 'Udayy, paid a quick visit to Amman and that King Husayn received him with the Iraqi president's adviser, 'Ali Hasan al-Majid.

Thus, life appeared normal in Baghdad. People went to their work as usual, although many of them have heard the news about the defection of the three Iraqi officials with Saddam's two daughters (the wives of two of the defectors) from foreign radios.

A woman shopping at a popular market in Baghdad said: "All I can say is that I would be shocked if these reports turned out to be true."

This was the first time relatives of Saddam Husayn have fled outside the country. Many people in the Iraqi capital still do not believe the reports. A journalist said: "I cannot believe this. It is truly shocking."

An Arab diplomat said that "the regime in Iraq does not necessarily depend on relatives and ministers. It is a firm, well-knit regime based on the well organized ruling Ba'th Party."

However, Staff Major General Wafiq al-Samarra'i, former Iraqi chief of intelligence, said that a state of confusion is prevailing in the Iraqi capital. Al-Samarra'i, who joined the opposition after defecting from Iraq about eight months ago, said that "the reports we have received from Iraq suggested that the situation was abnormal and that a state of chaos and confusion prevailed among the members of the armed forces and the people, particularly in Baghdad."

In an interview with REUTER, he noted that "an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust exists between Saddam and his family and followers, and this was creating much trouble for the regime."

He added that "Kamil will reveal—if he has not already done so—many secrets, which will show that Saddam was lying to the United Nations. This means that the UN resolutions calling for punishing Iraq should be directed at Saddam and that efforts must be made to overthrow him."

Al-Samarra'i urged the Iraqi opposition groups and states in the region and the world to encourage the defection of the members of the Iraqi Government and Army, stressing to them that they would not be put on trial. This, he said, will increase the number of defectors.

He said: "I think that the countdown for Saddam's downfall has begun and that he will fall unless he receives outside support to help him catch his breath." He added: "I did not mean to say that the regime will fall tomorrow or next week. What I meant is that this development has paved the way for the regime's downfall."

Asked about the possibility of finding a leadership to assume power if President Saddam's regime was overthrown, al-Samarra'i said: "I think that a realistic leadership will appear at the appropriate time to govern

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tuted fighting groups or tribes, as in the south or in the central Euphrates where fully armed combat tribes exist. They used to overthrow governments, and they were the ones who fought the British. The population of the Tikrit villages is not large. What brings them together are the heads of the clans. They have not established armed forces.

[AL-SHIRA'] No clannishness exists among them?

[Al-'Alawi] No. The strangest thing is that one does not know to which tribe a person belongs. We in Iraq belong to certain tribes. For instance, this person is from Tamim, this person is from Taghlib, this person is from Bani Qays. However, these villages in the Tikrit area, which are characterized by tribal clannishness, do not represent tribes.

[AL-SHIRA'] Can we say that Tikrit is just a partisan term?

[Al-'Alawi] No. People have a certain loyalty to their small village. This loyalty is evident when a person goes to the city. When a person from these villages sees the semi-socialist society there, he criticizes it and becomes more fanatic about his village. When the Tikritis assumed power, they did not behave like city people or people who belonged to a nation.

[AL-SHIRA'] Were they united by self-interest and power?

[Al-'Alawi] Yes. They are a specific clique. When Saddam reshuffles the cabinet, he replaces one Tikriti with another as if Iraq and all the other people in it do not exist.

[AL-SHIRA'] To which family branch does Saddam Husayn belong?

[Al-'Alawi] It is called Bu-Nasir and al-Bayyakat, in relation to the Bayyaki town. A branch of al-Bayyakat family migrated to Tikrit, and they were called al-Bayyakat. They are not named after the Ottoman title of "bakawat" [bey], but in relation to the town. The Arabs normally acquire the name of the father and not the place.

[AL-SHIRA'] Is al-Bayyakat the most important family branch?

[Al-'Alawi] No. The Bu-Nasir is. The al-Bayyakat is not a tribe, but a place.

[AL-SHIRA'] Again, is there a Tikriti clannishness?

[Al-'Alawi] No. All the conflicts and disagreements that exist among the people also exist among them. There is no Tikriti agreement or council now. There is also no Tikriti clannishness. What made Tikrit famous is that state leaders like Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn came from this town.

[AL-SHIRA'] What about Saddam Husayn's childhood?

[Al-'Alawi] This issue has been extensively covered. We spoke about it before, and much light has been shed on it. I spoke about it in my books. Here are some paragraphs from the book *The State of National Metaphor [dawlat al-isti'arah al-qawmiyah]*:

"Saddam Husayn is a big victim of a childhood whose effects he has not been able to shed in his present position. The circumstances of his unhappy childhood have reflected negatively on his children and on society.

"His brother Barazan al-Tikriti told me, while heaping praise on him, that he left the house with Saddam on the night of the July 1968 coup. They were followed by Saddam's children, shouting. He did not pay attention to them. When they continued to run after him, he kicked them without looking back. One of the children was hurt and his tooth was broken. His wife, Sajidah Talfah, said: How astonishing, o Saddam, your heart is like a rock.

"I asked his son 'Udayy, who was 13 years old, what did he admire about his father. He said: I love my grandfather, Khayrallah. I remember nothing about my father, because he is not kind to us and does not talk to us. If he gets angry with us, he beats us with the water hose.

"These testimonies must be analyzed by psychologists. They show a man who wants to deprive others of what he was deprived.

"What reinforces this belief is that the AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT chief editor had asked Saddam Husayn why he banned the Iraqis from traveling abroad. He replied: In all my life, I only traveled abroad once when I ran away from Iraq. This means that he banned travel because he was not able to travel. Can we conclude that he did not plan a housing project because, in his childhood, he did not live in a nice house, 'and that he seized the palaces in Baghdad and elsewhere to deprive their owners from living in a decent house?

"Did Saddam enjoy seeing the children of the people he killed? Did he deliberately issue decisions to encourage marriage to widows of war victims to create a generation of children without a father or a mother?

"His negative sentiments toward society extended to nature. He lacks the sense to enjoy the beauty of nature and the good things in life. I do not remember that he ever stopped before a beautiful scene. He does not love nature, does not read poetry, and does not listen to

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music. I do not think that he ever loved or was attached to an idol.

"When he expressed his admiration for Farid al-Atrash's [famous Arab singer] wonderful song 'The Magic Carpet,' he attributed that to a verse in it, which said: After passing over the Tigris and Baghdad, in every wink of the eye, a curved dagger. He repeated his admiration, saying to himself 'a curved dagger.' What his opponents say about his overwhelming love for cars and drinking is not true. The presence of a Havana cigar between his fingers is just an attempt to copy an aristocratic custom, which he does inefficiently.

"Does Saddam Husayn behave out of ignorance or disregard for others. I am inclined to believe the second. Saddam Husayn always underestimates the people's collective and individual mind. He talks about religion, his spiritual guide Michel 'Aflaq [founder of the Ba'th Party], and Arab unity while his borders are closed with his Arab brothers.

"He chooses Samir al-Shaykhali, a member of the investigations committee in a detention center and a former prison inspector as minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. He chooses his brother, head of the public intelligence service and the person responsible for melting bodies in acid tanks, as Iraq's representative in the meetings of the Human Rights Committee in Geneva. He also chooses his son 'Udayy as president of the al-'Ulama University. Saddam Husayn does not respect society. His underestimation of society is another reflection of his childhood feelings toward a society that did not help or care for him.

"Contrary to what he says about equations, calculations, and balances, and contrary to the way he appears, Saddam Husayn suffers from psychological imbalance, caused by the predominance of certain sentiments at the expense of others, and the excessive dominance of certain criteria and the absence of others. He suffers from an imbalance between memory and forgetfulness. Saddam lacks basic senses, like the sense of regret and guilt when he does something wrong. He suffers from a moral conflict between right and wrong and a lack of consistency between what he talks about and the truth.

"Man was given a memory, without which he would be foolish or semi-insane. Parallel to the memory faculty, he was given the forgetfulness faculty. A man is balanced and stable if these two faculties are balanced.

"When Saddam Husayn is psychologically analyzed, regarding the balance between his memory and forgetfulness, the result will be terrifying. This man has a strange memory. He only remembers the negative aspects of his life. This is where the danger lies. His memory exaggerates these negative aspects, making him see the dark world and painful pictures of his past. So, he lives an unhappy life with these memories.

"Although he often complains about forgetfulness, he is the victim of his memory.

"A long list of people, families, tribes, parties, states, kings, princes, colleagues, friends, neighborhood children, and school colleagues can testify to this.

"After he was pensioned off, the security official in charge of the National Assembly building told me that Saddam woke him up from his sleep one night to give him an order to bring in a certain person. When the person was found, after much difficulty, the security official discovered that he was a student who quarreled with Saddam Husayn in the primary or middle school.

"Dr. Manaf Hasan al-Tikriti told me that he intervened with Saddam Husayn to renew the contract of a teacher working outside Iraq. When Saddam Husayn heard his name, he paused for a minute, and then turned to him and said: Was not this man a teacher in the Tikrit school? Dr. Manaf al-Tikriti replied: I do not remember. Saddam said: Leave him.

"Dr. Manaf added that he knew the teacher. He had punished Saddam for his indiscipline. Saddam waited until the night, and then got a group of people like him. They masked their faces and attacked the teacher, kicking and beating him.

"Dr. Manaf expressed his concern to me about that teacher. He did not know what happened to him. Another example of the loss of balance is that Saddam Husayn does not feel any remorse after he attacks his victims. This is abnormal in a person's moral structure.

"A person might commit a sin or a crime, but some remorse and regret are kindled inside him. Between sin and regret and between crime and remorse, a person appears more balanced and more in harmony with the human nature, which is inclined toward good.

"I noticed that when Saddam Husayn used to mention the names of some of his friends whom he had executed, such as former Director of Public Security Nazim Kazzaz, member of the Ba'th Party Regional Command Muhammad Fadil, and others, he did that without any emotion, as if nothing had happened. His facial expressions did not change. I watched him. His tone did not change when he mentioned people like Lieutenant General Hardan al-Tikriti, who was assassinated, at his instructions, during his visit to Kuwait in 1971.

"I never saw the slightest reaction on his face when we were witnessing the following scene:

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"During one of his unexpected visits, some notables from al-Mudhayyanah, in the al-Basrah Governorate, approached Saddam Husayn to greet him and present their demands. I was surprised when I saw that every one of them jumped back, shouting and terrified, with his hands between his legs. The same thing happened, until the last one. No one knew what was going on.

"When I tried to find out what happened, I was surprised to learn that Arshad Kamil Yasin, his brother-in-law and chief bodyguard, was using a battery-operated electric stick. He pressed a button on the stick as he touched the bodies of these notables, who gathered around Saddam Husayn, causing a small electric shock.

"Saddam Husayn encourages and supports such inhuman methods, which are used on the pretext of keeping the people away from Saddam."

[AL-SHIRA'] In short, what can you say about Saddam?

[Al-'Alawi] Saddam's life is the life of a self-made person, the life of a child who was neglected by society and had to prove himself. He had no social backing or power. His only power was the stick he always carried with which he tackled the thorns, the animals, and the car drivers in the city garages who tried to provoke him. He grew up, depending on himself. When he became a president, the stick became a gun and poison gas. The psychology of the stick still governs Saddam's behavior. Society was unkind to him when he was a child, hungry, and suffering. His mother remarried and left him. No orphanages and no social security existed in Iraq. What is being said that his uncle adopted him is not completely true, because his uncle used him like a dog in the house. If his uncle clashed with someone, he sent Saddam to tackle that person. He did not send his son, 'Adnan. Therefore, Saddam's cousin 'Adnan Khayrallah, the son of Khayrallah Talfah, had a better and more appropriate upbringing.

[AL-SHIRA'] We asked about Saddam's childhood to learn if there were reasons that made his daughters Raghad and Rana defect to Jordan with their husbands?

[Al-'Alawi] Saddam's unhappy childhood has reflected negatively on his children and on his relations in society. Saddam Husayn has failed to establish good fatherly ties. The defection to Jordan was a natural outcome of bad fatherly relations between him and his daughters. I mentioned examples in my book.

Saddam Husayn has failed to establish fatherly ties with his daughters. Their defection shows weak family ties. Otherwise, how can a daughter betray her father in this way?

[AL-SHIRA'] Don't you think that Saddam's daughters did not know they were defecting?

[Al-'Alawi] Not at all. I think this was a reaction to their father and his cruelty.

[AL-SHIRA'] Reaction to the father or to their brother, 'Udayy?

[Al-'Alawi] There was a conflict of interest. It was a reflection of the father's upbringing. A conflict over personal gains was involved.

[AL-SHIRA'] What do you expect Saddam's reaction would be?

[Al-'Alawi] Saddam Husayn is now facing the worst dilemma. He wants to stay in power. However, if he had to choose between getting Husayn Kamil back or staying in power, he would choose Husayn Kamil to punish him.

[AL-SHIRA'] Is it a matter of pride or the result of fatherly feelings?

[Al-'Alawi] He is angry because someone got away from him with pride or to satisfy his inclinations.

[AL-SHIRA'] Will the departure of Husayn Kamil strengthen 'Udayy's position?

[Al-'Alawi] Do not forget that 'Udayy was accused, four or five years ago, of murdering his father's guard. This incident could have passed like dozens of others today. However, Saddam wanted to humiliate his son. If he wanted to make the right decision, he would have done what 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab did with his son, 'Abdallah. He did not take any measures. But why did he condemn his son, consider him a murderer, and register him in the state records as a murderer? When 'Udayy was sent to Geneva, the Swiss Government refused to welcome him because he was a murderer, by the admission of his father and according to an official statement. Therefore, I think that his presence is temporary. I do not think that Saddam Husayn thinks about his son and about the family. He only thinks about Hala, his youngest daughter. She always accompanied her father when we went out together. I think that he has a soft spot for her, because she lived with him.

[AL-SHIRA'] Is she married?

[Al-'Alawi] Yes.

[AL-SHIRA'] To someone close to him?

[Al-'Alawi] No one is close to him. As he told me once: The closest to me is the closest to his death.

[AL-SHIRA'] What is the position of Hala's husband today?

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[Al-'Alawi] He succeeded Husayn Kamil. Saddam Husayn replaced one son-in-law with another.

[AL-SHIRA'] Is the new son-in-law the close person to Saddam?

[Al-'Alawi] No one is close to Saddam. The person he hates most and with whom he cannot talk for a few minutes is Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan. They have been together since 1958. I expect Taha Yasin Ramadan to go any day.

[AL-SHIRA'] What about Tariq 'Aziz?

[Al-'Alawi] He hates Tariq 'Aziz as much as he hates Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jazrawi.

[AL-SHIRA'] How was his relationship with his uncle, the father of his wife, Khayrallah Talfah?

[Al-'Alawi] He always told me that his uncle understood nothing. I told him that this is not true. He knows much about history. He said: Your education adds something to society, but his education adds nothing. Nevertheless, he was strongly influenced by his uncle's personality. He is rebellious, cruel, and aggressive like his uncle.

[AL-SHIRA'] How will Saddam act following the defection of his sons-in-law and daughters?

[Al-'Alawi] Saddam Husayn will go to the Shiites and the Kurds and will end his alliance with Tikrit and the villages in the upper Euphrates, which dominated the country's institutions since the 1963 coup. He approached the Shiites and the Kurds the day his sons-in-law's defection was announced. Now he is talking about supplying the Kurds with electricity from Baghdad. It is also possible that he will send a delegation to Iran. Saddam Husayn has taken part of the opposition's program and is applying it. He sent messages to Iraqi opposition leaders telling them that if they do not support him, perhaps they should at least not oppose him. Saddam Husayn will implement the entire American program. One key to Saddam's mind and thinking is that he will not do what another person is supposed to do. When his son-in-law left the government and turned to the opposition, Saddam Husayn turned to the opposition and embraced part of its program. Saddam can be flexible and move in all directions. He has the ability to divert attention. When attention was being focused on his son-in-law, he adopted certain measures to divert attention from him.

[AL-SHIRA'] Such as giving the United Nations important information about his weapons program?

[Al-'Alawi] This was part of the American program, but it was also part of his policy to divert attention by announcing a deal with the opponent. This opponent could be Iran or Israel.

[AL-SHIRA'] Can you shed some light on Saddam's half-brothers and their vital positions?

[Al-'Alawi] The strange thing is that Saddam, his brothers, and his sons, 'Udayy and Qusayy, have the same mentality. It is difficult to distinguish Saddam's personality from that of Barazan or 'Udayy.

[AL-SHIRA'] Are they all the same copy?

[Al-'Alawi] Yes. They are the same. They kill people without any consideration, despise human life, have no inclination toward culture, have no love for society, have no permanent relationships with people, and act as strangers. I call them settlers in Baghdad. They came to Baghdad like a settler comes to a Palestinian village, not knowing its heritage, language, or traditions. A Tikriti comes to Baghdad like a settler, with no attachment or link with it. He maintains ties with intermediaries in Baghdad, in the south, or in central Iraq.

[AL-SHIRA'] Will Saddam Husayn's relations with his half-brothers be affected following the incident that involved Watban?

[Al-'Alawi] I view with caution the report that Barazan will join Husayn Kamil. I do not think he would do that for two reasons: First, if Barazan has a plan against Saddam, he wants to be recognized as the project's man and not be subordinate to Husayn Kamil. Second, Barazan's disagreement with Saddam is that Saddam married his two daughters to Husayn Kamil and his brother when Barazan had children of marriage age, and they are cousins. The conflict between the half-brothers and Husayn and Saddam Kamil was intense. Will Saddam Husayn again seek the support of his half-brothers? I think that Saddam Husayn no longer has confidence in his family. He now works according to the principle that the Tikritis are his opponents. He is now seeking his old opponents to reconcile with them. His old opponents are the Arab Shiites and the Kurdish Sunnis. This is what happened last week. The possibility that Barazan will reconcile with Husayn Kamil is slight. The possibility that Saddam Husayn will reconcile with Barazan is even slighter.

[AL-SHIRA'] Why did Saddam Husayn marry his daughters to Husayn Kamil and his brother and not to some others? Was he looking for certain qualities in a son-in-law?

[Al-'Alawi] One factor unknown to the world is that Saddam Husayn is only afraid of the people around him. He realizes that if he is killed, he will be killed by his body guards because they are the only ones who carry weapons. He married his daughter to a body guard to honor his body guard detachment. There is no tribal or family reason. There was no relationship between

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his daughter and this man. Saddam was the one who chose the husbands for his daughters. This marriage was imposed on his daughters to honor his mother-in-law and to tell them: you are like my children. He wanted to prevent any penetration. Still, a penetration took place. His house and his son-in-law were penetrated. Tariq 'Aziz has said that Husayn Kamil was a member of the American intelligence. This is 100 percent true. Saddam Husayn said that Husayn Kamil stole money. This is true. What Husayn Kamil said about them is also true.

[AL-SHIRA'] Some people say that Husayn Kamil could have done something against Saddam while he was in Iraq, but he can do nothing outside Iraq. Why did he not do something while he was in Iraq?

[Al-'Alawi] The strangest thing is that Husayn Kamil and the United States have suggested that change must take place from within so they can absolve themselves of responsibility. The chances and percentage of success of any attempt in the past were like the distance between Saddam Husayn and his son-in-law, which did not exceed a meter. They sat at the same table drinking from similar glasses. Husayn Kamil could have placed some poison in Saddam's glass and killed him. Husayn Kamil is good at doing that. He could have made it look as if Saddam died a natural death if he wanted the change to take place from within.

Now, the distance or the chances of Husayn Kamil's success in removing Saddam Husayn is like the distance between Baghdad and Amman; that is, 1 million meters. The chances before were one to one, and now they are one to a million.

They are trying to fool the Iraqis and the Arabs. They are underestimating the Arab mind. They think that the people do not understand the principles of action, policy, and plotting. We have been through the rooms of conspiracy for many years and experienced coups since 14 July 1963. They think that the Iraqi opposition members are more stupid than the people with whom U.S. intelligence is dealing, moving them from Saddam Husayn's room to the Hashemite Royal Palace to carry out a coup against Saddam Husayn. Toppling Saddam Husayn is definitely not one of the reasons Husayn Kamil defected to Jordan. The defection is part of the peace process and is linked with the provisions of UN Security Council resolution No. 687 of 3 April 1991. This resolution contained 24 articles. Articles 7 to 14 contain the terms for disarming Iraq. We tried to find an explanation and justification for Husayn Kamil's defection, but we could not find any, except these seven articles. Replacing Saddam Husayn, undermining his family, saving the Iraqi people, or defending human rights according to Resolution 688 have nothing to do with Husayn Kamil's defection.

[AL-SHIRA'] Did he defect to implement the resolution's articles?

[Al-'Alawi] Saddam Husayn knew why his son-in-law left. He immediately declared that he was ready to give (UN representative) Ekeus what he wanted to protect himself. However, when Husayn Kamil stood up at a news conference to challenge Saddam Husayn, he talked about the removal of Saddam Husayn. He forgot the rights of the afflicted city, the rights of the Arab majority, the rights of the Kurds, and the rights of al-Husayn [reference to the Shiites], which were violated. These rights were overlooked during Husayn Kamil's news conference. Then, people discovered that this man started challenging Saddam, through the media and not out of principles, after he left Baghdad. He is in the same position as Hasan al-'Alawi when he talks about Saddam Husayn through the microphone. Husayn Kamil has become a microphone man. The difference is that I can manage a microphone, but he cannot. This man has no future. He knows it, because he is not a real general. There are two types of generals in Iraq: The first is the one who went through the military college, wars, and Sandhurst [a famed British royal military college]; the second is the one who established the secret organization in the Ba'th Party, was given a low military rank, then promoted to lieutenant, and then on to general. I call Husayn Kamil a civilian general. There is a conflict between the two. The military general in the Iraqi Army is waiting for the right moment to express his hate for and disgust with the civilian general. Husayn Kamil is neither a military nor a party man.

[AL-SHIRA'] Is 'Udayy Saddam Husayn a civilian or a military general?

[Al-'Alawi] He is a civilian general, and so is Saddam Husayn. He did not attend a military college, and has not performed any national service. Watban is also a civilian general. They rule over the genuine generals.

[AL-SHIRA'] You mentioned the secret organization. Does it still exist in Iraq?

[Al-'Alawi] This organization is now a way of life and not a group of people. It is a system. It is now the political system. The state is the system. We in Iraq do not have a military dictatorship. Iraq is not governed by tanks. It is governed by the silencer. The silencer defeats the tank. The Volkswagen defeats the tank. The civilian general does not need a Sukhoi or armored forces. He needs a silencer, a diplomatic passport, and a small Volkswagen car to chase people. This is how

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the real generals, party leaders, and even parties were killed. There is no "militaria" in Iraq.

[AL-SHIRA'] Regarding U.S. policy, do you have direct information from U.S. officials on what the United States wants from Iraq?

[Al-'Alawi] In 1995, the Arabic press published a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report which said that the successor in Iraq should be like Saddam Husayn. In other words, U.S. policy on Iraq wants Iraq, as it is today, without Saddam Husayn. It will accept any substitute to him. Experience has shown 1 million party members and 1 million soldiers can be deployed to fight Iran for eight years and die without anyone protesting. The United States cannot find a similar situation anywhere in the world. It cannot find it in Africa, South America, Lebanon, or any country experiencing internal problems. Furthermore, the best thing is to keep Iraq dead or clinically dead. They would not want to recognize or deal with a clinically and politically dead Iraq, but Iraq exists and is causing embarrassment to the Syrian negotiator in the peace process. In this regard, any change in Iraq will strengthen the hands of the Syrian negotiator. U.S. policy is using Husayn Kamil to draw attention away from the Wadi 'Arabah's [Jordanian-Israeli] agreement. The United States wants to lift the pressure on its dollar. Notice how the dollar began strengthening following Husayn Kamil's defection.

U.S. policy on Iraq is two-faced, involving some deception. It established the National Congress, headed by Ahmad al-Shalabi. Some genuine national forces entered the congress after they were told that it was the alternative to the regime in Iraq. At a time when the congress was acting as the alternative and U.S. President Bill Clinton was saying that the congress is the sole representative of the Iraqi people, as the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people, I heard, at a luncheon, from an U.S. officer who participated in the Desert Storm operation, that the future leader must be like Saddam Husayn. I asked him: What about the National Congress? He said he was not a politician and cannot answer this question.

America's policy toward Iraq and the opposition is being exposed. I think that the dreams of those who want Saddam Husayn to go will be fulfilled soon.

[AL-SHIRA'] Why has Saddam favored his youngest daughter Hala over her sisters and brothers?

[Al-'Alawi] It is possible that he favored her because she was the youngest. Saddam took her with him on many of his trips. She had a special place in his heart. He carried her on his back and over his shoulders. He swam with her on his back like a duck. When he played with her, he did the movements she asked him to do. He also wanted the media to see him playing with his daughter.

[AL-SHIRA'] Did he want the people to see him as a father by allowing the media to publish photographs of him playing with his daughter?

[Al-'Alawi] Yes. Most probably this was his intention. Was he able to convince the people that he was a real father by allowing the publication of these photographs with Hala? I think that his daughters' defection casts some doubt on his success in this respect.

[AL-SHIRA'] Do you think that Saddam's distinctive relationship with his youngest daughter has caused resentment among his older sons and daughters, and later prompted his two daughters to defect to Jordan with their husbands?

[Al-'Alawi] I do not think so, especially as the older daughters had more resources than Hala. For instance, Raghad's husband, Husayn Kamil, has as much money as Saddam Husayn. I mentioned in my new book that the commission from one Chinese missile deal was $60 million. When we realize that Iraq imported 1/10th of the world weapons' production in 1984, we can get an idea about the astronomical amounts of money Husayn Kamil received in commission as the minister in charge of weapons' procurement. Therefore, I think that Husayn Kamil found a chance to escape from Iraq to manage his financial empire. I expect, in this regard, that Saddam's daughters will return to Baghdad within the coming few months, if Saddam was still alive or still in power.

[AL-SHIRA'] Based on what you are saying, do you think that Saddam's removal is imminent?

[Al-'Alawi] I compare Saddam Husayn's political situation with that of a person who has a coronary disease. He can live for 10 years or die the next day in his bed.

[AL-SHIRA'] But you said that Saddam's two daughters will return to Iraq. Will that take place because their husbands will abandon them?

[Al-'Alawi] No. The two daughters will return to Iraq for other reasons. Each one lived like a real empress. They had several passports, allowing them to travel wherever they wanted. They had money, jewelry, and various social privileges. Now the two daughters live as political refugees. Their movements are restricted. Imagine that they have to wait for the Jordanian court to issue them a new passport to replace the invalid ones they had. Furthermore, they are now in danger, and their movements are being restricted by King Husayn and by

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the fear of reprisal. In brief, whatever they have now is very small compared to what they had in Iraq. Their life in Jordan will be very different. Therefore, they will return to Iraq, not out of love for their father and his regime, but out of love for the life they lived there.

[AL-SHIRA'] Will Saddam forgive them if they returned?

[Al-'Alawi] I think yes. Things will then be resolved in the Iraqi way; that is, when he meets them the first time after they return, he will slap them and curse them, and then matters will return to normal.

[AL-SHIRA'] You mentioned that in choosing the people he wanted to marry his daughters, Saddam Husayn was thinking of ways to enhance his protection. In other words, he married his daughters to men who could protect him. Did Saddam apply the same principles when he chose a husband for his favored daughter Hala?

[Al-'Alawi] Only in Hala's case he did not apply the same principles.

[AL-SHIRA'] What qualities was he looking for when he chose Hala's husband?

[Al-'Alawi] I do not know. I think he is an engineer. His name is 'Adnan 'Abd-al-Majid, and he is probably from Tikrit, but I have no other information about him.

[AL-SHIRA'] Let us go back to Husayn Kamil's personality. Who is he, and what were the reasons for his political promotion?

[Al-'Alawi] Husayn Kamil was a junior soldier with the rank of corporal. He worked as a personal bodyguard for Saddam Husayn. I remember him in this capacity when Saddam Husayn and I were on some visits. He was then a member of Saddam Husayn's bodyguard detachment. He had no privileges. Salah Marjali was the commander of the bodyguard detachment. Husayn Kamil had no capabilities or talents other than his known cruelty. We must not forget that cruelty was considered the main criteria for the promotion of anyone in the Iraqi regime.

[AL-SHIRA'] Cruelty and loyalty?

[Al-'Alawi] Yes, cruelty and loyalty. Saddam Husayn regards cruelty as part of loyalty. To prove his loyalty, a person must be cruel. He must be able to drag a person into the torture chamber on charges of not being loyal to Saddam and then drag him out with astonishing changes in his human features. Such people, who include Husayn Kamil, were notorious for torturing people, including burning them with acid and mutilating their bodies. The year before last, Husayn Kamil participated in the heinous murder of a prominent doctor named Raji al-Tikriti. This doctor was interested in the history of Arab medicine. Apparently, at a private meeting in Amman, Raji described Saddam Husayn and Husayn Kamil as two vicious dogs. The man was taken from Amman to Baghdad. His tape recorded remarks were played. Saddam Husayn then asked his men: How do you want to kill him? Husayn Kamil suggested that he be killed by vicious dogs. Dogs from the Republic Guard were brought. Dr. Raji al-Tikriti was placed in a closed arena with the dogs, which ate him completely. It is noteworthy that Raji al-Tikriti was one of the best scholars specializing in the history of medicine. He wrote a very useful book, which he published after the Iranian-Iraqi war, about mobilization, training, and Arab. military spirit.

[AL-SHIRA'] Are you saying that Husayn Kamil was in charge of this murder?

[Al-'Alawi] Yes. He was the one who suggested the method and supervised the murder with a small group of people close to Saddam; that is, Qusayy, 'Udayy, 'Ali and Husayn Najib, and others. This was one of the terrifying murders in which Husayn Kamil took part. Still, some people are regrettably saying now that Husayn Kamil is a Sunni opposition figure. We must understand one important point. Whoever is trying to present him as a Sunni opposition hero is trying to indicate that the opposition is Shiite. The opposition is not Shiite, but Arab, secular, and Islamic. In this opposition, we have the religious, the sinner, the ascetic, the Marxist, and the mystic. Who has the right to give Husayn Kamil the description of a Sunni hero? Why are they insulting the Sunnis by calling this man a Sunni hero. If the next leader must be a Sunni Arab, there are hundreds of reputable, honest, and qualified Sunni Arabs in Iraq. There is, for example, a man who left his position as ambassador in 1978. He protested against Saddam Husayn, one year before I did and before all the existing opposition leaders. I am referring to Major General Hasan al-Naqib, who did not go to a hotel or a villa to live in exile. He went to southern Lebanon to live in a tent with the Palestinian resistance. He made a good choice. He did not go to hotels or any of the royal courts. The man continued his opposition work from his tent until the Palestinian resistance left Lebanon. He now lives in Damascus and enjoys respect and admiration. Why cannot Hasan al-Naqib be the hero, for example, instead of this dirty man? I think that the reference to Husayn Kamil as a Sunni hero is an insult to the Sunnis more than it is to the Shiites. A Jordanian once said to me: It is being said that you oppose Husayn Kamil because you are a Shiite. I said something to the effect that Husayn Kamil is an insult to the Shiites just as he is an insult to the Sunnis. I think that Husayn

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Kamil's defection was part of an American plan. Clinton wanted to punish Saddam Husayn before the American elections, because opinion polls were showing a drop in his popularity. Clinton also wanted to discipline the area by alluding to the threat Saddam Husayn represents in the area. In brief, American diplomacy is facing a dilemma and wants to get out of it. Criticism of the United States is now coming from its allies and not its enemies. The people in the Gulf are sharply criticizing U.S. policy on Iraq and the region. The popular mood is not in favor of the United States. It had to review its positions so it will not be found in an unenviable position. I think that Husayn Kamil's defection was part of Clinton's attempt to correct this policy and not to topple Saddam Husayn. Will the struggle between two people results in one of them winning, like in a boxing match. The involvement in this struggle between the two people could be an opportunity for the success of one person or a third party that takes advantage of their involvement in the conflict. Family conflicts and the struggle within a certain party for power have always paved the way for the emergence of a third party. This thing happened more than once in Iraq. In 1962, the Ba'th party split between left and right. 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif benefited from this split and seized power.

[AL-SHIRA'] If we were to admit that the recent event was the product of a U.S. plan and if Husayn Kamil is what U.S. intelligence says . . . .

[Al-'Alawi, interrupting] In this respect, I believed Tariq 'Aziz' story. I did not make the accusation. The defection of Kamil Husayn, the Industry Minister and Saddam Husayn's son-in-law, could not have taken place unexpectedly. It could not have been a personal decision, because the country state that is supposed to contain the repercussions of this decision and the international forces behind it must be stronger than Saddam Husayn. Otherwise, what was the sense in what happened? This is the first time in the 15-year history of the Iraqi opposition that a person defects and the U.S. President offers to protect his life, even by moving the American fleet. No one else has received this treatment.

[AL-SHIRA'] Will the movement of fleets toward Iraq develop into military operations?

[Al-'Alawi] There is a kind of blackmail similar to what happened in October and November last year when Saddam Husayn moved a small number of troops, not enough to capture a village. CNN exaggerated the move, reporting that columns of tanks were moving south. The United States wanted an excuse to send its forces to the area after its treasury secretary failed, during his visit to Jeddah, to secure the payments he had set himself. In short, 24 hours after the failure of the U.S. treasury secretary's visit to Jeddah and the failure of his talks with Saudi leaders, Saddam Husayn moved—not militarily. The one that moved militarily was CNN.

[AL-SHIRA'] Let us go back to Saddam's family. How do you view his family?

[Al-'Alawi] Saddam Husayn, the vice president, is different from Saddam Husayn, the president. His lifestyle changed. When he was a vice president, his lifestyle was ordinary—and I would not say it was humble.

[AL-SHIRA'] Did the president's family act superior to the Iraqi people at that time?

[Al-'Alawi] This happened later. As I said, Saddam, the vice president, was different from Saddam, the president.

[AL-SHIRA'] Did the president's children receive any special treatment when they studied in Iraqi schools and colleges?

[Al-'Alawi] No. They lived in their own atmosphere of superiority, aggression, and domination. It was impossible, for example, for a beautiful girl to get away from them. 'Udayy goes often to the Iraqi hunting club, which is a social club. 'Udayy's record is full of horrible incidents. There are many horrible stories about him.

[AL-SHIRA'] Let us open the file of Saddam's succession. Do you think that 'Udayy could succeed his father, especially after his position became stronger when his two brothers-in-law left the country making him the number two man in Iraq?

[Al-'Alawi] Although theology tried to create a divine succession, Saddam Husayn considers himself higher. Husayn Kamil was not the number two man, and 'Udayy could not become the number two man.

[AL-SHIRA'] Objectively speaking, 'Udayy is, in fact, the number two man?

[Al-'Alawi] This is not an objective statement. You are describing a situation. 'Udayy is not the number two man now. The number two men are the vice president and Revolution Command Council's Deputy Chairman 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri. Logically, these are the number two men. 'Udayy is committing major violations. In light of these violations, he is being referred to as his father's successor or the number two man. This is not being done in light of his accomplishments or his political role. He does not have a political role. He is the chairman of the journalists' association and the chairman of some societies and clubs. He does not play a basic role in the regime. In short, 'Udayy does not have a role. He has committed a number of violations. He killed some people and insulted others. His importance

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is based on the number of violations he committed as the president's son. Perhaps the regime is based on such domination and violations. The simple people think that 'Udayy will succeed Saddam Husayn because he looks like his father. Just as his father committed murder at a young age, 'Udayy committed murder at a young age, too. He talks like his father. He is like his father even in his life-style and personality.

[AL-SHIRA'] Then perhaps some truth exists in what you say about the people's impression of 'Udayy as his father's successor?

[Al-'Alawi] But I ask: Does 'Udayy have any influence in the Army? If tomorrow 'Udayy announces his first communique after a coup, as some newspapers expected, will he succeed? I think that Army units will oppose him and rebel. The Mosul and al-Basrah army units, particularly the border units that are far from Baghdad, will rebel. The real officers will rebel. He has no support in the military establishment. He has no support among the civilian generals nor among the military generals. His family does not approve of him. The party does not approve of him. He has not been prepared for the job, neither by his father nor by the party and the ruling establishment.

[AL-SHIRA'] According to recent reports from Iraq, if Saddam Husayn had something to complain about, he always did it to 'Udayy.

[Al-'Alawi] This is illogical. Saddam Husayn does not complain. I will give you an example. Saddam complained once when he issued an official statement about the murder of a person named 'Abd-al-Rahman Samarra'i. This person was killed in an uprising in an area called al-Thawrah. Saddam issued a strongly worded statement, promising to avenge the martyr. In short, the statement contained some complaints, and such remarks are not part of the vocabulary Saddam uses in his political speeches and party statements. I picked up the telephone and called Saddam, thinking that the statement was written by Tariq 'Aziz. I expected Saddam to get angry with him for doing that, but I was surprised when I heard Saddam telling me that he wrote the statement himself. He said that the intention was not to complain about the incident, but to highlight the complaint and use it to prepare the ground for retaliation. Saddam Husayn insisted, during our phone call, on denying my accusation that he had become "al-Sawadi."

[AL-SHIRA'] Who is "al-Sawadi?"

[Al-'Alawi] He is 'Aziz al-Sawadi. He was the first communist to be killed during the spread of communism in Iraq and at the height of the communist strength and terrorization of the people. A Ba'thist villain killed al-Sawadi. The Communist Party's newspaper TARIQ AL-SHA'B stirred up a big storm. This behavior made the Ba'th Party regard this day as a day of victory. The party interpreted the Communist Party's complaints as an indication of its weakness in Iraq. Therefore, "al-Sawadi" has become a term indicating the state of the complainer. Saddam told me then: You are wrong, and you will always be wrong. The Communists complained about al-Sawadi and then got quiet, but I complained to stir things up. Saddam Husayn does not complain to anyone.

[AL-SHIRA'] Talking about the persons close to Saddam—who, as you said, are always closer to their death—we want to ask about Tariq 'Aziz, who has been close to Saddam Husayn for a long time. Based on your knowledge of Saddam, what is his personal opinion of Tariq 'Aziz?

[Al-'Alawi] Saddam Husayn does not like Tariq 'Aziz. He has no sentiments toward him. For instance, one time we were talking about violations and problems in the media. Tariq 'Aziz was then managing the media, although he was not the information minister. He was the deputy chief of the Ba'th Party National Command's Cultural and Information Bureau. There was a surprise when the Ba'th Party issued a circular to every member working in the media asking them to write a letter containing everything they knew about their superiors. The superiors had to do the same to their superiors and so forth. So, gradually and after 10 stages, it got to Tariq 'Aziz. A committee headed by Tariq 'Abd-al-Karim, a party command member and a minister, was formed to investigate the contents of these letters. When the letters were opened, Tariq 'Aziz was surprised to learn that those who spoke against him were the same media officials he appointed. The result was that he immediately fainted. He developed an ulcer and was taken to the hospital.

[AL-SHIRA'] Why is Saddam Husayn keeping Tariq 'Aziz?

[Al-'Alawi] For several reasons. First, he is his messenger to the West. During the Iraq-Iran war, Saddam used to tell the West that the conflict was between Iraq and the Western camp, on the one hand, and those backward Islamists, on the other. In an attempt to give credibility to this claim in the West, he deliberately left the foreign affairs portfolio in Tariq 'Aziz' hands so he could tell the West that the one who represented our foreign affairs and culture in the world was a Christian.

[AL-SHIRA'] The other person who has as much seniority as Tariq 'Aziz in working with Saddam Husayn is Taha Yasin Ramadan. What is the secret

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of his continued service with Saddam, who has killed, banished, or imprisoned most of his aides?

[Al-'Alawi] His full name is Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jazrawi. His last name al-Jazrawi [the islander] is in relation to an island between the Euphrates and the Tigris. His origin is Kurdish. Ramadan al-Jazrawi is semi-illiterate. He served as assistant to Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, opening doors and serving tea. This was his duty, because al-Bakr was a Major General and Taha Ramadan was a retired officer. Once AL-MAJALLAH wanted to write an article about the 17 July coup. In an introductory interview, Ramadan said to AL-MAJALLAH that the people have a misconception about Saddam Husayn. Saddam did not play any role in the revolution. He is so and so and so. I asked him with surprise: What are you talking about? He answered: This is my opinion. Ramadan was then a protege of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. When Saddam Husayn learned about Ramadan's attempt to diminish his role in the July Revolution, he said to me: This person wants to make himself important, which he is not. We here are suffering from people with invented importance.

The days went by and another occasion came. In an interview with me, which I published under the headline "One Hundred Hours with Saddam," he said: We will get rid of the people with invented importance. On another occasion, Saddam was shown on television visiting Planning Minister 'Adnan Hamadani and Industry Minister Taha Ramadan. When Saddam entered Hamadani's office, the encounter was extremely cordial. They embraced and conversed. However, when Saddam was shown with Ramadan, the atmosphere seemed very tense. They did not embrace, and Saddam not talk to him. He almost had his back toward him. I commented to Saddam about this scene, saying it was an information and political scandal. You were cordial toward Hamadani in public and on television, while you were unfriendly toward Ramadan, the industry minister and the command member. He replied: I do not like Taha Ramadan. I like 'Adnan. However, in the end, he executed 'Adnan Hamadani, while Taha Ramadan is still in his position.

[AL-SHIRA'] There were reports that King Husayn played a role in the defection. According to one scenario, King Husayn would become the head of a Jordanian-Iraqi confederation when Saddam is removed from power. What role did King Husayn play in the defection of the two sons-in-law and what are his aims?

[Al-'Alawi] A strange relationship has existed between Saddam and King Husayn. The first is a revolutionary and the second is a conservative. The first is the head of a secret organization that believes in coups, and the second is a man who was hurt by uprisings. King Husayn is a king and the son of a king, and Saddam is a man who came from the back streets. What is common between them? Even in politics, Saddam is a leftist and King Husayn is a rightist. From the economic standpoint, Iraq is socialist and Jordan is capitalist. Therefore, there must be something that ties them together. I made this known for the first time in my new book. It is the agreement that British Labor Party Foreign Minister George Brown brokered among King Husayn, Saddam Husayn, and the shah of Iran to divide the spheres of influence and work together after Britain withdraws from east of the Suez Canal. King Husayn represented the Gulf states, which had not been consolidated then. They were protectorates. King Husayn represented them in the negotiations and in the talks with the shah. Brown visited Iraq frequently. The last time was after the Khomeyni revolution in Iran. Brown had a plan called the "equal benefits triangle." Each side—the shah, Saddam Husayn, and King Husayn—would give and take. This is what happened. Under this agreement, Iran withdrew its veto against the independence of Bahrain and the Arab Emirates. Iran occupied the three Gulf islands and withdrew its support for the Iraqi Kurds. Following this, the 11 March 1970 statement was issued and the Black September incidents against the Palestinian resistance took place. Based on an agreement between Saddam and King Husayn, the Iraqi Army did not intervene. Whoever wants to find out the secret of this relationship between King Husayn and Saddam Husayn should go back to the beginning of the seventies or the end of the sixties when Saddam Husayn came to power on 17 July 1968. It is noteworthy that six months earlier, on 17 January 1968, Britain announced that it was withdrawing from east of the Suez Canal. The architect of this plan was George Brown, British Labor Party foreign minister. During the six months, from 17 January to 17 July 1968, the Ba'th Party (Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn's group) seized power in Iraq and skirmishes began with the shah. This scenario was part of the plan. This was followed by Bahrain's and the Emirates' independence, the July massacres, and the agreement with the Kurds, specifically with Mustafa Barazani, which they called the 11 March 1970 statement. After that, following a long meeting with Brown after the Iranian revolution, Saddam Husayn unilaterally assumed power. The plan was that Iraq would withdraw from the unity pact with Syria and launch a blitzkrieg against Iran to topple the regime there. Saddam Husayn then would turn toward the Gulf where he would create his heroisms. These facts are not a revelation. They are facts that I knew as an eyewitness. I saw George Brown and Saddam Husayn. I met with

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Saddam and listened to what he wanted to say or wanted to leak out.

[AL-SHIRA'] Husayn Kamil is reportedly a U.S. agent. When did Kamil's ties with the Americans begin?

[Al-'Alawi] There are several stories about the history of Husayn Kamil's contacts with the United States. King Husayn said that he contacted him four weeks earlier. Another story says that Kamil's contacts with U.S. intelligence began following the attack on the U.S. Navy ship "Stark" and the killing of several Americans. It was reported then that Husayn Kamil paid $30 million to the Americans as compensation to close the case. A third story says that his contacts began during his treatment in the United States from some traumas he suffered. I tend to believe the second story.

[AL-SHIRA'] In your opinion, what role could King Husayn play in the future?

[Al-'Alawi] The role has been announced by the Americans themselves.

[AL-SHIRA'] When?

[Al-'Alawi] First, by President Clinton at the signing ceremony of the Wadi 'Arabah agreement when he emphasized King Husayn's right to become the custodian of the holy places in Jerusalem. This gives him the right for the custodianship of, what the king calls, the Hashemite province, which includes Iraq and the holy land. Second, by President Clinton in the message of support he sent to King Husayn, following Husayn Kamil's defection, in which he expressed his conviction about Jordan's strategic role in defending peace.

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Editorial Examines Future of Iraq

95LH0267a London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 10 Sep p 7

[Editorial by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid: "Iraq of the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is a race to plan the future of Iraq after its collapse, which, in the view of many, appears imminent. Objectively speaking, these proposals are not worth the paper they are written on because they are hypotheses that do not always stand up in the light of facts that are stronger than hypotheses.

However, the driving force behind this plan is that the future of Iraq is a concern not only to Iraqis, but also to all the states of the region, more precisely the neighboring states that will either lose or gain from the change. The future of Iraq also concerns the great powers because Iraq is an oil producing state with strategic and geostrategic value.

During the course of its history, Iraq, like many other Arab states, was the product of its artificially created borders and became the Iraq it is in the shadow of colonialism. Its borders included a mixture of Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shi'is, Turkomens, Persians, Assyrians, Armenians, Chaldeans, Jews, Yazidis, Sabaeans, and others.

It was inevitable that this mixture would naturally produce some degree of unrest and confrontation, because of the different aspirations of these groups or, quite simply, because of the absence of any spirit of communal life, which we see in an ideal form in Switzerland, a mixed land with deeply rooted divisions.

What made matters more complicated was the failure of Iraqi governments to solve this social-political problem and even the way some of them exploited ethnic or racial differences in order to implement their political programs. The source of their weakness generally derived from the inability of these governments to represent Iraqis. Faysal I, the King of Iraq from 1921-33, is reputed to have complained about the difficulty of establishing common ties between the people of Iraq when he wrote in a secret memorandum: "I say—and my heart is full of sorrow because I believe this—that there is not yet an Iraqi people in Iraq. Rather, there are imaginary human blocs devoid of any nationalist ideology and filled with religious traditions and vanities. Nothing unites them. They listen to evil, are inclined to chaos, and are always ready to rise up against any government whatever."

These harsh words bear testimony against the successive Iraqi governments that failed to establish a common identity that would make all Iraqis feel a common sense of belonging to the state. It was not the mistake of the people themselves. Now, more than 60 years after this testimony, the Iraqis face the question of the their future with the same fear—indeed, an even greater fear—that some of them felt when the country was first established.

Where is it possible for Iraq to go after the bloodbaths it has experienced, in the midst of the threats of chaos that confront it, and in the shadow of the great internal disintegration that occurred during the years of the present regime, to the extent that the number of Iraqis living abroad has reached nearly 3,000,000 emigres out of a population of 18,000,000?

The present regime has lost numerous opportunities to establish a united Iraq bound together by a national connection, under whose protection Iraqis of different persuasions and religions would live. During the 16 years of the present regime—which was preceded by 20 years of a similar regime—Iraq was transformed into nothing but the state of a political party, then into a state based on the solidarity of a city, then into a state belonging to a family, and, finally, into a state belonging to an individual who is no longer tolerated, even by the other members of his family.

That had a negative impact on the way Iraqis view one another, so that each group started wanting to rule itself or to be independent within its own entity in the belief that such a solution was preferable to one tyrannical Iraq composed of different races and religions that only brought them suffering. Were we to assume that either of the two forms of this proposal was acceptable—seizing control of all power in the state or partitioning Iraq—the consequences of this would be disastrous. The Kurds stand before us as a living example of this. They assumed control of their region, which was detached from the control of the Iraqi Government and had the good fortune to fall under international protection. Despite all this, the Kurds fought among themselves. As a result, the misfortune they brought upon themselves was no less than what the Baghdad regime previously did to them. Partition is not a solution to the Iraqi problem and would certainly be a danger for all the states of the region without exception. For any one group to seize power would likewise extend the suffering of Iraq for more years and continue the conflict between all Iraqis in a war without end.

There is a conviction among many states in the region that the solution must be found within the framework of an Iraq that respects all and represents all. That view has become acceptable to the Iraqi dialogue through numerous dialogues among several of its factions that have coexisted abroad.

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There is nobody more knowledgeable of the cure that heals the sick Layla in Iraq than the skillful Hashemite doctor in Jordan.

King Husayn's Scenario for Ruling Iraq Described

95LH0264 Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 21 Aug 95 pp 22-25

[Unattributed article: King Husayn's Scenario for Ruling Iraq]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the afternoon of 10 May 1995, an Arab citizen made his way to the famous Tawrin restaurant in Amman, that was previously known by the English name "Smarties", in order to surprise his friend, the owner of the establishment. He apologized for taking over the entire restaurant at the request of the security services on behalf of a prominent Arab guest. He did this without canceling the invitation he had extended to his friend, the owner of the restaurant, to be his guest at his private table during lunch, so that the owner could oversee the orders of the guests and those accompanying them.

The guests were none other than the Iraqi minister of industrialization and son-in-law of President Saddam Husayn, Husayn Hasan Kamil al-Majid, prominent figures from his ministry and Shakir bin Zayd, head of the accompanying Jordanian delegation.

This unannounced visit was not the first of its kind. Amman was an obligatory passageway for every Iraqi official— and most citizens. Passing through Jordan was the only option available to them because the other alternatives of crossing the Syrian, Kuwaiti, Saudi, Iranian, and Turkish frontiers were closed because of political and security considerations.

Jordan continues to be the route Iraqis—especially politicians and officials—must follow to reach the outside world.

This route was the snare that King Husayn set to trap the leading elements of the Iraqi regime. King Husayn did this so that he could, with obvious astuteness [shahama] and generosity, receive as his guest every Iraqi official passing through Jordan to the outside world. He would have each one of them join him at his table for lunch, dinner or for a cup of tea during the afternoon in order to talk with him about what was happening in Iraq, his personal anxieties, the state of the blockade, and its effects on the citizens of Iraq. The King always volunteered to play the part of an intermediary with the United States of America to solve the enormous problems between Baghdad and Washington. This was especially true after his standing in Washington grew following his signing of a peace treaty with the Zionist enemy on 25 July 1993.

Husayn questioned and probed every visiting Iraqi official about his willingness to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people and lift the blockade imposed on the regime. He would add that he was prepared, as a matter of Arab national duty, to request internal Iraqi movement towards showing Iraqi good intentions towards the United States of America. More precisely, every time Husayn would call upon his guest to speak frankly with President Saddam Husayn about the need for an initiative in the direction of this movement for own his sake and the sake of Iraq.

Husayn would speak sincerely with his official Iraqi visitors in a manner befitting the temperament, demeanor and mentality of each. And if he found someone who agreed with him, Husayn, acting on the basis of his experience with men, would offer more suggestions and advice. Husayn Kamil was the most frequent visitor at the table of Husayn bin Talal. When traveling abroad, he always passed through Jordan coming and going from Iraq. Several considerations account for the attention that was focused on this very important man in the Iraqi regime:

First, he is the son-in-law of President Saddam Husayn, the supreme strong man and ruler of Iraq, who became vice president in 1970 and has been president since 1980. This means that he has been in power for a quarter of a century since seizing control of the regime in 1969.

Second, he is well-informed about the basic secrets of the Iraqi state with respect to the army, its armed forces and their equipment, military industrialization and the dangerous material used to make weapons of mass destruction.

Third, he is the principal figure in charge of the Republican Guard, the backbone of the Iraqi military regime. The importance of the third point derives from the fact that Husayn Kamil is indeed the one who built this guard, with the absolute support of Saddam Husayn. He is the one who transformed it from a flimsy brigade that was, so to speak, one of the foundations of the Iraqi opposition, into a large army of 100,000 fighters divided into 37 brigades, most of which are under the command of members of his family and tribe.

Husayn Kamil succeeded in building the Republican Guard, the Military Industrial Organization, the president's Special Security force, and in gaining the confidence of the president which led to his becoming related by marriage to the president.

Fourth, he is a soldier, Sunni and pan-Arabist ['urubi] from Tikrit who is a member of the president's family.

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According to the checks and balances of the Arab-international political system, these are qualifications that any future president of Iraq must have. The name of Husayn Kamil had previously pushed aside several other names, among them Maj. Gen. Hasan al-Naqib and Lt. Gen. Rafiq al-Samarrai', both of whom are Sunni pan-Arab soldiers from Samarra', one of the five towns from which the Iraqi army has drawn most of its commanders during the last 50 years. The other four towns are Mosul, Tikrit, 'Ana, and Falujah. An acronym taken from the first letter of the name of each town spells "tyrannical" [muta'assif].

Fifth, he is a young man who stands out for his bravery, violence, and intelligence (even if his education is limited: the only language he speaks well is the colloquial Iraqi dialect.) All these factors led King Husayn to focus his attention on Husayn Kamil so that he could draw him to his side [istiqtabihi]. The opportunity to do this increased when Husayn Kamil started giving King Husayn his first "in" [bada yumsiku awwal al-khayt] by talking about the inevitable conflict between the centers of power inside the Iraqi regime, the ruling family, and the home of the president himself.

King Husayn gathered information on all this, waiting for an opening and a disclosure at just the right moment. He did this as would any veteran party politician intent on winning over a candidate when all the conditions fell into place for him to join his political party.

When dissension appeared at the decision-making level inside the president's home between 'Udayy, the son, and Husayn, the son-in-law, and 'Udayy became the most important center of power and Husayn a minor center of power, a breakdown became inevitable. In particular, Husayn Kamil complained to King Husayn about 'Udayy's influence, power and [word indistinct] in everything in Iraq. When the time came and 'Udayy decided to purge Husayn Kamil (see elsewhere in this issue for a related story), Husayn Kamil decided to flee to King Husayn. And so it was.

Why Jordan?

It is known that Jordan was the creation of one of the sons of Sharif Husayn the Hashemite, who installed his sons as rulers of the Arab East after his defeat in the Arabian peninsula following the revolt of 1916. After his defeat in 1920, King Faysal I (head of the Arab state in Syria that had its capital in Damascus) made his way to Iraq so that he and his sons after him could rule that land. When his brother 'Abdullah headed from Iraq to Syria to reestablish Hashemite rule there, the English advised him to remain in the east bank of Palestine so that the Palestinian-Syrian Jordan River would become a separation between Palestine, the state the British occupied in the west, and an eastern territory where it would be possible to establish an emirate that was originally known as the Emirate of Transjordan. (The English were the ones who set the political course for the Hashemite family from the moment they assumed the political burden early in this century of opposing the Ottoman state.) One of the sons of Sharif Husayn would assume control of Transjordan instead of heading for Damascus because it had fallen under French control and, especially, because of the peace treaty that the British and French had concluded following disputes over partitioning the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. It was no political coincidence that, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, the establishment of political entities in Greater Syria was proclaimed as follows: Lebanon (1920), Jordan (1927), the Balfour Declaration in Palestine (1917).

'Abdullah and Faysal established themselves as the rulers of Jordan and Iraq respectively so that their rule would be passed on after them in a hereditary fashion as follows:

In Iraq Faysal was succeeded by Ghazi and then by Faysal [II] who was overthrown by the revolution of 14 July 1958 that was led by 'Abd al-Salaam 'Arif.

In Jordan, 'Abdullah was succeeded by Talal, whose [mental] illness and well-known Arab nationalist tendencies raised doubts about him. After he was declared legally incompetent, his wife, Zayn, took charge of the affairs of state and laid the groundwork for her son, Husayn, who came to power in 1952 and is still on the throne.

Relations between Jordan and Iraq have passed through periods of intense disputes, whose nature was determined by the character of both regimes. These conflicts sometimes reached the point where the two regimes threatened one another with war and violent acts. Other times, the two regimes unified their countries, as happened in 1957 when preparations were being made for the unification of Egypt and Syria in 1958. And then, suddenly, the two Hashemite kings who were cousins, Faysal and Husayn, established a Hashemite union between Iraq and Jordan that preceded the establishment of the United Arab Republic.

While the monarchical political system in Jordan has stabilized under the rule of one man for 43 years, Iraq has witnessed since the fall of the monarchy a number of rulers beginning with 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, who was followed by 'Abd al-Salaam 'Arif, then 'Abd al-Rahman 'Arif, then Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and, finally, by Saddam Husayn, who became the sole ruler of Iraq in 1980.

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So as not to be drawn foolishly and naively into political speculation, we know that a pluralistic Iraq will require more than good intentions. It will have to be imposed by force. This by itself will mean taking a great risk.

What made the departure of Husayn Kamil Hasan from the lion's den of his president and the father of his wife, Saddam Husayn, important is that it gives hope to some that it might be possible to implement a program of pluralism with the help of those who support the idea. The only way out for Saddam and his group is to undertake a program of mutual reconciliation. By doing this they would leave the present situation behind and move to a temporary transitional phase that would prepare their country for a government that would respect the rights of all. During the reign of that government, the continuous massacres would stop; the country's military machine would stop being used against the neighboring states; and the security apparatus that has been used continuously since 1958 to sow terror and conduct the largest purges we have known in the history of our region would cease doing such things.

Leaving a known for an unknown regime involves taking a risk. After having tried various types of governments that have mistreated them, the Iraqis will have to take that risk one more time.

Perhaps the next government will be like the present one or worse. The way to safeguard against this would be to have a transitional government bound by external pledges that it would abandon the logic of vengeance and turn toward an era of coexistence that its predecessors failed to achieve. Husayn Kamil is not the proposed leader. However, the idea of participating in reforming the deteriorating situation of today qualifies him and others for such participation.

King Husayn's Role, Future of Iraq Discussed

95LH0277A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 1 Sep 95 p 27

[Article by Sami al-Hajj: "King Husayn Declares Start of War To Topple Baghdad's Regime; Lack of Internal Alternative Revives Possibilities of Hashemite Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] King Husayn has severed the last bridges of political contact with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and has kept all his bridges with the Iraqi people open. On the other hand, the king has asserted that he will not boycott Iraq economically and will not shut, in the Iraqi people's face, their only window to the outside world and the only lung through which they continue to breathe under the umbrella of the stifling economic blockade which has been imposed on their country for nearly five years.

The Iraqi monarch, who is tied to Iraq and the Iraqis by blood ties, neighborly relations, and a historical partnership, seemed to be deeply emotional while delivering his televised address, whose words he had chosen with extreme care, first to the Jordanian people and second to the Iraqi people and to other peoples of the world, not to mention these peoples' leaders. In his address, the monarch said something to the effect that the war to topple the Iraqi regime has started, that this regime must be replaced, and that he will stand with the Iraqi people until their long night ends with the death of this regime.

This royal Jordanian position was not a surprise. It has been expected and anticipated in the wake of the developments which followed the defection of General Husayn Kamil, the Iraqi president's son in law, and his colleagues to the sanctuary of the king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan out of fear for their lives. But the announcement of this position the way it has been announced can be considered a declaration of an international and regional war to topple the Iraqi president and his regime. It is also tantamount to royal approval of the wish of the United States to make Jordan the base from which this war is launched. Furthermore, it is tantamount to consent to the immense subsequent consequences emanating to Jordan and to its monarch during and after the war, not to mention the dangers this position entails.

It is not essential or expected that this war will be waged with military means, but it is certain that it will be a harsh psychological-political war. This war may be short or protracted, but it will make Jordan the center leading the battles against the Iraqi regime and its president, who has a historical record abounding with ferocity in his defense of himself and of his survival in power. Nobody expects him to give up this power willingly or under the impact of a political isolation which will get even tighter now that the Jordanian monarch has chosen to join the broad regional and international camp which has been seeking to topple the Iraqi president for a long time. The monarch has taken advantage of the cracks developing within the family group controlling power in Baghdad to boost this endeavor and to put removal of the Iraqi president at the top of his priorities.

The position chosen by King Husayn for Jordan as the center of the offensive to bring about the required change and to oust Saddam Husayn and his regime is countered by another position that puts Jordan in the lead among those who will have the final say in defining the character and form of the regime which

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will succeed the current Iraqi regime. It also puts Jordan in the lead among those who will have the final say in appointing the replacement that will fill the likely leadership position and will occupy Baghdad's top leadership seat, which is occupied currently by the Iraqi president .

In addition to declaring the start of the war against the regime, the Hashemite king's position has also announced the start of the search for the alternative to the Iraqi president himself in the near-total absence of such an alternative on the political map both inside and outside Iraq and in light of the diminishing chances of (civilian) General Husayn Kamil and of his faded image in Washington and in other western capitals and Arab capitals, even though King Husayn has tried to restore some of these chances to him, presenting General Kamil to the world as courageous, convincing, and... his nephew.

It is evident that if the war to topple the Iraqi regime will be hard, then finding an alternative to Saddam Husayn will also be hard in light of the objective circumstances and international specifications that are supposed to be met by this alternative. These specifications cannot be found in any of the prominent or active political figures within the Iraqi opposition, whether represented by the Unified Iraqi National Congress, which is divided upon itself; or in the Constitutional Royal Grouping which demands a monarchy in Baghdad and projects its leader, al-Sharif 'Ali Ibn Husayn, as the heir to the Hashemite throne that was toppled by the 1958 revolution in the well-known bloody manner when the union between the two Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan was still new.

Among the conditions agreed to by the parties to the broad camp formed of Arabs and non-Arabs and working currently to topple the Iraqi regime is that the regime that succeeds this one must be democratic, pluralistic, and peaceable. It must also have no ambitions or aspirations beyond Iraq's borders, must respect covenants and accords, and must acknowledge the new political realities and old geographic conditions in the Gulf region primarily and in the entire Middle East ultimately. It must inspire confidence, must have the ability to restore Iraq's unity, must stabilize the country's domestic conditions, must be compatible with the general climate in the region, reflected in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and must be prepared to join this process like the other Arab countries.

The specifications required in the likely alternative to the current Iraqi president is that he must have the broadest popular base; must be acceptable to all Iraqi factions, must have the necessary esteem to sit at the top of the regime and to maintain its unity and the country's unity, and must not be involved in the crimes committed by Saddam Husayn and his regime against the Iraqi people and against Arab and non-Arab neighbors.

Eagerness for stable domestic Iraqi conditions in the post-Saddam era constitutes a red line. All those who wish to get rid of the ruling regime in Baghdad are keen not to cross this line, especially the Arab states adjacent to Iraq and those far from it. This keenness has been behind the fact that in the past five years these states have refrained from joining just any scheme or plan to topple the conditions existing in Baghdad. They have favored keeping the status quo—until what is foreordained by God comes to pass—to any leap into the unknown because the harm of such a leap will not be confined to Iraq alone but will extend to their own lands.

The Hashemite king and Jordan have led those who have refrained and who have said that firing the signal to start the war of change in Iraq must be preceded by preparation of the alternative. This alternative must, moreover, be agreed upon and he must be readied so he will be prepared to take control of the reins when the hour comes.

Has the time come?

Is the alternative ready?

It is not easy to answer these two questions decisively, even though logic leads one to conclude that King Husayn has such a long and successful political experience and he is so broadly informed with the facts and secrets and so capable of determining the direction of the wind that he is qualified to take the proper position at the right time and not to leap into the unknown. In light of the international, Arab, and Iraqi circumstances that have engulfed the king's latest position—which is clear and decisive—toward Saddam Husayn and his regime, it is certain that he has two decisive answers to the two aforementioned questions.

So, does the Hashemite monarch also have a decisive answer to the question: Who is this alternative?

It is likely that the answer is yes.

Whether this alternative is Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil himself, even though his chances seem to be very poor, or another Iraqi figure from inside or outside the country, what is certain is that the path to Baghdad definitely goes through Amman.

This is a legitimate and natural right. Moreover, it is a right accepted by the allies waging this second "desert storm" with King Husayn.

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Between Saddam Husayn and King Husayn

Iraqi-Jordanian relations during the era of Saddam Husayn witnessed years of strange-tasting honey for both countries. The honey had a bitter taste for the Iraqis as a people and for their institutions. Iraq is the wealthiest country in the world in terms of water, oil, date palms, fertile land and people who are vibrant because of their culture, work, generosity ['ata], fighting spirit [qital], literature, poetry and recitation [qira'a (of the Quran)]. The honey had a sweet taste for Jordan, even though it is a yellow island in an arid desert surrounded by unending threats from within, without and across its borders...

The first Gulf war against Iran, that began a few months after Saddam came to power as the sole ruler in Baghdad, was a good omen for Jordan and its regime. Jordan was the main beneficiary of that war, during which the country witnessed unnatural progress in its economy, culture, and services sector. That progress coincided with Lebanon's declining role [in regional affairs] during the civil war and the economic blockade imposed on Syria.

Jordan was the point of entry through which Iraq imported its huge needs during the war. Jordanian and Arab trucks traveled the Amman-Baghdad road as intensively as regular taxis traveled the streets of Baghdad during the same period.

It is said—and the secrets in this regard have not yet been made public—that King Husayn was one of the first to encourage Saddam Husayn to go to war against Iran. Perhaps the reasons for this became known after the war.

King Husayn was likewise the first to encourage Saddam to invade Kuwait on 2 August 1995. Perhaps the reasons for this also became known.

These years of honey made King Husayn an honored guest in Iraq, so much so that, out of respect for him, Saddam undertook a reconsideration of the Hashemite royal family, the uncles and cousins of King Husayn. Saddam, together with King Husayn, visited the royal cemetery and laid a garland of roses on the tomb of Faysal, the last Hashemite king of Iraq. He returned the possessions of the royal family to its remaining members who are now moving back and forth between Jordan, Britain, and the United States. He offered to turn over the royal palace to any one of them who wished to return to Baghdad.

One of the curious features of these years of honey was that they witnessed a new reconsideration of the idea of unifying Iraq and Jordan, but with a change of name from the Hashemite to the Arab Union.

The Arab Cooperation Council

This, however, was not entirely unusual and was partially realized when the two parties established the Arab Cooperation Council, which both Egypt and Yemen joined. It was clear that this idea was entirely the brainchild of King Husayn and a Jordanian invention designed to satisfy the conceit and ambitions of Saddam Husayn after finishing his war with Iran stronger and more vigorous than he was before. On the other hand, a Jordanian-Egyptian letter was sent to the Gulf states asking for more aid. Another letter was sent to Syria because she rejected the logic and basis of the Iraq-Iran war on the grounds that it led to the shedding of Muslim blood and because she called for reviving the logic of confronting the Zionist enemy and no one else.

Next, the Invasion of Kuwait

Here we must talk about King Husayn's role—and not, as some imagine, April Glaspie's—in encouraging Saddam Husayn to invade Kuwait. King Husayn's influence on Saddam was much greater than that of a mere female ambassador who barely knew a few words of Arabic.

Logic dictates that if America wanted to embroil Saddam in Kuwait to the extent that he became involved there in order to eliminate to the role Iraq played in regional affairs [dawr], its enormous capabilities, its youth, and ambitions, it is preposterous to think that America would have done this through a female ambassador. It is logical, therefore, that America, who was thoroughly familiar with the details of the years of honey between King Husayn and Saddam, would have done this through King Husayn. Perhaps America herself devised part of the scenario of the years of honey between the two states, including the first war and even more the second!

The king of Jordan also wanted to embroil Iraq so that it would not direct its ambitions after the war—in which it considered itself the victor—towards Jordan and eliminate that state as an independent political entity. He did this because of the growing political movements in Jordan that sympathized with Iraq during its war against Iran. The Islamists and Arab nationalists of Jordan sided heart and soul with Iraq, as did the masses of the Jordanian people, its tribes and businessmen who benefited from every tie to Iraq.

Kuwait, of course, and not Palestine.

Through Kuwait, he threatened the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, thereby strengthening his far-reaching political ambitions.

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In order to reach Palestine, he had to take possession of Jordan in a brotherly, if not military, way and eliminate it in both cases.

So let it be Kuwait. Saddam thus fell into the trap that King Husayn set for him. The invasion was followed by the destruction of Iraq, and then by the continuous blockade. The largest beneficiary is always King Husayn of Jordan—the passageway leading to and from Iraq.

Into that trap fell the policy makers and leaders of Iraq, including Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid.

Where is the Danger?

A danger threatens the unity of Iraq in the form of a revived scenario of dividing that land between the Kurdish north, the south subject to Iranian pressures, and the center subject to an Arab ambition led by King Husayn himself.

A danger threatens the capabilities of Iraq in the form of Husayn Kamil telling America and Israel through King Husayn everything they want to know about this Arab land, that will return democratically to the possession of its people and their vital forces however long or short the present regime ultimately lasts.

It was a calamity that Turkey could seize northern Iraq whenever it wanted on the pretext of combating the Kurds. If Turkey previously obtained the explicit or implicit permission of Baghdad to do this, the fact that she has recently stopped asking for permission and started going in and out whenever she wanted is an important indication of Turkey's ability and willingness to violate the sovereignty of this Arab country in this shameless fashion.

Another indication is that, for the first time in Turkey's history and her conflict with the Kurds, Turkey was the one who tried to initiate a reconciliation between the two Kurdish parties fighting for control, money, and influence in occupied northern Iraq: the Kurdistan Democratic Party under the leadership of Mas'ud al-Barzani and the Kurdistan National Party under the leadership of Jalal al-Talabani.

Turkey brought the two of them together in Dublin, the Irish capital, while American guaranteed the implementation of their agreement after the negotiations. A new party known as the Turcomans was inserted into the equation. They form the majority in the oil-rich Governorate of Kirkuk in Iraq.

As part of this settlement, Turkey guarantees the cessation of operations by the Kurdistan Workers Party. Turkey does this by leaving this matter to the Kurds themselves and by guaranteeing direct involvement for herself in the political, geographical, and oil affairs of Iraq. As a reminder, we reiterate that the Turkish press itself has published a document concerning a program submitted by the late president of the Turkish republic, Turgut Ozal. That program decreed that Ankara would take control of the Governorate of Mosul in northern Iraq during the battles between the international coalition forces, under the leadership of America, and Iraq that began on 17 January 1991. As Ozal stated, this would occur as part of the anticipated partition of Iraq.

The Blockade of Syria

While following the steps of this scenario, we cannot ignore the objective of blockading Syria. Syria has known since the beginning that comprehensive nationalist-Islamic-Kurdish cooperation would be needed in order to bring the situation in Iraq under control. Such cooperation would create a popular democratic alternative acceptable to all in place of—but not derived from—the present regime.

Syria's haste to dissociate herself from any future role for Husayn Kamil in the nationalist opposition was an indication of the clarity of her vision. Damascus also does not fail to see that any settlement would be designed by America, Jordan, and Turkey. Syria welcomed the Islamic opposition in the person of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, President of the Supreme Council, so as to pave the way for the announcement of a comprehensive nationalist-Islamic-Kurdish Iraqi front.

Damascus knows that King Husayn has been charged with a large regional role after the peace he made with the Zionist enemy. Together with 'Arafat, he is hurrying to tighten the blockade of Syria and siding with Israel against 'Arafat. The true state of affairs is weighted against the Palestinians. (This is another matter that would require a lengthy explanation.) He is siding with America against Iraq and the Islamic groups that oppose a settlement with the Zionist enemy.

Has King Husayn's role in his game with Husayn Kamil now become clear? Has the standing of Husayn Kamil in this game become known? (tab) The fate of Iraq as a nation and its capabilities has always been and remains more important than the fate of the regime, whatever its fate may have been.

May God protect Iraq and its people from its rulers—and from King Husayn.

[Begin box]

A Danger to the Regime..No, A Danger to Iraq..Certainly

Does the defection of Husayn Kamil constitute a danger to the Iraqi regime? Observers, most of whom come

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from the Iraqi opposition abroad, are unanimous about one thing: There is no danger to the Iraqi regime after the defection of Saddam Husayn's son-in-law. Had there been any hope for a change, Husayn Kamil would have been capable of making it happen by killing the President and his son 'Udayy while he was in Baghdad inside the home of the ruling family. However, as long as he fled to Amman, there was no danger to the regime, even though it was a blow to morale because the defection came from inside the ruling family. What remains is more of a danger to Iraq than to the regime.

How?

Because Husayn Kamil possesses important information that was discussed between himself and the president only. Under the direction of the president, he worked on Iraq's military and industrial secrets that have been hidden from the International Sanctions Committee for the last five years. Those secrets will become the object of bargaining with him. What is significant is that Husayn Kamil in his coming weak state will fall into America's grip and reveal what he knows about these secrets, so that Iraq will pay the price. Even if he did not fall in America's grip he—because his fate will eventually become clear—is a lemon that will be squeezed and then thrown into the trash bin.

Husayn Kamil is too weak to do any damage to the Iraqi regime from Amman, unless Washington and King Husayn could entice Saddam to undertake a new adventure towards Jordan so that, on the one hand, what remains of Iraqi capabilities could be smashed and, on the other, so that the door would be opened to the greatest danger of all: the partitioning of Iraq between the neighboring states. This is one of the objectives of King Husayn...Perhaps. [end box]

Arab Views on Iraq, Various Scenarios Discussed

95LH0279A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 8 Sep 95 p 17

[Article by Sami al-Hajj: "Three Scenarios Projected for Replacement of Baghdad's Current Regime; Arabs Agree on Toppling Iraqi President But Disagree on Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is evident that Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil 'Abd-al-Majid has lost all his glitter and all his chances to be the acceptable and trusted alternative to lead the new Iraqi regime that succeeds the current regime, led by President Saddam Husayn, when this regime is toppled. The search is now underway for the successful overthrow of this regime.

The people concerned don't state this fact publicly. However, this fact can be inferred and concluded when one reads carefully the group of opinions and analyses that have dealt with Husayn Kamil from both personal and political perspectives. All these opinions and analyses agree on excluding his name from the list of likely alternatives to the Iraqi president for numerous reasons, foremost of which is that he is a product of the same regime and that he has not offered enough evidence to persuade those concerned with change in Iraq that he can be the horse that wins the race.

Among the forces working to replace the regime in Iraq, the Americans have been the first to drop the card of the Iraqi president's son in law, who has sought the Jordanian monarch's sanctuary and protection, from their calculations for the post-Saddam phase in Baghdad. The Americans have been followed by Arab and non-Arab members of the camp seeking to overthrow the current government and to change the situation existing in Baghdad. This does not abolish the fact that both Washington and London have expressed their support for the position contained in King Husayn's address, which included some praise for the lieutenant general who has occupied the position of the "number two man" in the current Iraqi Government.

U.S. and British support has been channeled toward backing the Jordanian monarch's position and his plan for change and not toward backing the "civilian" Iraqi lieutenant general who has not convinced Egypt, Syria, or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—the countries which Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah has visited in an effort to coordinate the positions on the situation in Iraq in its entirety—and not on Lt. Gen. Husayn Kamil himself. It also seems that the sultanate of Oman has not been convinced by Kamil either, not before the talks between King Husayn and Sultan Qabus and not after those talks during which the Hashemite king sought to familiarize himself with the Omani sultan's advice and opinion on Jordan's position and all the developments emanating from Husayn Kamil's and his comrades' defection to Amman, including the open dispute between Cairo and Amman.

However, the halted talk about Kamil as a possible alternative to Saddam does not mean that the task of searching for this alternative has also halted. nor does it mean that the political warfare to topple the Iraqi regime—the Jordanian position being tantamount to a declaration of this warfare—has been discarded or toned down. All the U.S. muscle-show activities in Kuwait and Jordan and even Arab contacts, consultations, and meetings, are taking place in the name of this task and as a form of the warfare which, everybody realizes, will not be easy, especially in light of the success the Iraqi regime has demonstrated in containing the painful blow it received with the defection of the president's two sons

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in law. This regime has reorganized its ranks which were shaken and confused in the initial days following this defection.

As we have already said in a previous article, published by AL-HAWADITH last week, the task of agreeing on the alternative to the Iraqi president and his regime, especially agreement on the Arab side, could be more difficult than the task of toppling this president and overthrowing his regime.

We base our opinion on the fact which the United States knows and which it, along with its Arab and western allies, acknowledges. This fact is the absence of a ready alternative, either because such an alternative is actually non-existent or because he is available but there is no agreement on him by the Arab countries directly concerned with the need for change in the existing condition in Iraq, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Each of them has legitimate, justifiable, and understandable interests in current and future Iraqi conditions because they are influenced directly by these conditions, either positively or negatively.

Another fact is the absence of a scenario founded on real information and on realistic ideas about the degree of readiness inside Iraq for the concept of change and of toppling the regime, as well as about the degree of public acceptance of any backing from abroad to accomplish this objective. All the scenarios under discussion are founded on "supposed facts," beginning with the scenario of change through a military coup by the Iraqi Army and ending with the scenario of change through a corrective movement by way of those whom some call the "old guard" among leaders of the Arab Ba'th Party. This party's cadres and institutions form the main base of Saddam's regime, regardless of whatever is said to the contrary in this regard.

Even the scenario inspired by the idea presented by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, who expressed Egypt's willingness to accept President Saddam Husayn as a political refugee in his country, is a scenario based on a hypothetical fact, namely that the man holding the keys of power in Baghdad is prepared to accept the idea of voluntarily ceding this power and handing the keys to others very willingly and gladly just because Egypt is prepared to host him and ensure his safety as a political refugee. This scenario is an impossibility, even though Saddam Husayn tried political asylum in Egypt in the past and remained in Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's sanctuary for three years.

Here are the current developments supporting our opinion and proving its soundness. Arab disagreement over the scenario for change in Iraq, over the nature of the alternative regime, and over all aspects of the form of this regime has surfaced faster than expected. The Jordanian-Egyptian disagreement—which surfaced openly in the wake of the position contained in the address which King Husayn delivered and in which he attacked the Iraqi regime and called for its replacement so the long night of the Iraqi people will end—is part of a broader and hidden Arab disagreement on the Iraq issue. We can sense this disagreement in the caution Syria displays toward the Iraq issue, refraining from expressing its official opinion or disclosing its position on all the current developments connected with Iraq and its regime. This disagreement can also be inferred from the evident reservation which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia displays toward these developments. Both countries agree with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that it is necessary to change the conditions in Iraq, but they disagree with Jordan on the condition that will rise on its debris. In this regard, Syria and Saudi Arabia are like Egypt, whose president was the first to disclose this disagreement and to bring it out to the open when he talked of "political motives" that pushed the Jordanian monarch to confront the Iraqi regime and its president to the extent of declaring war to overthrow them.

Even though President Mubarak has not defined the nature of these motives, people well-informed with the region's history and with the hidden current struggle for power in its capitals can figure out the motives behind the Egyptian stance that opposes the Jordanian position. These motives are embodied in the historical apprehensions and sensitivities that can be evoked in Cairo, Damascus, and other Arab capitals concerned by any possibility of the formation of a political axis whose two parties are Baghdad and Amman. These two capitals tried to form a union when Iraq was a kingdom ruled by King Faysal II, the son of Ghazi I. However, 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim's and 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif's coup did not give them the chance to establish the foundations of their union.

It seems that the evident enthusiasm and the emotional phrases with which King Husayn molded his address to Iraq have awakened in the Egyptian president and in other Arab leaders concerned some of the old apprehensions and sensitivities. Thus, the Egyptian president has objected to the Jordanian "political motives" without defining them. He has offered Iraqi President Saddam Husayn political asylum in Egypt to block the path in the face of what can be called the "Hashemite scenario" for change in Iraq. Nobody is talking of this scenario openly, even though like the other scenarios, it is projected on the basis of the "supposed facts" about which we have talked in this article.

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Whatever the degree of truth about the presence or absence of this scenario, it is certain that the Egyptian-Jordanian disagreement on the Iraq issue is not at all because King Husayn wishes to topple Saddam Husayn and his regime and President Husni Mubarak does not. This also applies to the other Arab leaders neighboring Iraq, in whom King Husayn's address has evoked the same apprehensions it evoked in President Mubarak, even though they agree on the need for change in Iraq. Meanwhile, the regime ruling Iraq is taking advantage of this lost time to restore cohesion to its weakened domestic link and to re-polish its shaken image abroad.

U.S. Dual Containment Policy Seen Changing

95LH0278A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
8 Sep 95 pp 14-17

[Article by 'Isam al-'Ayyash: "Washington Shifts From Containment Scheme to Scenario of Change; Americans Wager on Further Splits Before Baghdad's Regime Is Overthrown"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Amman—"After me, let the deluge come."

This phrase, attributed to King Louis XIV, the sun king, is most applicable to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's condition in the wake of the defection of one-half his family to King Husayn's sanctuary. Foremost among the defectors are Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Husayn's son-in-law, the regime's number two man, the industry minister, and head of the Military Industrialization Authority; Colonel Saddam Kamil al-Majid, Husayn's brother, husband of the Iraqi president's second daughter, Rana, and star of "The Long Days," a movie by Tawfiq Salih, an Egyptian producer. 'Abd-al-Amir Mu'alla, an Iraqi citizen, wrote this movie's scenario in 1979. This colonel, basically a law student at Baghdad University, rose like a meteor in the regime's sky and within the narrow security circles, not because of his capability but because of his similarities with the Iraqi president who wanted his character to be worn by a man who is from outside the "stars" club and who severs any relations with the movies after he plays this role. Thus, the young man arriving from al-'Awjah village, near Tikrit, entered the world of influence. Under the umbrella of Husayn Kamil, Saddam rose in rank, blazing through the various phases of the journey until the night of the great defection—the latest true scene of the "long days." Those who saw Saddam Kamil in the Jordanian capital within the first hours of his defection last August rushed to say that the real Saddam was the man who fled to Amman, not his political twin, the palace guard, and Saddam's second son-in-law. In the moment of great confusion when rumor is mixed with fact and realities with myths and fables, those who saw Saddam Kamil believed that Saddam Husayn had requested political asylum in Amman and decided to join the opposition ranks in order to overthrow the regime in Baghdad!

This biting sarcasm is not, in fact, void of content. Even though it sounds "absurd," it may be concealing within its folds the beginning of the end or the end of the beginning amidst scenarios, expectations, and speculation which, many people believe, can materialize within six to eight months. These people also believe that by the time mid-1996 arrives, the conditions will have unveiled a new Iraqi situation. Those who draw up scenarios and formulate expectations, however, do not venture to state in crystal-clear terms the kind of change, how it will be managed, and how its surprise will be contained so Iraq will not be torn apart and so no factional, sectarian, and ethnic wars will erupt in it. Such wars will provide a ready-made theater for the involvement of regional powers, such as Iran and Turkey. The former has never concealed that it aspires for al-Basrah and its province, where the majority are Shi'ites; the latter has never hidden its aspirations for Kirkuk and its oil resources. This is precisely what the Gulf people, the Americans, and the Jordanians, who have joined in a single front to topple Baghdad's regime, fear. This fear is the first security belt for Saddam Husayn, who has burned his Arab, regional, and international cards and who, with his miscalculations, has closed the Jordanian window—the last window to remain open for him since the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Assessing the defection of Saddam's two sons-in-law, a step that is still a big mystery, many experts believe that Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil's coup against his uncle's regime doesn't seem to be enough to create the required tremor to topple the Ba'thist rule that has existed since 1968. Saddam Husayn, who was the regime's number two man then, actually took over the reins of government from President al-Bakr in 1979. Of course, this breaking away has its psychological, political, security, and strategic ramifications, especially since Husayn Kamil actually became the regime's number two man after Defense Minister General Khayrallah was killed in 1989 in a mysterious military helicopter crash. Kamil has turned into something akin to a plane's black box that records every detail of a flight. His departure in this manner is an indication of the degree of internal disintegration within the regime, of the loss of hope in this regime, and of the closure of all emergency and safety doors in its face. However, Husayn Kamil's defection alone is not enough for the fall of the regime which relies on four mainstays: the army (350,000 elements); the Republican Guard (60,000 elements); the

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Special Security Agency, which is tantamount to secret police and to an army within the army and which is estimated number of 40,000-50,000 elements. Add to this security agencies with octopus-like tentacles. As for the party, it has turned into an enormous heap of hay that will burn with the touch of any small match stick. This is why it cannot be relied upon to defend the regime.

It seems that within the dynamism of collapse and of struggle for survival, the latest act of breaking away from the regime, in which the new sample includes the president's two sons-in-law, is not the first and will not be the last such act. Prominent diplomats and officers have defected, including Major General Wafiq al-Samarra'i, an ex-military intelligence chief. A tribal rebellion took place among clans that have constituted the traditional storehouse from which the regime has gotten the men for its military and security institutions, such as the al-Dulaym and the Jubur tribes. Half brothers, such as former Interior Minister Watban al-Hasan, and cousins, such as former Defense Minister 'Ali Hasan al-Majid, have been dismissed. It is not likely that the fissure will stop at this point. Perhaps the Americans are wagering on further fissures in order to create a favorable background for change on the basis that the collapse in the regime's internal chambers could not occur at this pace and with such reverberations if it were not for the "dual containment" (Iraq and Iran) policy which has entered an advanced stage of implementation. Martin Indyk, Clinton's special aide and the Near East and South Asia director at the National Security Council, defined the givens of this principle recently in a report he delivered to the general annual assembly of Washington's Near East Policy Institute. Indyk was director of this institute until he was selected to become national security adviser in the Clinton administration. Experts believe that the U.S. amassment in Kuwait and Jordan and the joint military exercises with these two countries are directed as much at Tehran's Islamic regime as they are at Saddam's regime. At a time when Baghdad is busy trying to curtail its losses after the fall of a part of its regime, the Iranian capital has held operational and combat exercises in Ghaylan District, which is adjacent to the border with Iraq. Iran's rulers have answered challenge with challenge, even though they are included in the U.S. containment policy which calls for curtailing their negative role in the region's peace-building process. It also calls for blocking the path in the face of revolution exportation and of the financing of radical fundamentalist movements. It calls, moreover, for uprooting any Iranian capability to pose a threat to the Gulf's security and obstructing the delivery of nuclear weapons technology to Tehran.

Evaluating these objectives, Indyk has said, "Baghdad's and Tehran's regimes are hostile to the U.S. interests in the region. Therefore, we don't agree that we need to continue to play an old game embodied in maintaining a balance between Baghdad and Tehran, i.e. strengthening one to counter the other. This tendency is rejected, not just because Iraq's invasion of Kuwait proved the bankruptcy of this theory but also because we have an accurate assessment of the hostility both regimes harbor for the United States, its allies, and its friends in the region..."

It is noticed that Washington stops at this containment level in connection with Iran. However, the situation is different with Baghdad. In Baghdad's case, the containment principle has been replaced by the principle of harassing and changing the regime. This constitutes an advanced phase in a conflict for which Washington has mobilized new alliances, including Jordan as an immediate and main party in this "project."

This is why it is necessary to be familiar with the U.S. qualitative transformation from containment force to a force for change. This requires that one return to Indyk who has said in his important report, "Our policy seeks to prevent Saddam's regime from posing a threat to his neighbors again." He added, "We seek to impose submission and obedience on any regime in Baghdad. We will not be satisfied with the overthrow of Saddam to have the sanctions against Iraq lifted. Rather, we want to be convinced that any government that succeeds Saddam will completely adhere to implementation of the UN resolutions." Indyk asserted that the "U.S. Administration refuses to conclude any truce with Saddam's regime. We will work to prove that it is a criminal regime that stands out of the international community's fold."

According to this very decisive formula and based on it, successive containment steps have been taken firmly against the Iraqi regime. The process of destroying strategic chemical, nuclear, ballistic, and germ weapons has continued. Lieutenant General Husayn Kamil's defection has proven that Baghdad has misled the UN inspection teams and has concealed tons of biological materials it has produced in the form of bombs to be dropped by aircraft and in the form of missile heads. The exposure of this deception has given Washington an additional pretext to prolong the sanctions, to declare that Baghdad's regime has lost its credibility finally, and that there is no room for dealing with this regime any longer, unless to topple it.

The second form of the containment policy has been embodied in the sanctions that have been maintained as a means to topple the regime, but after five years of these

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sanctions, the regime has not collapsed, even though great damage has been inflicted on the Iraqi people who, in fact, are caught between the U.S. rock and Saddam's hard place. Because of the blockade's inefficient impact on the regime, a move was made to a more advanced phase through internal acts of infiltration. This is why British and Arab reports have said that Husayn Kamil Hasan's defection could be the first in a chain of future acts of infiltration, especially of the ranks of high-ranking officers. Six months are needed to complete the contours of the collapse from within according to the U.S. scenario discussed most widely in the western lobbies. Some parts of this scenario have been mentioned in a report drafted by the U.S. Rand Organization under the auspices of the U.S. National Defense Research Institute. The report underlines a central role for the Iraqi National Congress [INC] as a democratic alternative to the existing regime, provided that the INC adheres to "Iraq's territorial integrity and observes international charters and obligations." However, the said report adds that the opposition abroad does not intrinsically possess capabilities that make it eligible to seize power or to stage a military coup. Moreover, this opposition is experiencing sharp conflicts within itself and is in a constant movement of disagreements and coalitions. The report finds it likely that Saddam will be destroyed by a close associate. Here too, this possibility shows a flow that makes it hypothetical and inaccessible, especially since Saddam's close associates are partners who share the same fate with him. If he goes, the ship, along with its entire cargo of family and relatives, will sink. This is why the "fatal bullet" has not been fired to date, not by Husayn Kamil Hasan nor by his brother, who was one of the palace guards, i.e. in a position that qualified him to fire such a bullet. Iraqi citizens in London and Amman say that had Husayn Kamil dared liquidate his uncle, he would not have departed Baghdad alive. These words are reasonable and are justified by the fact that neither the son-in-law nor his brother took the step to liquidate their father-in-law. When asked about this aspect at his press conference, Husayn Kamil said that he was within the family and the regime, that he did not wish to betray them, and that he then decided to break away from them.

In any case, the "Iraqi film review" continues now, with silent events at times and talking event at others and amidst a growing conviction that the alternative can only come from the army initially and, according to the Saddamist formula, without Saddam so the country's unity will not be shattered and so various factions will not divide the country among themselves because such division will not flow into the channel of regional security and stability.

The U.S. report which projects the scenario for change in Baghdad notes that "Saddam's family and clan will not be able to greatly change the regime's oppressive character because they are tied to past blood." This scenario considers an army role one of the influential factors in the expected move "because removing Saddam's clan and, perhaps, ousting the Ba'th Party from power are impossible without the military establishment. There will be a transitional period between Saddam's departure from power and another official's takeover of the rudder. This period will be sensitive and delicate because conditions have to be kept under control. Here, one must expect a period of instability and uncertainty, and only the army will be able to fill the void."

The U.S. report backtracks to the phases following the end of the Hashemite monarchic rule of Iraq in 1958 and the roles that the army has played. It is noticed that as an establishment, the army cannot respect what the Ba'thist leadership, embodied in Saddam Husayn's person, has done in recent decades. Moreover, the army cannot be proud of Saddam's military command in two devastating wars, during which this establishment's commanders were dismissed. Even Saddam has been viewing his military establishment as a threat "to the regime's security."

While the report acknowledges that it is difficult to specifically define the identity and aspirations of Iraq's next leader, it acknowledges that the ruling Sunni elite is the party most eligible to maintain power and to preserve Iraq's unity. It is difficult to persuade this elite to make concessions in the interest of complete self-rule for the Kurds or to agree to a number of federal arrangements. It is also difficult to imagine that the army is prepared to become the nucleus for a more liberal regime.

However, this is not the only scenario in town, even though successive events have justified a main part of its expectations. Numerous U.S. scenarios have surfaced recently. The common denominator among them could be King Husayn's role. This is why the king has moved toward rapprochement with the Gulf states and toward reassuring these states under the umbrella of a U.S.-British conviction that change has come to dictate itself, whether by a movement from within or by voluntary departure. The alternative is a "second Saddam" who holds Iraq together. During the change process and in case an internal explosion erupts, King Husayn's help will be enlisted to control the conditions through Jordanian-international-Arab forces.

Therefore, the current U.S. movements are precautionary and protective movements for the change and post-change phase. Jordanian forces, along with U.S. forces,

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could be the "spearhead" for going into the central area and the south. If the situation collapses, there is also fear of a Kurdish invasion of the oil areas in Kirkuk and an Iranian invasion, either direct or through the opposition Badr Forces, of the south and all the way to al-Najaf and Karbala'. Washington and the Gulf capitals fear the possibilities of involvement by Iranian forces in wake of the recent Iranian troop amassment in Ahvaz and Abadan and along the axis facing al-Basrah. These fears have dictated coordination to prepare joint U.S.-Arab forces under a UN umbrella to block the path in the face of any Iranian, Kurdish, or Turkish intervention and to prevent a Kurdish invasion of the oil areas.

In these moments, which could be a turning point, monarchic memories are revived. In this regard, Sharif 'Ali Ibn al-Husayn, the claimant to Iraq's throne who demands the restoration of monarchy and who has been living in exile for 27 years, has said, "In light of the climate of confusion and conspiracy existing inside Saddam Husayn's regime and of Husayn Kamil's defection to Jordan, constitutional monarchy is the alternative to the deteriorating current conditions. The monarchic regime is the umbrella that will rally all factions behind it. It will be tantamount to a symbol." Al-Husayn pointed out that the matter will be ultimately up to the people and that "therefore, it is necessary to conduct a free referendum in which the Iraqi people determine the type of government they want." It is attributed to al-Husayn that he has said that Iraqis from all political factions have asked him to nominate himself to lead the monarchic movement, considering that he is the most deserving of Iraq's throne, in case the Iraqi people agree to it.

As to the reports that King Husayn has claimed "Iraq's throne," al-Sharif 'Ali Ibn al-Husayn said that this question should be addressed to the Jordanian monarch specifically, especially since he has not announced such a claim on any occasion from the time the Iraqi monarchy fell 37 years ago (in 1958). Al-Sharif said, "King Husayn is Jordan's monarch. The Iraqi people must select the head of their state, who must be an Iraqi." In an address he delivered on 23 August 1995, King Husayn intimated that he had no ambitions in Iraq. He said, "I am eager to assert to everybody, and may God be witness to my words, that I have no aspiration and no ambition other than to see an imminent day in which Iraq emerges from its gloomy darkness." He added, "I say this so nobody will think that I am perhaps looking for the place where the martyrdom date of the companion of my youth, Faysal II—the son of Ghazi Faysal Bin al-Husayn—is inscribed. I was his deputy and his successor to the presidency of the Arab Union which combined the two countries." By this, Jordan's monarch means the Iraqi-Jordanian Hashemite Union which was formed in 1958 to counter the United Arab Republic. That union was tantamount to a fragile federation that was quickly toppled by the developments.

However, there are numerous questions regarding the Jordanian role in this phase. The "ready-made" answers are connected with calculations for reconciliation with the Gulf. The early signs of reconciliation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have begun, and they may not be long in coming where Kuwait is concerned. But is Jordan, even if it establishes the highest levels of coordination with the Americans, eligible or capable of playing the role of the "base" for making the change in Baghdad?

AL-HAWADITH has addressed this question to a number of experts on the Iraqi issue in Amman, London, and Washington. Some of them have said that Jordan is straddling the fence and that there are Iraqi, Gulf, and U.S. considerations that have to be reconciled on the basis of the regime's priorities and interests, of the ordinary citizen's mood, and of the spontaneous popular sympathy for Baghdad. King Husayn has spoken of the "imminent emergence of a new era in Iraq, where it is time to make a change toward the better." This is something in which Amman cannot but play a role because "it cannot aspire to establish human rights in Jordan and remain silent on human rights violations in Iraq."

These words need no deciphering. They directly mean that Jordan is a base or a launching pad for a likely change in Baghdad. Husayn Kamil's dissension is the first step in this change because "it is a significant development for Iraq and for the entire region." But the speech made by Jordanian Prime Minister al-Sharif Zayd Bin Shakir is totally different. He does not accept in any way that Jordan become a base for Husayn Kamil to topple Saddam or to "harm Iraq's interest," as he put it verbatim. He added that Amman "does not approve of foreign intervention in Arab affairs in any shape or form."

There is no doubt that there is a great transformation in the relations between Amman and Baghdad. These relations touched the ceiling of complete alliance in some phases, beginning in 1980 when King Husayn worked to bolster the Iraqi barrier confronting the tide released by the change in Iran. He spoke of Iraq as the Arab world's eastern gate, repeatedly inspected the long Iraqi front lines, and familiarized himself on the spot with the field developments. The Jordanian monarch also played a role in piercing the blockade that surrounded Egypt in wake of the Camp David accords.

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It isn't unlikely that the Jordanian monarch had measured his new steps toward the Iraqi president. He reads wind direction well and knows how to select the right time. All these are elements of a successful decision. It is difficult for the Jordanian monarch to sympathize with a decision in which he does not find adequate guarantees. This is why he insists on an alternative that ensures Iraq's unity and stability, thus preventing the Balkanization of Iraq and its breakup into three states. In this, Amman agrees with the United States and the Gulf capitals on the need to prevent the eruption of Iraq into sectarian mini-states, which would open the door for Tehran to become a partner in ruling Iraq. This is why Husayn Kamil Hasan's defection goes beyond the man and the documents which he is said to have had in his suitcases upon his arrival in Amman. This defection is connected with the change in Baghdad which must go through the Jordanian bridge and not through any other bridge at which the opposition is waiting, be it in Tehran or in Irbil, the capital of Kurdistan's self-rule administration. Even Washington needs this Jordanian bridge, if it wants its scenarios and plans to be meaningful and successful. There are those who say that Jordan has begun to play a prominent regional role under the umbrella of the warm peace with Israel. This means that Husayn Kamil Hasan will remain in Jordan. If he leaves it for another capital, then it will mean that the "concoction" is not ready yet and needs more fuel. This could be the more likely scenario, in light of what Rolf Ekeus, head of the UN commission assigned to eliminate Iraqi mass destruction weapons, said after his visit to Baghdad and his meeting with the absconding son in law in Amman. His statement is tantamount to a "testimony" which flows in the same direction that seeks change according to a timing that has not been determined to date.

Those in the know say that there are three lists: a golden list, a black list, and a waiting list.

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